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Tigers in decline  September 2008

By remaining firmly within a conventional military mindset, the LTTE may have missed – for good – an opportunity to make substantive political gains.

Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai
Over the past three decades, the LTTE has been portrayed as a brutal organisation, with its structure, motivations and strategies all shrouded in secrecy. Some have rejected the force as politically bankrupt and irredeemably nihilist, while others have claimed (and continue to claim) it to be the only entity that has a chance of steering the political future of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Over the last few years, however, a greater degree of sober public analysis has emerged on the LTTE. This has been due to several factors: the internationalised Norwegian-led peace process; the no-war situation, in which dissident voices from within the Tamil polity were able to bring to light some of the inner workings of the Tamil Tigers; and also the split in the organisation, with its former Eastern Command being used as a paramilitary arm of the government against the LTTE. Few will disagree, however, that the Tigers have radically changed the security situation and the political landscape in Sri Lanka, mainly through its military strategies and guerrilla tactics. Indeed, the LTTE’s growth and survival over the last 30 years were solely dependent on its singular focus on militarism. In this context, the organisation’s weakening, caused by defeats on the battlefield over the last two years, become significantly more difficult to explain, as it is its subordination of politics to conventional military efforts that could well be the cause for its seemingly irreversible decline.

During the early years of the LTTE, in the mid-1970s, the force was made up of a small group of middle-class Tamil youths, who came mostly from the Jaffna peninsula. It was inspired by the ‘hit and run’ tactics that had been used by sections of the anti-colonial movements in India and in Ireland. Following on the early-20th-century legacy of the militant freedom fighter Bhagat Singh, the LTTE focused on assassinations in an environment conducive to urban guerrilla warfare, where bicycle-riding youths with pistols assassinated policemen and individuals labelled as ‘traitors’. These attacks, largely restricted to the Jaffna peninsula, were financed by the looting of banks. Over the next several years, state repression in response to such armed activity escalated, including the introduction of draconian measures such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the abduction and murder of politicised Tamil youths, and the burning of the Jaffna Library. Subsequently, the armed groups, especially the Tamil Tigers, took on larger operations, such as attacking police stations and army convoys. At this time, the LTTE consisted of no more than 30 fulltime members, divided into cells.

It was following the July 1983 state-sponsored riots, in which more than 2000 Tamil civilians were massacred, triggered by the LTTE’s attack on an army convoy that had killed 13 soldiers, that the Tigers and other armed groups mushroomed in size and number. Suddenly, thousands of youths joined them, along with broader political and material support from the Tamil people in general. The post-1983 environment, combined with the activities of armed groups with support bases in India, led the Sri Lankan Army to be pushed back to their barracks in many parts of the north. The hit-and-run tactics were transformed into full-blown guerrilla warfare, with the support of Indian training in camps in Tamil Nadu and financial support from expatriate Tamils in the West. This period also led to a dramatic increase in killings and torture within many of the armed groups, including the LTTE, as the militant leaderships attempted to control their quickly growing organisations amidst an environment of mistrust and fear.

Third actor
Combined military gains and attempts to put forward a joint coalition of the four major armed groups – known as the Eelam National Liberation Front, or ENLF – were short lived. Much of this failure was due to the LTTE, which decided to take advantage of the internal tensions within the other armed groups by moving to eliminate the competitors. This began in April 1986 in Jaffna, with the massacre of hundreds of cadres of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). But such an internecine war necessarily weakened the military gains that had been achieved by the rebel groups. In May 1987, the Sri Lankan armed forces made rapid gains culminating in an attack on Vadamarachy, in northern Jaffna, known as Operation Liberation, only to be halted by pressure and outright intervention by New Delhi. While the training in India of the few hundred LTTE cadres was meant to be in guerrilla warfare, it was essentially training for a conventional army. This is significant, as the LTTE attempted to face Operation Liberation on conventional military terms for the first time, and could not withstand the significant man- and firepower, and particularly the air assaults, of the Colombo government.

