Special Report
Kashmir ka sawaal
Report of the Istanbul media retreat
on the question of Kashmir
Panos South Asia organised a ‘media retreat’
in Istanbul on 2-3 December 2005 to discuss critical issues
related to solving the Kashmir problem. The meeting was attended
by seniormost Indian and Pakistani ‘media gatekeepers’
and a panel from India- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir
— Sardar Qayoom Khan, former prime minister of Azad
Kashmir, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Chairman of the Srinagar-based
Hurriyat Conference, and Ved Bhasin, chair of Kashmir Times
of Jammu.
The media persons participating were, from
India: N Ram, editor-in-chief of The Hindu; Shashi Shekhar
Gupta, group editor of Amar Ujala; Uday Shankar, CEO and editor
of Star News; and Om Thanvi, editor of Jansatta. From Pakistan:
Hameed Haroon, publisher of Dawn; Talat Hussain, director
of Aaj television; Rehana Hakim, editor of Newsline; Mujibur
Rehman Shami, editor of Daily Pakistan; and Mehmood Shaam,
editor of Jang. Also participating were Panos South Asia Executive
Director A S Panneerselvan and Himal Southasian editor Kanak
Mani Dixit, moderator of the Panos India-Pakistan media retreats
since the beginning.
The Istanbul media retreat followed on three
earlier meetings between Indian and Pakistani journalists
on the following topics: the India-Pakistan ‘composite
dialogue’ (Bentota, Sri Lanka, September 2004), the
nuclear weaponisation of Southasia (Bellagio, Italy, July
2003), and conflict and the India-Pakistan media (Nagarkot,
Nepal, May 2002).
Himal presents here an edited summary of the
discussions held in Istanbul as well as selected statements
by participants. The transcribing was done by Assistant Editor
Prashant Jha. Himal’s reports on previous India-Pakistan
media retreats are available at: www.himalmag.com/India-Pakistan.
Articles
on Kashmir in Himal Southasian
The
politics of violence
All photographs: Sahar Ali
|
| Mujibur Rehman Shami (Daily Pakistan)
and Uday Shankar (Star News) |
Moderator: In this session, let us try to look
at how perceptions of violence, which has been the continuous
motif accompanying Kashmir for so many years, difer among
the participants here.
Om Thanvi: Violence is a real problem and needs
to be condemned — be it in Kashmir or in Nepal. When
we – the intellectuals, writers or politicians –
discuss such issues, there is often a tendency to justify
or ignore violence. We must recognise that violence cannot
be a part of any political process based on talks and dialogue.
Not condemning violence unequivocally is a dangerous approach
to adopt.
Uday Shankar: The only association that the
rest of India has with Kashmir is that of violence. Kashmir
registers on the Indian consciousness only if there is a violent
side to it. If the peace process is to be pushed ahead, we
have to pay attention to this perception. Kashmir is beginning
to fall off the national consciousness of young Indians who
tend to see it as a problem and little else. In any newsroom
today, the standard response to a Kashmir story is whether
there is a violence angle to it – the number of casualties,
whether any big personality was involved.
What I am saying is that It has suited the
Indian leadership to convey that Kashmir is a problem of violence.
The responses that have come from across the border have reinforced
this perception. The perception is not rootless either, there
has been a lot of violence in India because of Kashmir.
Sardar Qayoom Khan: While we believe that
violence must end, it must be recognised that violence in
Kashmir has emerged out of a long historical process. It is
also true that violence in Kashmir – whether we call
it freedom movement, jehadi struggle – has been a major
reason for world attention. Earlier political efforts did
not succeed in doing this. If there is a roadmap for the process
ahead and people feel their aspirations can be fulfilled by
peaceful means, the violence will automatically subside –
nobody wants to commit suicide. Unless people see a way out
of the deadlock, this criminal bloodshed and violence will
continue. President Musharraf has made desperate efforts to
control Pakistan-based militancy but the other side needs
to reciprocate now.
We should also not ignore the fact that, in
the past decade, there has been an influx of non-Kashmiris
into the movement, who are neither under Pakistan’s
control nor the local militant groups. They may continue,
they may run away – everyone should not be treated alike.
There is a fence on the Line of Control, 16
feet high, with steel wire and electrified parts. 800,000
troops guard it on both sides. If someone succeeds in crossing
that fence, then he deserves an international gallantry award.
But there are people in the state already in significant numbers
with a generation-long commitment to the movement. They need
to be dealt with sensitively and I believe a roadmap could
help reduce the violence.
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq: Violence is one part
of the problem but it is not the whole problem. I believe
there is lack of information about Kashmir among the Indian
people and it is important to inform them about the actual
situation. Violence in Kashmir must also be related to the
politics of the region. Vested groups have been created in
Kashmir, which are working for their own interests –
both on the militant and military side. Their interest lies
in the violence continuing. One way to reduce the violence
is by taking the indigenous groups on board. The government
of India needs to take the initiative in this regard. We went
to Azad Kashmir earlier this year and met Kashmiris who are
involved in militancy. They are willing to talk, but need
to be provided with some incentive.
N Ram: I don’t think it is smart politics
for the government to raise the stakes in this way and link
anything Kashmir-related that happens in Kashmir or outside
with cross-border infiltration, terrorism, and what Gen Musharraf
has failed to do. They may think that it puts pressure on
the other side but it distorts the situation.
The decline in violence since June 2002 has
been real. It appears that Gen Musharraf has at least part
delivered on his 2002 promise to end cross-border terrorism.
But at the same time, the violence is also real. The same
people who romanticise the Kashmir quest for a solution try
to underplay the political influence and role of these groups.
The Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are major players,
eclipsing the role of the Hurriyat and others. This is a real
problem.
It is said that the roots of violence lie in
the oppression of the people of Kashmir, the denial of justice,
the atrocities and human rights violations that take place.
No question about that. Some horrible things have happened
in J & K. But I do not see any organic link between those
root causes and the fact that Lashkar and Jaish are at large
in Kashmir and in other parts of India, and free to strike
the way they do. You need to get them on board and put it
in the same basket as other grievances. Otherwise, I do not
think politically it is realistic or sound.
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq: One
cannot deny that some groups are working in Kashmir independently.
Gen Musharraf gave us a commitment in Amsterdam in 2004 that
Pakistan is willing to address the issue of violence as far
as India is concerned. We have started taking measures to
address those concerns as well. But it is important to recognise
that Jaish and Lashkar are in a position to work because they
enjoy public support to some extent. Once there is a genuine
movement for the people of Kashmir to see and realise, I am
sure that the support to these organisations will automatically
diminish. There are still people who believe that violence
is the only means to compel India to come on to the negotiating
table.
Ved Bhasin: The violence is no doubt there, but it is not
the only problem. In fact, it is not the predominant problem.
Violence has in fact come down during the past two-three years.
Uday Shankar: It is a very
big problem for the rest of the country.
Ved Bhasin: The Indian state
has fed the public with many lies, emphasising that only cross-border
terrorism exists in Kashmir and denying that there is also
a popular revolt against the Indian state. Violence undoubtedly
exists but it is not one-sided violence. The Indian security
forces kill innocent people as well. Women are raped, some
by militants but largely by the Indian security forces.
Shashi Shekhar Gupta: The
violence is affecting the Kashmiris more than anyone else,
and it is showing both its facets in Kashmir. Violence begins,
and the state responds with its counter violence. A person
in Kashmir once told me how the militants dress like the military
and how the soldiers grow their beards long. This dual-sided
violence has now begun to eat up Kashmiriyat and once that
happens, your movement will go completely astray and lose
focus. The movement is now being considered a terrorist movement.
Hameed Haroon: The conventional
notion in India is to define terrorism as a weapon to perpetuate
independence. In Pakistan, it is the use of violence as a
weapon by the Indian state forces to perpetuate terrorism.
There are two points regarding violence here, that it serves
to mobilise public support or it serves the purpose of intended
manipulation. I am not looking at the public support theory,
of guerrillas living in an ocean of sympathy from the people,
instead I am looking at the intended manipulation. For example,
the recent bombings in the Valley appear to have been intended
for Ghulam Nabi Azad who had taken over as Chief Minister
a few days earlier. The targets chosen were very strange –why
were the people of the Valley attacked? In Kashmir, like elsewhere,
terrorism becomes the format for what is essentially a crime
and not a political move. I put it to you that trying to change
the government's composition by such actions, if indeed it
was the case, is in fact using terrorism for a power agenda.
The other example is the recent attack at
Lal Chowk. Why would any force, Laskar or any other group
that cares for the Kashmiri people, launch an attack after
the earthquake? I would suggest that to answer this question
and understand the issue of violence in Kashmir, it is also
important to consider other regional developments. For instance,
developments on Pakistan’s western borders – the
US policy, the attempt to woo the soft Taliban, the internal
politics of these outfits, the massacre in Quetta –
all have their implications for Kashmir.
The
minorities of J & K
Moderator: Even though the
question of Kashmir is seen to revolve around the question
of Kashmiri rights, is there not a possibility that other
communities will come forward to demand a fair hearing once
a solution is seen to draw near?
Om Thanvi: While discussing
the Kashmir issue, we tend to forget about Ladakh and its
Buddhist population. They too are an integral part of the
state and must be included in the process that determines
the future.
Shashi Shekhar Gupta: Let
us also remember that a large section of the Kashmiri people
– the Pandits – were sent from Srinagar to Jammu.
When they live in camps in Jammu, the general impression that
emerges is that because Jammu is a Hindu dominated area, they
are safe there, their shops, homes, lives and land are unsafe
otherwise. They are your people who are refugees in your own
land and your state. Something must be done to address this
issue.
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq: We all
agree that the return of Kashmiri Pandits should not be conditional
to the issue of Kashmir being resolved. We have been interacting
with the Pandits at different levels and had invited Pandit
leaders to come to the Valley. The Hurriyat is planning to
go to their camps in Jammu. However, there is an element of
uncertainty.
When we started interaction with the Pandits,
the next day there were threats from unknown organisations
threatening them not to return. We would like to take the
responsibility of their return but are not in a position to
guarantee their safety and security. If something happened
tomorrow, either by design or accident, the whole effort would
collapse. So, there is need for caution.
We also disagree with the state government’s
plan to have separate Hindu colonies in the state, protected
by armed forces and the police. The Pandits also want to live
the way they used to live with their Muslim brethren, as friends
and neighbours.
Ved Bhasin: For the last 150
years, Kashmir has been a united state and for a number of
years, it was an independent entity. It is essential to preserve
the diversity and the pluralistic character of the state.
The shattered trust between the two communities has to be
restored. The return of the Kashmiri Pandits is not possible
without goodwill of the majority community in Kashmir. While
there are efforts in this direction, there is a powerful vested
interest – both in Kashmir and among the Pandits, which
would not like the Pandits to return and live with their Muslim
brethren. Kashmiri Pandits are being used as an excuse to
highlight what is happening in Kashmir, the violence, and
atrocities, and to project the Kashmir movement as a communal,
fundamentalist movement. The plans by the state government
to set up separate clusters for Kashmiri Pandits must be opposed
– if they are to live in separate camps and clusters
then there is no reason for them to go back.
Sardar Qayoom Khan: Let there
be no departure from the fact that that Jammu and Kashmir
state, despite its diversity, is one unit. If I had the authority,
I would give Kashmir’s non-Muslim minorities a blank
cheque to sign on future arrangments. Whatever the political
arrangements, we can live together the way we have for so
long in the past. I fully support the return of the Pandits.
The Pandits have lived in Kashmir like the Muslim community
itself and this is the one spot in the Subcontinent where
there has been no ethnic problem whatsoever. The state will
have to play its role in their return to Kashmir and their
security will have to be assured at the hands of the majority.
And the Pandits, together with the Muslim community, will
have to fight back in some of the cases if security problems
do arise.
The media and
Kashmir
Moderator: It is important
to discuss the role and the attitude of the media in India
and Pakistan vis-a-vis Kashmir. I would like to make a few
suggestions in order to feed the discussion. For one, we should
look at the power of what may be called the ‘language’
or ‘vernacular’ media, Hindi and Urdu and Sindhi,
Punjabi and so on. If it is important to sensitise the larger
mass, which will then understand the political aspects of
the Kashmir issue, is it enough to just consider the English
language press? We should also perhaps examine how the media
in the southern extremities of the two countries is dealing
with Kashmir – is the Sindhi and English press in Karachi
different from Lahore and Islamabad, and how is the Chennai
press different from the New Delhi press? We must also study
the power and impact of television, considering that satellite
television has cross border footprints. Also, if we want to
change attitudes, it may be important to begin with terminology.
I would like to suggest that instead of ‘Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir’ and ‘India Occupied Kashmir’ used
by the opposing sides, it is time to start using ‘India
Administered Kashmir’ and ‘Pakistan Administered
Kashmir’.
Hameed Haroon: For the ethnic
press in Karachi – the evening papers and the popular
papers affiliated to parties – Kashmir was a distant
problem, a Punjabi problem, though it has been a long time
since Punjab ruled Kashmir. It had to do with the violence
and killings but little beyond that. Interestingly, things
have changed in the last 60 days after the earthquake, when
the city of Karachi surpassed all others in providing aid
and skilled personnel. A humanisation of Kashmir has taken
place. The Sindhi press carried this emotion and has been
involved in the earthquake coverage. Sindhi broadcasting has
been covering this as well.