Following the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, Indian intervention and the deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) introduced a third force into the conflict. The LTTE subsequently chose to challenge this new force, as it viewed Indian intervention as undermining its ‘sole representation’ of the Tamil community, in a political process that was intended to lead to electoral representation by a number of Tamil political actors. New Delhi, on the other hand, viewed Tamil armed groups, including the LTTE, as means towards political ends, both in terms of its hegemony in the region and a political settlement towards Tamil grievances. With the resumption of unpredicted hostilities by the LTTE, the Indians proved to be ill prepared and overconfident in their ability to control the LTTE. The latter, in turn, used calculated provocations that led to large civilian casualties from attacks by Indian forces, undermining the people’s initial support for the IPKF. While the Peacekeeping Force was eventually able to establish its presence and push the LTTE into the jungle – thereby reducing them again to conducting hit-and-run operations – many believe that the IPKF did not actually want to completely eliminate the LTTE, due to the lingering tensions between New Delhi and Colombo. In this murky terrain, the government of Ranasinghe Premadasa, which did not want to see the implementation of the Indo-Lanka Accord and was resentful of the Indian intervention, went so far as to make a deal with the LTTE, including providing it with arms, in the hopes of forcing the Indians to withdraw.

By March 1990, the withdrawal of the IPKF was indeed complete. This provided the opportunity for the LTTE to decimate the remaining Tamil armed groups and political formations, including the leadership of the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The resumption of the war with the Premadasa government, in the early 1990s, had with it the element of surprise that the LTTE often used. In June 1990, it massacred hundreds of policemen who had surrendered in the Eastern Province. The Premadasa government, unprepared for the eventuality of war, had asked a large number of besieged police stations to surrender, not expecting the LTTE to massacre them. The rebel forces were subsequently able to expand their control in the east.

In the north, meanwhile, the LTTE used this period to establish quasi-state structures in areas of Jaffna that were under its control; this period also marked a major transformation of the Tigers into a conventional armed force. A number of operational structures were established, which ultimately led to significant changes in the organisation’s functioning. These changes also necessarily led to a qualitative change in the LTTE’s relationship with the people, as they institutionalised overt exploitation exemplified by new structures of taxation, increasing recruitment of children by dubious methods, and the institution of a ‘pass’ system for civilians travelling outside its territory. It was this period that also witnessed the Kattankudy and Eravur Mosque massacres of August 1990 in the east, where about 150 Muslims at prayer were massacred by the LTTE; followed by the ethnic cleansing of the entire population of Muslims from the Northern Province, numbering close to 75,000 people, within two days in late October 1990. These acts of brutality against the Muslim population, which would alienate the Muslim community in the future, were carried out like military operations, and foreshadowed the emergence of exclusivist state structures.

Conventionalising
While the LTTE had from the beginning asked its cadres to carry cyanide capsules in case of capture (so they could commit suicide rather than be tortured into divulging information), it was during the early 1990s that suicide squads were developed into the Black Tigers. This was an elite group of suicide cadres who were used to assassinate important targets, or as human bombs in the course of military operations. Likewise, the force of Sea Tigers was also raised in order to attack the Sri Lankan Navy.

The increasing lack of support from the people, leading to the dearth of voluntary recruits, led the LTTE to resort to forced recruitment and a more sophisticated use of propaganda. This also led to the deployment of larger numbers of women and child recruits. In addition, the Tigers developed an extensive international network for arms procurement, by tapping the financial support of Tamil expatriates and the businesses started by the LTTE itself in the West. Furthermore, an intelligence wing, consisting of international, military and internal intelligence, was developed in order to control the organisation, infiltrate the state and carry out assassinations.

Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai
Tiger training, mid-2006
The LTTE’s transformation into a conventional force saw some major military victories, including the Mullaitivu army camp attack in 1996 and the Elephant Pass army camp attack in 2000. These battles not only pointed to extensive intelligence-gathering on the part of the LTTE, but also to considerable use of manpower and suicide cadres, resulting in the sacrifice of hundreds of cadres as cannon fodder. Nine years earlier, a failed attempt to capture Elephant Pass had led to the deaths of hundreds of Tamil Tigers. Indeed, the LTTE’s persistence and willingness to sacrifice cadres in large numbers has been a crucial part of its successes. The Tigers also began to videotape their major battles, to use the footage for propaganda purposes, particularly to mobilise support and raise funds from the Tamil diaspora.