Azad Kashmir has been poorly covered because
of its absurd geographical situation where it takes six-seven
hours for a newspaper to reach. There is no integration mechanism,
most papers do not have a Muzaffarabad edition, and the state
of communication in Muzaffarabad has been poor. For its part,
the Azad Kashmir government has delegated its powers two years
ago to the Pakistan government to regulate their frequencies,
which is why they do not have FM radio today in the true sense,
and lack all other kinds of decentralisation opportunities
in media. Unless the Azad Kashmir government takes that power
back, Kashmir will continue to be deprived of real micro reportage,
which is the essence of any good media anywhere.
Mehmood Shaam: Kashmir is
an emotional as well as religious issue in Pakistan, so a
completely free and independent approach is difficult in such
a context. However, things have changed, particularly after
the 9/11 attacks. People are convinced that only peaceful
negotiations can solve the Kashmir issue and the national
press is supporting the talks with India. At the same time,
there are some newspapers and magazines owned by religious
parties which advocate jehad as the only solution. They accuse
Pakistan of being either over-cautious or too flexible, and
believe India is not moving an inch from its stated position.
Pakistan’s Urdu national press is in
fact discussing the different options in Kashmir – demilitarisation,
self-governance, or the seven regions proposal. There are
debates on whether trade relations with India should be contingent
on the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Before 9/11, these
debates were not possible in the Urdu newspapers. There are
very few papers which support militancy. Sometimes in our
Urdu papers, a speech by the Indian prime minister can make
the lead story. However, we do not find such coverage of Pakistani
leaders, or this kind of support for the peace process in
the Indian newspapers, either English or Hindi.
N Ram: There is considerable
coverage of the détente process and support for it
in the Indian press as well as in television discussions.
However, we cannot say much regarding coverage of Kashmir
in the absence of a proper information base. A small study
did find that the media tends to tail official policy on Kashmir.
But there should be in-depth study of the coverage of Kashmir
by the different streams of the media, to gauge the credibility
of coverage of the human rights situation or of election campaigns.
The press also has to play a more vigorous
investigative role in Kashmir. Is the media in India performing
its educational role – on providing interim solutions,
gauging the mood of the people, and suggesting more enduring
solutions? The commentator A G Noorani and a few others are
doing rigorous analysis that the matter deserves. While the
media cannot claim to set the public agenda, it can surely
participate in building it. Finally, there is the propaganda
role – manufacturing consent for what the Hurriyat see
as unjust, oppressive or failed policies.
Kashmir and its leadership get a lot of news
coverage, even in the south. There is a lot of information
presented, and a lot of images. Kashmir’s very articulate
leaders representing different strands are active with the
press and get adequate coverage. There may be an unfriendly
editorial position, which you have to take in a sporting spirit.
Shashi Shekhar Gupta: In
discussing the role of the media, we must also focus on the
changes within J & K. The dailies Amar Ujala and Dainik
Jagran have editions in the state now and the readership for
Hindi is growing. When we began our own reporting in Kashmir,
instead of terrorism we decided to focus on core issues that
affect daily lives – electricity, education, clean water,
health facilities, transport and so on.
Mujibur Rehman Shami: Since
Kashmir is such an emotional issue, I do not think we can
use the terms ‘India Administered Kashmir’ and
‘Pakistan Administered Kashmir’ in Pakistan. We
can do so only if the governments of both countries agree
to do so as a gesture of goodwill. As far as Pakistan’s
stand is concerned, the whole nation agrees that Kashmir is
occupied by the Indian forces. I suggest that newspaper publishers
and owners and editors in India and Pakistan should prepare
a code of ethics for the coverage of events on each side.
At the moment, you can say that the Pakistani
press is divided, but with only a small section supporting
the jehadi struggle. Most of the newspapers believe in the
peaceful resolution of the Kashmir problem. A few papers suggest
that the problem be settled under the UN resolutions and a
plebiscite be held, but the consensus is that this is not
possible and we should try to find a solution to the satisfaction
of both the countries and of Kashmiris. While historically
the Pakistani press has seen Kashmir as a problem between
India and Pakistan, since 1989, most sections of the press
believe that Kashmiris must be involved in the process of
dialogue.
Talat Hussain: As media persons,
we need to follow very closely the change in the official
idiom and the description of issues. Nowhere in recent documents
is Kashmir described as a dispute. It is an issue. It is not
‘Kashmir ka jhagda’. It is ‘Kashmir ka mamla’.
And in none of his statements made on Indian soil has Gen
Musharraf described occupied Kashmir as ‘occupied Kashmir’.
I guess we are all beholden to our own perception of what
the reality is.
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq: I do
believe that there needs to be new thinking by the media on
the Kashmir issue. The media can perform an educational role
by informing the people of the actual situation in Kashmir.
While Kashmiri leaders might be given publicity in the media,
very few editorials and commentators are suggesting new ideas.
For its part, the Kashmiri leadership does need to have more
interaction with the Urdu and Hindi press.
Talat Hussain: Mirwaiz Sahib,
the reason media does not do bold analysis of Kashmir at this
time is the absence of information. The print and television
media has become highly competitive, and if you want to drive
out negative propaganda you must provide information. Without
it, we are handicapped and the fact is that the main political
players are holding on to information as a closely guarded
secret. All the media can do under the circumstances is present
speculative analysis and ‘bold thinking’ that
has no link to reality.
Ved Bhasin: The media, both
in India and Pakistan, is still a prisoner of the mindset
of 1947. The media has been used by each state to demonise
the other. After 1989, the media has not been able to express
their views and ideas freely because they have either been
under threat from the militant groups or from the state forces,
particularly the latter. When some of the newspapers reported
about human rights violations by the army, they were called
enemies. Many media people have been eliminated, victims of
the security forces and the militants. While the situation
may have changed to some extent, it is still difficult to
write anything that does not serve the interests of the state.
The situation must change, and media persons from the both
countries must be allowed to freely visit both sides of Jammu
and Kashmir.
Hameed Haroon: Seven militants
were shot at and injured a month ago in Srinagar near Lal
Chowk. Now the entire media corps wears crash helmets up there.
Death is a real possibility for many of these journalists.
At the risk of arousing controversy, let me say that militants
know how to get their point across to any journalist if they
want to. There is a real atmosphere of threat from the militants.
Ved Bhasin: A large number
of journalists in Kashmir have been defying the dictates of
both the security forces and the militants and have been working
with independence.
The earthquake and the peace process
Moderator: The October 2005
earthquake was an immense tragedy that visited the people
of Kashmir. Even in tragedy, it provided an opportunity to
push the peace process forward, open the window for Kashmiris
to meet up, and generally usher greater empathy and understanding
among the two state players. Was the tragedy 'utilised' to
accelerate rapprochement? Is there still time to do so? How
has the Indian media covered the plight of Azad Kashmir?
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq: We are
very disappointed. This was definitely an opportunity to let
people of Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control share
their pain and grief. But the Indian and Pakistani governments
were making statements more to score political points than
out of sincerity. It took India ten days to decide on establishing
telephone links between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad, and even
then we were allowed access to make calls only at four points.
The decision to open five checkpoints came too late, and it
came with too many restrictions. A person living in Tanghdhar
has to come 120 km to Srinagar, apply in the passport regional
office, wait for the security clearance, then the IB and CID
clearance, and only then be given permission to cross over.
We saw international agencies assisting in
relief work in Muzaffarabad but India categorically said ‘No’
to all aid agencies and international donors. The Indian Army
did a good job in relief work but please recognise that the
army has always occupied these areas. There is no civil administration.
In fact, at times it looked like it was more a public relations
exercise for the army than a genuine relief effort for the
affected people. All in all, I think there is still time to
do more. Procedures must be simplified for people to move
across the ceasefire line, more people-to-people contact is
essential. In the longer term, we can think of intra-Kashmir
trade and commerce.
Mehmood Shaam, Jang
|
Sardar Qayoom Khan: The efforts
made by the Pakistan government, the people and the international
agencies were good – whatever was humanly possibly was
done. The Indian government, for its part, offered four helicopters
and I believe that Pakistan should have accepted the offer.
There was no security problem involved; this kind of thing
is just baggage from the past. The earthquake did provide
an opportunity to build confidence, but it has been missed.
The procedures involved in trying to move across the LOC are
actually prohibitive – they have allowed something but
do not want it to happen.
Hameed Haroon: Look at the
peculiar nature of the situation. This is territory that India
and the Indian government claim as belonging to them, but
then the Indians did not react with the required protocol.
What is essentially required in Azad Kashmir is helicopter-based
relief. If India and Pakistan had acted with the required
alacrity, lives could have been saved in the upper Neelam
and Jhelum valleys, which are accessible from the Indian side.
Looking to the future, the spate of respiratory diseases,
particularly for children, is going to be immense. The Indian
medical establishment, by a multiple of many, is larger than
the Pakistan establishment. We have seen the results of Bangalore-based
hospital diplomacy. Even the movement forward for a few symbolic
cases will generate a positive momentum. I have strong faith
in Indian civil society – if they are sensitised to
the situation, they will come forward.
Uday Shankar: On the Indian
side of Kashmir, the Indian media was there in full force
and for about two weeks, every television channel I know of
had at least five or six camera units deployed there. However,
in the absence of strong professional linkages with the media
in Pakistan, I think the Indian media did not fully grasp
the scale of the tragedy on the other side. The television
channels did cover the earthquake extensively but still did
not do justice to the enormity of what had happened. There
was also the problem of access, with Indian journalists prevented
from going to the other side. Television and newspapers in
the two countries must build stronger linkages.
Talat Hussain: All of the
linkages were there to understand the scale of the tragedy
in Azad Kashmir, and the Indian government was fully aware.
For instance, the meteorological offices and the seismic centres
were co-ordinating with each other. The reason why the Indian
media did not focus on the issue or understand its significance
is that the Indian government was not interested in taking
it up. The Indian media simply followed that lead. The tragedy
was there but since the mainstream policy parameter was set
in a manner that it was not exactly playing up the tragedy,
the media followed suit.
N Ram: I think it was a great
opportunity missed. This was in contrast to the reaction in
the aftermath of the tsunami, when India rushed in with relief
and assistance to Sri Lanka. We followed the earthquake in
detail but the Indian television channels were handicapped.
I do agree that it is the tardiness and the insensitivity
reflected in the Indian government’s response that set
the terms for this. The government’s response was poor.
There was a response from the media, encouraging the Indian
government to open up, but sometimes the power of the media
is not only over-estimated, it is a myth. Now I do not know
how we can mobilise opinion at this late stage. It did not
happen – people did not feel that they could intervene
and do something in this situation. I don’t think it
will happen now.
Shashi Shekhar Gupta: I would
like to talk about the earthquake within the framework of
the hope it generates, and the dangers it points towards.
In the last five years, only two pictures have been published
in the Indian newspapers in poster size. The first was the
photograph of the re-opening of the bridge that joins Kashmir
with Kashmir. The other was an image from the other side of
Kashmir where some people are getting ready to board a helicopter
after the quake. These images point to the hope – hope
of a connect between the two sides.
But I also see danger in the fact that we could
not see an emotional response of the people in Jammu and Leh
in relation to humanitarian relief required for the earthquake
victims. We must consider the reasons for this, and ask whether
the people of Jammu and Leh have started considering themselves
as the colony of Kashmir, and whether a situation is developing
where they cannot attach their emotions to that of the Valley.
Moderator: Our discussion
has focused on the massive scale of the tragedy on the Azad
Kashmir side and the coverage or the lack of it on the Indian
side. For many reasons, from the weakness of the media entities,
to the lack of access, to poor information across the frontiers,
there was not enough coverage on the Indian side. In turn,
this seems to have failed in pressurising the state to open
up. But while we might have missed the immediate opportunity
of news coverage, we must look ahead to the harder task of
covering the longer-term tragedy through the upcoming winter
and beyond.
Kashmir, the way forward
Moderator: We should perhaps now look to where
the question of Kashmir, the sawaal of Kashmir is headed,
and what the media can and should do about it. Talat Hussain:
I have two questions for the panel – the geographical
compartmentalisation of Kashmiri politics has also led to
the rise of what I call constituency politicians, who owe
their first allegiance to constituencies, which could be religious
or secular or local or anything. How will constituency politics
translate into being a part of the process for a final solution
of the Kashmir problem? How will leaders leave their constituencies
in terms of practical politics, and sit around the table and
develop a vision? What will be the mechanics of internal dialogue
and reconciliation?
The fundamental assumption of the Pakistan
government seems to be that we are not going to get the whole
of Kashmir; that Kashmir is probably not going to get independent.
They seem to believe that the best deal possible could be
self-government, or an upgraded version of self-government
that comes close to self determination, and to see a solution
take shape through the opening of borders and free trade.
But the assumption of the Indian government seems to be that
the Kashmir solution has to be found within the four walls
of the Indian Constitution. If that is the case, how will
the negotiation ever move forward?
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq: We have
been grappling with this issue as well. When we began talking
to Delhi, we were saying that the dialogue should not be held
under any constitution. But my suggestion is let us recognise
that stand as India’s maximalist position. If you are
engaged in serious dialogue, there is bound to be a fallback
position as well. We need to figure out India’s minimal
position. The Indian prime minister has referred to a situation
where Kashmiris don't feel the difference between being in
Srinagar or Muzaffarabad – such a reference is definitely
to open borders and trade. For us however, these are CBMs
and not solutions.
N Ram: May I point out that
the Indian Constitution can be amended quite substantially
to accommodate higher degrees of autonomy. So, by saying ‘within
the constitution’ does not mean being tied in a straitjacket.