Together with the organisation itself, its military aims became grander. The Katunayake Airport attack in 2001, by 14 LTTE suicide cadres, was an important milestone in crippling the Sri Lankan economy, as it led, among other things, to sharply increased import insurance. The organisation was also successful in assassinating political leaders in Colombo, the army top brass and Tamils opposed to the LTTE. It was a combination of these military attacks and high-profile assassinations that eventually gave the Tigers the image of being something of an invincible force. Assassinations in particular served to politically destabilise governments, providing room for the organisation to recoup – even if such actions inevitably undermined any long-term progress on the political front.

The Norwegian-aided peace process and the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) further entrenched the LTTE as a conventional force. The LTTE used the no-war situation to further transform its military structures, including a massive recruitment campaign. The CFA also ensured clear forward-defence lines and demarcation of territorial borders, and the legitimacy awarded by the internationalised peace process was used to build state-like structures with the support of expatriate and donor funds. However, this development reduced its flexibility to fight a guerrilla war. On the other hand, the split in the LTTE – with its Eastern Command, led by Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (aka ‘Karuna’), rebelling in 2004 – weakened the organisation’s conventional strength, as it lost a large part of its manpower and effective control of the east.

By 2006, the ceasefire had collapsed, after the LTTE escalated the violence. In fact, the LTTE strategised to help elect Mahinda Rajapakse, who was backed by Sinhalese extremists, through an enforced boycott by Tamil voters, who were expected to vote mainly for his opponent. The LTTE then systematically provoked the Rajapakse government, to test its strength on the battlefield; since then, however it has faced major defeats. The Colombo military proved to be far more capable in conventional warfare than its adversary, with significantly more advanced firepower, whether in air bombing, shelling or the use of multi-barrel fire. Not only has the LTTE been crippled on the conventional war front, with steady loss of territory over the last two years, it has also been unable to take forward its ‘dirty war’. The LTTE’s intelligence network has been crippled by the counter-intelligence efforts of the Sri Lankan military, as reflected by the organisation’s inability to succeed in attacking high-profile targets in recent years. The last successful major assassination by the LTTE was that of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005, whereas the security forces have been successful in targeting senior LTTE leaders over the past year, including political-wing leader S P Tamilselvan in November 2007, and deputy intelligence leader ‘Colonel’ Charles in January 2008. In recent months, the Tigers have been reduced to attacking ‘soft’ targets, such as civilian buses.

Politics subverted
The evolution of the LTTE has been characterised by one constant – its pyramidal structure, with the entire organisation built around its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. The organisation rests on a fragile balance around the personality cult of Prabhakaran and the demand for Tamil Eelam. While its previous political advisor, the late Anton Balasingham, described the LTTE as a politico-military organisation, in practice politics was always subordinated to the military agenda. While the international community engaged extensively with Balasingham and the LTTE’s political wing during the Norwegian-led peace process, in reality the political wing has always been in existence merely to justify the military actions.

In building the organisation as a military institution, there has been a complete lack of internal political debate, with the LTTE cadres reduced to mere fighters. In fact, there is little critical discussion about military matters in general, with a clear top-down command structure that even limits critical feedback on military setbacks. The LTTE’s strength as well as its limitations are centred around complete loyalty to Prabhakaran, internal fear and, most of all, the suicide cult extensively used to pursue military gains. The LTTE’s former senior commanders, such as Karuna and Mahendrarajah Mahattya, have shown little political maturity, reflecting the lack of political development of even the deputy leaders. Although they were held in very high esteem while in the organisation, they were incapable of putting forward any serious alternative political vision.

The continued extreme demand for a separate Tamil Eelam, coupled with the unwillingness to engage with any political process, has inhibited the LTTE’s military advances from transforming into political gains. Rather, the LTTE seems to believe that its own relationship with the Tamil people would be threatened if there were political progress and the state moved toward addressing grievances of the Tamil people. It is such an exclusivist politics, particularly the Tigers’ claim of ‘sole representation’, that has made it impossible to form any sustainable alliance in partnership with other Tamil organisations. Furthermore, by engaging in attacks on civilians, the LTTE has also isolated itself from the island’s Muslim and Sinhalese communities. This inability to engage politically with other actors has, furthermore, isolated it further from the international community.