A S Panneerselvan: Some issues
have repeatedly been brought out by India and other players
but we have never heard the Kashmiri response to it. When
Inderjit Gupta was the home minister in the H D Deve Gowda
government, he had for the first time talked about reducing
the presence of the Border Security Force and flagged off
the issue of demilitarisation. But then immediately 13 blasts
happened within three days and he could not answer even a
single question in Parliament. Another interesting observation
is that the moment the composite dialogue was conceived as
2+6, Kashmir was accorded an important position. The centrality
of the Kashmir issue has been accepted which means that Delhi
is not suffering from the time warp we try to believe it does.
Additionally, Manmohan Singh ordered withdrawal of troops,
and the first batch withdrawal did happen and then it stopped.
There was also a move away from interaction led by bureaucrat-interlocutors
and towards political leadership. These are some of the positive
trends for which we do not know the Kashmiri reaction.
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq: All
political groups in Kashmir welcomed the announcement of withdrawal
of troops. However, they did use the term ‘redeployment’,
and there was no difference at the ground level. They got
the BSF out and the CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) in.
It was more of posturing than giving concrete relief to the
people. In fact, despite the fact that violence has reduced
in the past few years, in Kashmir sandbag posts are giving
way to bunkers of concrete, brick and cement. The people fear
that irrespective of whether violence goes up or comes down,
the Indian security forces are here to stay. While India may
have accepted the centrality of the Kashmir issue, we see
little other movement in New Delhi on the Kashmir issue. They
are unwilling to give concessions at the ground level.
A S Panneerselvan: One other
key issue is that Kashmir has become the reason for the being
for both India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, having a Muslim
majority province as a part of the country confirms the two-nation
theory and the reason of its birth. For India, retaining its
Muslim majority state confirms its secular credentials. The
way forward, as the Bombay-based advocate A G Noorani has
been emphasising, is to find a solution that should be accepted
in Delhi, Islamabad and Srinagar.
Panos South Asia Exeucutive Director
A S Paneerselvan and moderator Kanak Mani Dixit |
Hameed Haroon: I think the
point about the two-nation theory is no longer relevant. The
two-nation theory died in Pakistan the day Bangladesh became
separate. The theory called for two countries as majority
areas, one for the Muslims of the Subcontinent and one for
the Hindus. That of course is clearly no longer the case.
If anything, Kashmir maybe in line for a four nation theory
because a third nation has already been established and that's
Bangladesh. Both India and Pakistan accept that reality. The
second thing, which is dead in a practical sense, is India's
battle to prove itself secular. India's fears of its secularism
being under threat is also some sort of a bygone in the sense
that the Indian nation is there to stay in whatever form it
decides.
N Ram: There have been suggestions
by the leaders of Kashmir and others that the solution rests
completely with the people of Kashmir. I would suggest let
us not romanticise the quest for an internal solution by Kashmiris
themselves. I fully understand the powerful nature of the
aspirations of the Kashmiris. But let us recognise that independence
for Kashmir is a pipe-dream, as much as independence for Eelam
is a pipe-dream, given the geo-politics of Southasia and all
the other factors involved. It is also important not to romanticise
Kashmiriyat. The issue has to be redefined largely as a democratic
question rather than as a national question.
There are good and constructive tendencies
within the Hurriyat but I see it as largely drifting. It is
your political duty and mandate to think out of the box. The
interim is terribly important but that does not mean that
you need not think hard and precisely about what solution
may fly and what may not. The Hurriyat has a reactive strategy.
There is also a confusion, are you after independence or are
you wanting to remain within this whole process. Let us not
fail to give credit to Vajpayee and Musharraf, and to Manmohan
Singh and all other politicians – they have at least
come up with some creative thinking with their policy-making
establishments behind them. Gen Musharraf’s ruling out
what is unacceptable to both countries took the process forward
quite some way.
Talat Hussain: Both Mirwaiz
Farooq and Sardar Qayoom have emphasised the need to look
at interim measures at this stage and later aspire for a final
solution. What is more likely to happen, however, is that
the ultimate solution is not going to be an out-of-ordinary
solution. It is going to be the outcome of all the confidence
building measures that you put in during the interim. What
you get in terms of CBMs is going to be foretelling you about
the ultimate outcome.
Among the matters that are unacceptable to
either India or Pakistan, we have heard that India has made
it clear that they are not willing to have any negotiation
with Pakistan on Ladakh – behind closed doors or publicly.
For its part, Pakistan has made the Northern Areas an absolute
no-no as far as negotiations with India are concerned. India
is also believed to have excluded Jammu from the agenda. Therefore,
we are essentially talking about the Valley and Azad Kashmir.
There is some confusion about the Poonch area. Pakistan thinks
that is up for negotiations whereas the Indians tend to say
that all of Jammu, including Poonch, are non-negotiables.
Uday Shankar: It is clear
that you cannot have all these discussions under the glare
of public scrutiny. You need to retire to the inner chamber
with the stakeholders. In order to do that, it is important
to let the rest of the two countries move on with their other
concerns so that the stakeholders can sit down and have a
completely emotionless discussion on the various issues. This
can only happen if the issue of violence is addressed.
Mujibur Rehman Shami: We
have spoken about the nature of the possible solutions, but
it is important to focus on evolving a mechanism to reach
a settlement. Historically, the resolution of disputes between
India and Pakistan has been possible only through third-party
intervention. The boundaries of the two countries were drawn
by Radcliffe; the ceasefire of 1948, ‘65, and ‘71
were possible with UN intervention; the Indus Water Treaty
was signed because of the involvement of the World Bank. Since
India is firm on not accepting a third party, we need an arbitrator
or a forum from within. I would therefore suggest that a high-powered
joint committee be set up by the two parliaments. This committee
should include an equal number of members from both countries.
The decision of this committee should be binding. This committee
should, first of al, decide how to involve the Kashmiris in
the process.
N Ram: The idea of a joint
parliamentary committee is new and a welcome suggestion, but
it cannot be binding. It is a forum where the parliamentarians
can meet for serious discussion, however. I think the slogan
of self-determination must find concrete expression in a demand
for maximum autonomy, and we can think about how it can be
shared. This was subverted starting with the Nehruite policies,
and since then every government has failed to deliver on what
was promised in the Indian Constitution – what has happened
is unconstitutional and has occurred through executive interpretations.
There has also been a reneging on promises made during the
last decade. Sovereignty can be internal. In fact, in the
Indian constitutional discourse, it is well recognised that
sovereignty is shared between the centre and the states, so
it is possible to work around this particular problem.
The solution is going to lie in maximum autonomy
and in demilitarisation agreements. We are very concerned
about the military administration of the Indian state of Jammu
and Kashmir. At the same time, I believe the Hurriyat must
think hard about its decision not to contest elections. They
must think about how they relate to the legitimate political
parties, which are mass-based. Twenty four percent may be
what the National Conference gets, the Congress gets a little
less than that and PDP gets 16 percent, these are real numbers.