Two decades after the LTTE’s decision to fight India, followed by its assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the negative attitude is beginning to prove militarily costly. Indian surveillance and support for the Colombo government are both significantly contributing to the weakening of the LTTE. Despite the legitimacy given it by the West during the Norwegian-aided peace process, including peace negotiations and tours of Europe for Tigers negotiators, the LTTE engaged arrogantly with the Western interlocutors. It refused to attend the Tokyo donor conference in June 2003 attended by some 50 governments and 20 multilateral organisations, nor did it respond to human-rights-related concerns, including on child soldiers and political killings. Ultimately, this intransigence culminated in the Canadian and EU bans on the LTTE, in April and June 2006, respectively. Such international isolation has weakened the LTTE’s political and financial base in the Tamil diaspora, and also crippled its international arms-smuggling network.

The recent military defeats suffered by the LTTE have surfaced during discussions of the possibility of the organisation reverting to action as a guerrilla force. But such a change is unlikely for a number of reasons. The LTTE’s own mindset has changed as it transformed itself into a conventional force, with Prabhakaran emphasising that his force now has a full spectrum of land, sea and air capabilities. While this illusion of an emerging state with a full fledged conventional military helped mobilise support in the diaspora, in reality there are serious limitations to the organisation’s capacity. The transformation in the LTTE hierarchy, including in terms of military status and position, has also alienated the organisation from the masses – a critical relationship for any guerrilla war. Finally, the Tamil people in general are suffering from severe fatigue after a quarter-century of conflict, and few youths today join the LTTE voluntarily.

In the event that Prabhakaran is at some point killed or removed from the scene due to illness, the absence of politicisation among the LTTE cadres would mean that the organisation would most likely not be able to continue as a sustainable resistance movement. Instead, the apolitical LTTE cadres would undoubtedly disperse, to be appropriated by the state, function as isolated cells or be reduced to criminal activities. Ultimately, armed resistance needs to be transformed into political gains, all within a sustainable timeframe. Many Tamil moderates now argue that the LTTE has done more than any other actor to destroy the Tamil community. In counting on gains through its strength as a conventional military force, and dragging out the war in Sri Lanka for two and a half decades, the LTTE may well have missed the opportunity to even entrench its own position. The LTTE’s singular focus on its own military strength, to the detriment of political gains and support from the people on the ground, all while ensuring its emergence as the dominant Tamil armed force, could now well be the cause of its demise.

Anonymous is a Tamil democracy activist.

Comments

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It is no secret that military regimes are heavy handed in crushing any uprising. The despots everywhere don't tolerate dissent as if the power is their birthright. These 'electile' dysfunctional despots use oppression as viagra to prolong their stay in power. Even the fact that some of these uncrowned tyrants had to run for their lives at the end, even facing prison sentences and at times cruel death, doesn't deter the current ones from exercising the absolute power. Torture camps and mass graves are the byproducts of the corruption of this absolute power. Marxist and Maoist states have their gulag labor camps to re-educate the 'counterrevolutionaries'. Then in the emerging theocracies, where the concept of democracy is alien, mullahfication of politics, based on following the letter of the law from ancient texts, purportedly given by the Almighty, lead to primitive ways of punishments like flogging and beheading, making the Almighty a creator of criminal as well as constitutional law. But, the sad truth is even the democratically elected governments resort to bullets and blood in defeating rebellions and dissent. Even a peaceful demonstration can be broken up by the state, showing what a state can do to the very people who put it in power. It is no secret that military regimes are heavy handed in crushing any uprising. The despots everywhere don't tolerate dissent as if the power is their birthright. These 'electile' dysfunctional despots use oppression as viagra to prolong their stay in power. Even the fact that some of these uncrowned tyrants had to run for their lives at the end, even facing prison sentences and at times cruel death, doesn't deter the current ones from exercising the absolute power. Torture camps and mass graves are the byproducts of the corruption of this absolute power. Marxist and Maoist states have their gulag labor camps to re-educate the 'counterrevolutionaries'. Then in the emerging theocracies, where the concept of democracy is alien, mullahfication of politics, based on following the letter of the law from ancient texts, purportedly given by the Almighty, lead to primitive ways of punishments like flogging and beheading, making the Almighty a creator of criminal as well as constitutional law. But, the sad truth is even the democratically elected governments resort to bullets and blood in defeating rebellions and dissent. Even a peaceful demonstration can be broken up by the state, showing what a state can do to the very people who put it in power. As these are happening more commonly in the developing world, the western democracies selectively condemn or overlook these violations as they see fit. Now under the guise of fighting terrorism, they too are denying their own citizens the same human rights they proclaim to safeguard. Cracking down on terrorism may not be as brutal as quashing a rebellion. But in west, where individual rights are cherished, the powerful media and civil rights groups, and the eventual punishing at the polls keep the politicians from declaring an all out war on terror by taking away the civil rights. It is not simple as legislating an emergency declaration in the third world. They wish they could stuff the ballots and rig the polls or make the results 'null and void'. Luckily, in these places where public policy is often shaped by opinion polls, human rights violations don't happen in mass scale. Even revolutions and rebellions have their own way of dealing with dissent. They too have their own skeletons in the closet. In that world, branding somebody a traitor is a simple licence to kill. Pretending to be looking at the big picture, their apologists consider it as the collateral damage and try to sweep it under the carpet, or in the closet! At the end, it all comes down to the power. When the absolute power is questioned, in the name of order, individual human rights are violated. It isn't much about the safeguarding democracy or law and order. It is just a game for the powers that be to cling to their power. The scale in which these power setups deal with dissent may vary. But the intention is all same. The purported violators of order can be branded from separatists to terrorists, from criminals to traitors. This will make them punishable in the public's eye. When the 'terrorists' can't be apprehended or eliminated, there begins the collective punishment. In the era of aerial bombardment and explosive laden vehicles, collective punishment of the innocent civilians causes death and destruction in mass scale. Most of the times, number of innocent people caught in the crossfire exceeds the intended targets. This doesn't prevent the power to claim of 'inflicting heavy casualties on enemy'. Sadly, those who suffer most are the society's vulnerable... children, women and elderly.
Peter Tosh