There is an Election Commission which has done a good job,
relatively speaking, in the recent period. These are real-life
issues, and you can’t live in a world of your own, saying
I will not legitimise the process. Even the LTTE does not
believe in that. It sets up its surrogates to contest elections,
which is why the LTTE is a real force in the Sri Lankan Parliament.
Ved Bhasin: The mainstream
parties in Kashmir are also divided about the future set-up
of Jammu and Kashmir state. The BJP stands for abrogation
of Article 370 in the Constitution and wants erosion of the
state’s autonomy to bring Jammu and Kashmir at par with
other states. At the same time, the BJP and some of the ‘Parivar’
outfits like the RSS and the Jammu Mukti Morcha are also working
for the communal division of the state. I don’t think
the Congress is opposed to a greater degree of autonomy but
they will support only if this is a decision of the central
government. The National Conference is committed to the restoration
of the state’s autonomy to the pre-1953 position. The
PDP is not very clear on this issue but is by and large not
opposed to greater autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir state. They
are also emphasising greater financial autonomy for Jammu
and Kashmir state, whatever that means.
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq • No to LOC, no
to status quo
There is a clear consensus among Kashmiris
that it is time to address the Kashmir problem. At a recent
seminar where I shared the platform with the National Conference
and People’s Democratic Party for the first time, despite
our political differences, we agreed that the Kashmir issue
needs to be resolved with the people of the region a necessary
part of the dialogue and reconciliation process.
Delhi seems to have realized the need to address
the problem as well. What is lacking, however, is the will
and determination on their part. The only concern of the Indian
establishment seems to be the violence in Kashmir, ignoring
the political aspects. The Kashmiris still do not trust Delhi
because of what has happened in the past, actions that have
also made it difficult for people like us who are categorised
as ‘moderates’. It is easier and safer to be a
hardliner in
Kashmir, holding secure positions. It is also unfortunate
when opportunities to build better relations are missed, such
as the earthquake. People felt that if such a tragedy could
not move India and Pakistan to let Kashmiris share their pain
and grief with each other, what would?
At the same time, there is definitely a change
in sentiment. A new generation has emerged in Kashmir that
is willing to think anew. Indigenous parties and groups, even
those who have adopted violent means, are willing to move
to something that is acceptable to people on both sides of
Kashmir. The change in attitude is discernible from their
reaction to the Hurriyat’s decision to talk to the Indian
government – in 2004, when we started the process, we
were condemned; this time around, there was no support but
neither was there condemnation.
Instead of seeking a final solution at this
stage, we must adopt a gradual approach. Once the process
is in place, a solution will emerge from that. Kashmiris belonging
to different regions, religions, ideologies and cultures must
be allowed to interact. The dialogue process between India,
Pakistan and the people of Kashmir also needs to be consolidated.
We do recognise that Hurriyat is not the only player representing
the people of Kashmir, and we must get other groups on board.
Even those outfits that have taken to violence, particularly
the Hizbul Mujahideen, are willing to be a part of the process
if there is change at the ground level that can help them
convince their followers.
We need a change at the ground level and a
move towards genuine dialogue so that people feel the difference
in their lives from the peace process. Apart from the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad
bus, we have seen no Kashmir-centric or people-centric confidence-building
measure. The hosilities must also end for the process to move
forward. Unless and until there is peace on the ground, no
CBM or action by India and Pakistan is really going to take
effect in the real sense. There should be a halt to violence
from the militant’s side as well as from the military
side.
In the Kashmir context, it is difficult for
any party, including the Hurriyat, to take a single position.
We can declare that the majority of the people want independence
– and there is no doubt about that fact – but
that does not mean we are unwilling explore other ideas. People
realise that an independent Kashmir may not be a possibility
because it does not serve the interests of the other players
in the region. While we are willing to be accommodative, two
things are clearly unacceptable to us – the conversion
of LOC into a permanent border, and the status quo. Besides
this, the Hurriyat is ready to discuss all other possible
options with all other parties, irrespective of their ideology.
There are different ideas emanating from Islamabad
as well- one can agree or disagree with them but it is important
not to discard them. I believe that Pakistan has moved beyond
its stated positions. The question now is whether India is
willing to move beyond CBMs such as trade, bus links and people-to-people
contact and towards a solution. What we encounter is complete
silence on the Indian side. There is fear that India is trying
to buy time and maintain status quo.
Sardar Qayoom Khan • Independence
is romanticism
The India-Pakistan relationship is stuck on
Kashmir. It is imperative that Kashmiris on the two sides
are allowed to meet and talk freely. For the past five decades,
they have been denied this opportunity. Given the fact that
they are suffering the most in the conflict, Kashmiris would
certainly try to find ways to reduce the tension. The situation
in Kashmir must be normalised as it would provide moral support
to all sides as well as serve a humanitarian purpose, and
this can happen without any party having to surrender its
claims to sovereignty.
It is important not to talk of a final, permanent,
lasting, durable solution. The focus should instead be on
the procedure for moving ahead. Interim steps have to be taken
before arriving at a model to resolve the dispute, and these
may be discussed in the media on both sides. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad
bus, for instance, is a good step but has not been effective
due to many restrictions. We should think of processes and
interim steps and not insist on particular form, shape or
model. We need a gradual, systematic process rather than an
ambitious, grand plan.
There are several ideas that can push the process
forward – the withdrawal of troops from population centers,
release of prisoners, and allowing movement of Kashmiris on
both sides. A few years ago, I had suggested the creation
of a small demilitarised zone on the ceasefire line where
the Kashmiris can meet freely. Before 1956, people were allowed
to move on the two sides by producing identity cards certified
by the local deputy commissioner. All routes blocked since
1956 could be re-opened. President Musharraf, for his part,
has also come up with some ideas – a seven-region formula
and self-governance.
I believe that the majority of people in Kashmir
want either accession with India or with Pakistan, not independence.
While there are a few sections, including international players,
who support the idea of independence, we must recognise that
independence is romanticism; it is not available given the
situation or as per the Partition Plan or the UN resolutions.
There can be a solution only if all sides
are talking – there must be talks among the Kashmiris;
between India and Kashmiris; Pakistan and Kashmiris; and between
India, Pakistan and Kashmiris. The Kashmiris need not have
a specific seat on the table but their involvement is essential,
either by proxy or directly. A government in Pakistan that
does not consult the Kashmiris on the issue cannot survive.
The question could be who represents the Kashmiris, and it
is important that Kashmiris of all denominations are consulted
and taken into confidence. Several ways can be devised to
include them: for instance, if it is difficult to give them
a seat on the table, Kashmiris from each sides can be included
in respective Indian and Pakistani delegations.
For effective movement forward, the Indian
and Pakistani leadership will have to act but they need our
support. On the Pakistani side, especially, it is important
to be conscious of the difficulties of the Indian government
because they operate in a democratic set-up. Additionally,
the Indian Army in Kashmir has constitutional authority on
some matters, and unless the constitution is amended, the
Indian government cannot go beyond certain limits. On both
sides, we need to understand each other’s constraints
and help each other overcome them. For this reason, it is
important not to advance any one-party agenda, from the Indian,
Pakistani or even the Kashmiri side. An agenda solely driven
by one party will not work even if it is based on gospel truth.
A joint agenda must be evolved.
Uday Shankar • Discard the cocoon
Let us recognise that, as in other areas, journalists
make mistakes while reporting on Kashmir. This need not be
due to a grand conspiracy, but because of the ignorance of
the journalist in question or the conditions in which he is
operating. Reporting in Kashmir is difficult – there
is little transparency; access to location or event is not
always there; sources often have partisan positions; and from
all sides, a lot of misleading information is fed to the reporter.
You have to ‘de-intentionalise’ and ‘de-sensationalise’
media mistakes.
For way too long, Kashmir reporting has been
hostage by Delhi journalists. Politicians of Kashmir, of different
hues, spend a disproportionate amount of time and attention
on the journalists of English-language newspapers, whose reach
has been highly exaggerated. A large number of politicians
in India today neither read any English newspaper nor care
about what it says. But they have a very effective voice in
policy making, in legislative decision-making, and they have
to be engaged. You could say that there has not been any attempt
by any Kashmir interest group on a sustained basis to engage
the rest of the country. For instance, the readership of the
Hindi dailies Dainik Bhaskar, Dainik Jagran and Amar Ujala
together is anywhere between 40 to 45 million. If you do not
address this mass of Indian people, then there is no way you
will be able to get out of the cocoon in which you are trapped.
For its part, television suffers from a lot
of ignorance because the entire television-reporting contingent
is still very young – with a physical energy sometimes
not matched with intellectual rigour or deduction skills.
However, it is also important to understand the nature of
the beast. Television has linear delivery and it has to suffer
the remote control button. People switch channels in seconds.
To avoid that risk, news editors just drop a story where a
clear perspective does not come through. And they can do so,
precisely because Kashmir is not such an important issue in
India if you divorce it from its violent implications. There
is clearly a problem of understanding and a crisis of credibility
in the whole process of what is happening in Kashmir.
Talat Hussain • Generational change
in media
We must recognise the fact that media does
not create reality. If the ground reality in Kashmir does
not change, the media is not supposed to be creating its own
agenda and trying to put an alternate fiction of what reality
ought to be. Things have to change in Kashmir, between India
and Pakistan, and among Kashmiris, for media to be amplifying
the reality. We should also remember that, generally speaking,
the media also follows the flag of nationalism. The Indian
and Pakistani media have not been exceptions to that rule,
and coverage has been very lop-sided and subject to the considerations
of state policy rather than independence. Most of us have
fallen in line in varying degrees. Since the level of tension
has come down, there is now a greater opportunity for the
media to cover the reality more objectively.
The bigger the issue at hand, the greater the
stakes are, the more cautious the media becomes. Mainstream
media cannot do sustained coverage of a large issue over a
period of time that strikes off from the mainstream policy
parameters. We also tend to take a romantic view of media
independence, and forget the environment within which newspaper
and television journalists work. On coverage of Kashmir, for
example, it is not necessarily the independent journalist
but the larger media conglomerate which sets the parameter.
Let us also understand that journalists are not sitting there
brooding over the fate of earthshaking issues. For people
to think that journalists are studying big tomes on Kashmir,
working out great solutions, and peddling editorial lines
is a little unrealistic to put it charitably.
A generational change has taken place in the
Pakistani media, and the young journalists are not burdened
by history. There is greater tolerance for diversity of views
being expressed, not just in newspapers but also on television.
The media has become more even handed in giving room to stories
that do not necessarily fall within the boundaries of government
policy. A cross-fertilisation of ideas and commercial interests
has contributed to increasingly liberal coverage of Kashmir
as well as India-Pakistan relations. There is more openness
when it comes to presenting the Indian point of view, and
articles from the Indian press are reprinted in Pakistan.
Television’s own interest in the larger arena of India-Pakistan
peace is also fuelling its more liberal coverage of the Kashmir
issue. The three big players in Pakistan – GEO, ARY
and AAJ – have developed huge stakes in terms of co-production
and joint programming with Indian channels and do not wish
to see those jeopardised.
Ved Bhasin • Need for a ‘Kashmiri’
solution
A few myths that dominate the discourse on
Kashmir need to be exploded. For one, the issue is often considered
a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan, when it is
actually a problem concerning the human rights, justice and
dignity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmiris
are at the centre of this dispute. The second myth, spread
by the Indian state and sections of the media, is that the
problem in Kashmir is essentially one of violence. However,
the gun is the consequence of suppression of fundamental rights
with people resorting to it only after all options of democratic
protest were closed. The fact that there is a popular revolt
in Kashmir coupled with massive human rights violations by
the Indian security forces has been concealed from the Indian
people.
Jammu and Kashmir is also seen as a territorial
problem, with suggestions that the state could be divided
on regional and communal lines. However, the state is in fact
a single entity, despite its diversity, and any division would
create further problems. A solution can be found only if we
respect the pluralistic character, unity and integrity of
Jammu and Kashmir. We must also recognise that there are multiple
voices and divergent aspirations in Jammu and Kashmir. While
India and Pakistan have started talking, with sections of
Kashmiris given a half-hearted invitation occasionally, there
has been no effort towards initiating a dialogue among the
Kashmiris themselves. No peace process will succeed unless
an internal dialogue among Kashmiris begins to reconcile the
divergent aspirations, respecting the viewpoint of the majority
yet accommodating the sentiments of the minority.
To pursue an internal dialogue however, a climate
of freedom must be created. As long as the Indian troops are
present and the Indian state is meddling in the affairs of
the state using draconian legislation, such an atmosphere
of trust cannot be created. For intra-Kashmir dialogue, some
confidence-building measures must be introduced. The ceasefire
on the LOC is a good step but the guns must stop and hostilities
must end within the state so that people are able to express
their views freely. Only then will this process be genuine,
meaningful and realistic. Opening up routes and borders in
all regions could be another important CBM. The Muzzafarabad-Srinagar
bus link has not helped the common people because there are
too many restrictions and curbs. Release of prisoners, rehabilitation
of victims of violence (whether by militants or security forces),
and the repeal of the draconian laws are some of the measures
that will pave the way for dialogue and a negotiated settlement.
Possible solutions to the Kashmir problem
have been suggested, but at this stage we must look for interim
measures. While exploring any solution or alternative, certain
ground rules must be respected: one, Kashmir is not a territorial
dispute but concerns the people of Jammu and Kashmir; two,
the state entity as existed on 14 August 1947 should not be
changed; three, the plural, democratic and federal character
of the state must be preserved and strengthened; four, the
interests of the religious and linguistic minorities must
be safeguarded.