2008-09-07 09:09:57
observed "Living next to you is like sleeping with an elephant; no matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt." The man who'd been a pain in the rear to the US with his leanings towards Russia and Cuba should know a thing or two about being a neighbour to the real beast. Like Canada, we Sri Lankans are geographically thrown in the backyard of our one and only neighbour. But, unlike Canada, we have to be careful not to be a pain in the rear and disturb the sleeping giant. Thank god, India may be a beast, not a bully. History, along with myths, talks about the link between both. Sri Lankans often raise (and bury!) the historic link with India as they see fit. Sinhalese may beam about the birthplace of Buddha or their ancestors when the relationship is warm, but with the slightest signal of leaning towards Tamils, become ready to fight the invaders till death. Tamils, mainly the vocal minority, upon cue from LTTE, would talk about the motherly love of India, but with any suggestion of marginalizing tigers, would thunder about defeating the fourth largest army in the world. Nobody is enthusiastic about military intervention except chauvinist comrades and venerables in Sri Lanka and Tiger apologists in Tamil Nadu. Reds and saffrons, who fear a UN intervention will divide the nation along the ethnic lines as in Cyprus, wouldn't mind India 'neutering the cat' and, of course, get out right after that, without insisting on a political solution. Blackshawl brigade in Tamilnadu wants India to 'declaw the lion' and crown the tiger as the King of the Jungle and, of course, get out right after that without dictating any changes in Law of the Jungle. But the Gentle Giant seems to be sleeping. But for some, as the cliche goes, silence is deafening. Make no mistake about it. It is just pretending by refusing to engage openly. But the engagement is not as much as some want it to be. India may have reasons behind its reluctance. Having disturbed the hive and stung by the bees, the elephant doesn't want to bother again. Then there are those southern sentiments towards their brethren in Ealam have to be addressed and the pragmatic reasons for the minority governement that is kept alive with the support of regional special interest groups. Above all, with the new SL government aligning itself with Sinhalese extremist elements, India doesn't want to be found guilty by association. In one hand, making India to think twice is, for LTTE, a victory in itself. And on the other, being held hostage and blackmailed by regional parties is a shame for the government of a regional superpower. But this reluctance paved way for a new player in the field and the giant is disturbed now. Growing Pakistani influence in military affairs has India thinking loud. India cannot blame Sri Lanka or LTTE alone for the debacle. Having flexed the muscles for a long time, it entered the arena without assessing the pitfalls and feasibility. Military might of the regional superpower alone is not enough to find a solution for a conflict that passed its original cause long time ago. Initial blessings to the rebel groups may have more to do with west getting a foothold in west-leaning JR's regime than the suffering in 83 riots and aspirations of Tamils. Ethnic riots may have elicited sympathy, but it is the VOA and Trincomalee that are the real reasons behind arming anybody who wanted to setup shop in Tamilnadu. If India was there for altruistic reasons, it should have pushed for joint front like PLO. As Americans learnt their lessons in backing Mujahideen to fight Russians, India paid a big price by arming them. Despite repeated Sri Lankan accusations of arming rebels, India tried to gain political leverage using rebels. By twisting JR's arms, it pushed the Indo-Lanka accord against the wishes of everyone involved. Apart from JVP and chauvinists, even the JR government's Premadasa and Lalith Athulathmuthali were against the accord. LTTE Supremo was holed up in Delhi against his will and swore revenge on Rajiv. Realizing that it is no more considered the sole representative, LTTE tried to torpedo the accord by declaring war on IPKF, blaming India for the suicide deaths of their commanders despite the fact that it is the JR regime that insisted on flying them to Colombo. Dealing with untrustworthy partners, who viewed India's entry as to promote its own interests, and playing well into