Neither the option of joint control or conversion
of the Line of Control into an international border can be
acceptable. Sovereignty must rest with the people of Jammu
and Kashmir state, and it is for them to choose to surrender
whatever quantum of autonomy to either India or Pakistan,
or to both jointly. Even in the Instrument of Accession which
India recognises, the state has been promised autonomy in
all areas except foreign affairs, defence and communication.
This status must be restored. Azad Kashmir too should have
identical autonomy within Pakistan.
One possible way forward towards a solution
is by holding free and fair elections on both sides under
international supervision, for the assembly in Azad Kashmir
and the assembly in Jammu and Kashmir. Then there could be
a common council elected in proportion to the population of
both sides to deal with common issues like trade, tourism
and environment. Such an arrangement should continue for five
years or maximum up to ten years. There should then be a joint
session of both assemblies, which can decide on the future
status of Jammu and Kashmir. By that time, Kashmir will cease
to be the emotive issue both in India and Pakistan, and it
will be possible to look at a conclusive solution. All parties
would be required to respect the decision of the two assemblies,
even if it were to be complete independence for Jammu and
Kashmir.
A S Panneerselvan • Noorani’s
proposal
The ground rules that both India and
Pakistan have agreed to with regard to the Kashmir issue include
negating those outcomes that either side finds unacceptable.
While India has ruled out the question of a plebiscite, Pakistan
has rejected the option of converting the Line of Control
into an international border. India has also made it clear
that there will not be any partition of the region on communal
lines. From what we have heard, Pakistan has agreed to retain
this composite nature of Jammu and Kashmir.
The advocate and commentator A G Noorani
has written extensively on devolution of power and examined
different models that can provide a framework for solving
the Kashmir issue. He writes, “History teaches by analogy
and not identity. No two cases are alike but Trieste, Northern
Ireland, South Tyrol and Aaland provide considerable guidance
on both the process of conciliation as well as it’s
end product.” The Aaland Islands agreement, signed between
Sweden and Finland in 1921, is most relevant for Kashmir.
Under the agreement, Finnish sovereignty over the islands
was internationally recognised; autonomy for the 25,000 people
of Aaland Islands, largely reflecting their Swedish character,
was internationally guaranteed; and it included a component
of demilitarisation and neutralisation. In Kashmir, the state
could have an autonomous character and an assembly of its
own. India and Pakistan would exercise joint sovereignty,
with each having the right to see that the other is implementing
promises on its own side, thus involving a mechanism of mutual
guarantees.
In this context, A G Noorani has sought
to rework the notion of sovereignty completely with reference
to the region. This is indeed a difficult task. How are you
going to re-negotiate the notion of sovereignty? How are you
going to make the LOC genuinely porous? What is the type of
system you are going to put in place? It took 70 years –
the agreement was signed in 1921 and implemented in 1992 –
to make the Aaland provisions work. In most of these models,
the people’s representatives acquired a voice only when
the states had embarked on a serious negotiation and the outlines
of an accord were discernible. Noorani believes it is unrealistic
for Kashmiri leaders to demand a seat on the table now, when
the main hurdle is yet to be overcome – the recognition
of Kashmir as a state whose future is yet to be determined.
This precludes neither the parlance with New Delhi nor India-Pakistan
talks. In the end, all three will have to agree on the terms
of settlement.
The issue is fundamentally about transfer
of power, sharing of power and empowering. In the final analysis,
as in South Tyrol and Aaland, international guarantees of
autonomy through agreement with Pakistan and the Kashmiris
is the only alternative to secession. Repression and suppression
have been tried – they have failed. India not only refused
to hold the plebiscite it had promised but also wiped out
the autonomy it had guaranteed. However, a settlement is achievable
with Pakistan as well as Kashmiris; it will not violate the
criteria set by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh; it involves
no secession, only creativity, and a sense of justice and
fair play. The Aaland solution shows that this can be accomplished.
Therein lies its great merit.
Hameed Haroon • Ten concerns
It is essential to look at concerns and
modalities structurally. You cannot talk of dismantling a
power structure without replacing it with a concept of sovereignty
and operation. I have ten concerns regarding the present process.
Firstly, Pakistan should explain to the satisfaction of India
why the militants cannot be satisfactorily reined in. Secondly,
is it realistic for Pakistan to speak of controlling the militants
without a regional solution to the militancy problem, i.e.
vis-a-vis Afghanistan? While these regions may be separate,
the theme of arms and sacrifice of one’s life is common
to those engaged in the struggles. For them, state boundaries
do not exist. Any attempt to find a solution to just the Kashmir
side without addressing the source of the problem is not going
to work.
Thirdly, let us try and understand the
precariousness of the moderate Azad Kashmir leadership vis-a-vis
the militants and the militants in the intelligence agencies.
There has been official and unofficial undermining of the
moderate position for so long that it will take a while before
people like Sardar Qayoom can shake off the persistent vilification
campaigns within Pakistan. The fourth concern revolves around
the precariousness of Mirwaiz and the Hurriyat vis-a-vis the
militants, and the intelligence agencies of India as well
as Pakistan.
The fifth concern is the role of the
army on both sides. The earthquake has exposed very clearly,
whether it is in Uri or in the Neelam Valley or the Jhelum
Valley, who are the bosses of the regions that are affected.
It is the army on both sides, and not civil society, which
wields real control. This should be addressed. Then, sixthly,
India should provide assurance that a cessation of hostilities
would not be used to dispose off an onus to structurally alter
the operation of the two Kashmirs to India’s advantage.
Would such cessation allow India the opportunity to change
or repair the situation to its own advantage, as opposed to
the advantage of the Kashmiris? This is as serious a concern
on the Pakistani side as militancy is on the Indian side.
The fear is that the next five years will be utilised to calm
the Kashmiri problem for the moment – its more virulent
aspects, to draw out the militants and remove them from the
scene, and then to impose a new unilateral solution.
The seventh concern is to factor in the
difference between the Hizbul-Mujahideen on the one hand and
the Lashkar and Jaish on the other. While their concerns with
respect to Kashmir ought to be addressed, we should not legitimise
their element of decision-making in resolving the Kashmir
problem. My eighth point is that it is also important to recognise
that the Kashmiri diaspora residing in the West has emerged
as a powerful force. They too can be a part of the solution,
through access to material resources and sympathies in legislatures
outside Southasia, which might help towards seeking a solution.
My ninth concern is regarding the international
aspects of the Pakistan-China border interaction, which would
be shaken by the Northern Areas going into former territories
of Jammu and Kashmir state. How the Pakistan-China physical
border would be affected by the unitary aspect of the old
Jammu and Kashmir state, will have to be considered. Finally,
tenth, everybody has forgotten that the Kashmiris too have
a right to the waters of the Indus basin. Do the people through
whose territory the rivers pass have a right to their benefits
or is there only a downstream right? The right to water is
crucial because in the long term, the politics of Kashmir
will be about water.
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