the hands of JR and LTTE, Referee India finally donned the gloves and entered the ring to fight the LTTE. On-the-job-training prime minister was outfoxed by JR.Jeyawardena as JR reportedly boasted later. Regime change in Sri Lanka turned the tables. Touted ad nauseam as a diplomatic move by LTTE, the warring parties have become strange bedfellows and declared, to quote Trudeau again partially, India 'has no place in their bedroom.' The country that was trying to force a shotgun wedding was hit on the head with the butt of a gun. Apart from the paradigm shift in Sri Lankan politics, changing political landscape in India itself worsened the matters. Emergence of regional parties eroded the majority rule and paved way for the minority governements that lack mandate and muscle. Due to the political meddling, IPKF had to fight the war with one hand tied behind. With the ultimate insult of fighting LTTE that is fully armed by the Sri Lankan governent, India bowed out bloodied and humiliated. It is the price India paid for not having a dignified exit strategy and a time frame. In this war, India forgot the very reason it got into this mess in the first place. A Political solution for Sri Lankan Tamils. Blinded by the military might, India failed to win the hearts and minds of Tamils. LTTE provoked IPKF in a typical guerilla fashion to do atrocities on Tamils. LTTE played its cards very well in portraying India as a bully trying to impose its will on Tamils and destroy the dream of Tamil homeland. India was outgunned in propaganda war with LTTE as well. Tamils, with inflated expectations, had their dreams shattered about India repeating another Bangaladesh in Ealam. Fighting Colombo's war, India alienated Tamils who felt betrayed when Indian army turned it rage on the innocent civilians. But, India could have tried to heal the wounds. Even after the departure, India never gave any formal apology, nor ever regretted the 'excesses' of the army. ('Tragedy or aberration', some may prefer calling) Then came the Rajiv's killing and that destroyed whatever left and made everything irreversible and irreparable. Above all, India hesitates to deal with a regime with extremist tendencies. With its militaristic approach to ethnic question, Rajapakse's government tried to get India on board for tiger hunting. As soon as the governent took over, Sri Lanka went to India with all the enthusiasm, carrying a shopping list for military hardware. But it was politely informed to come up with a political solution and look elsewhere for arms. Believing that 'Tiger terrorist problem' can be conatined by military means, Sri Lanka looked elsewhere, which happened to be the regional rivals, China and Pakistan. These intertwined factors make India look before it leaps. Is that fear justified? In the question of southern sentiments, despite all the rhetoric of firebrands, sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamil people in Tamilnadu is dried up thanks to the killings of LTTE. Now it has become more of a nuisance. Not to be left out, from time to time, both main parties in Tamil Nadu call for Indian intervention while carefully distancing themselves from LTTE. Main parties are not ready to risk thier political future by aligning with tigers. The leaders with mixed loyalties, who enjoy tiger sponsored world tours and reported finanancial backings, are just showing obedience to their masters offshore. These leaders, for all their rhetoric, can't even mobilise enough people for a Pro-Tiger conference, let alone for a protest to make the state standstill. If it is not for the shameless last minute dealmaking with either of those poltical parties, they will bite the dust in elections. With its 'People's decision is Almighty's decision' changing to 'Centre's decision is Almighty's decision', DMK is distancing itself from LTTE, which one time had a free ride during DMK regime and killed its opponents in indian soil. Karunanithi toeing the centre's line, with jayalitha being vocal anti-LTTE as ever, India can simply ignore the firebrands tiger sympathizers in the centre coaltion, centre has to listen and act accordingly. India's recent refusal to sign Defence Pact was widely credited to those tiger sympathizers in Tiger media. With their rhetoric about transforming Tamilnadu into another Punjab is dead along with separatism in Punjab, fire breathing panthers and other 'mewtant' felines are now threatening that 'Tamilnadu will erupt'. These Firebrands only want to drum up support for the LTTE by exploiting the suffering of Tamil refugees. Not to be outdone, main parties are not left with any choice, but to stage a show of sympathy. The whole drama makes it look like Tamilnadu is about to explode. On the question of Pakistani involvement, India could have handled differently. Looking for an opportunity to get a back door access to India, Pakistan gladly offered to help when India refused. With sales, come the after-sales guarantees, warrantees, in-house technical support etc. Of course, India was right when refusing to give lethal arms that could be used against Tamils. It does't want to be a part of it. But, refusing to sell lethal weapons didn't stop Tamils from dying of Sri Lankan firepower. In the military front, India could have played its cards well. India could have signed the military pact like US and sent a message to LTTE that 'sheriff is in town'. Like all those superpowers acquiring nuclear power for 'Peace', India could have provided military assistance for 'peaceful purposes' with attaching some strings. One has to remeber that after the peace talks, most of the killings could be attributed to LTTE's provocation, be it 'claymore attacks by Tamil resurgence force' or mortar attacks on camps. The latest surge in violence itself was triggered by LTTE's closure of a sluice gate in Maavilaru. In LTTE's web media, anyone can find pictures of its much lauded citizen force training exercises similar to the tragic 'First aid training'. LTTE's tactics of attacking from populated areas, using humanshields and exploiting the resulting civilian deaths for propaganda shouldn't be new to India. A military pact could have been a deterrent to LTTE attacks and its grand military ambitions, like retaking Jaffna. And it would give the right to question any military killing without LTTE provocation and, above all, the need for military soltution. It could have thwarted any attempt by Pakistan to get a toehold to use Sri Lanka as a springboard. But now, by having them look anywhere else, India doesn't have the same clout it would have had to influence or pressure Sri Lankan governent. By not offering the carrot, India is unable to use the stick. territory of Sri Lankadesh. But it might change the Sri Lankan political landscape forever. With the newfound air superiority, thanks to the unlikely combination of Kfirs and Khans, Sri Lanka is pushing militarily to defeat LTTE. Emboldened by the recent military gains, despite some stunning reversals, Colombo may try to dictate tems for the solution and impose it on Tamils. As usual, LTTE is trying to exploit the Pakistani involvement. Political pundits in LTTE media, with their sudden-found sympathy for India, are worried about the Chinese and Pakistan involvement in Sri Lanka. LTTE media is littered with analyses on how these involvements will affect India's domination in the region. Recent assassination attempt in Colombo on a Pakistani diplomat and Chinese involvement in oil exploration were highlighted by these doomsayers. Fortunately, these pundits haven't yet come up with the threat of china's territorial claims on China Bay where Indian oil storage is located. In its wildest dreams, LTTE is drooling at the prospect of India being left with no choice but to deal with them in their own terms. You can't blame them. Having seen Afghanistan, Sind and Baloch, LTTE believes it can exploit regional rivalry. On a different note, according to those close with the leadership, LTTE believes that India eventually has to deal with them in the same way it dealt with Musharaff who overthrew the elected government. chairmanship with co-chairs for obvious reasons, India was right in every aspect. When it comes to the commitment to Sri Lanka's territorial integrity, offering defence against the much hyped air threat, tipping SL navy about arms smuggling, stance on North-East merger, offering to send food to Jaffna and, above all, on diffrentiating LTTE and Tamils, India is sticking to its guns. Though, from time to time, LTTE stalwarts bragged about the channels it keeps with India, India refuses to accept LTTE's sole representative claim. By not facilitating the audition to TNA and repudiating the political advisor's suggestion of forgetting the past, India effectively denied the bragging rights to the LTTE propagandists of India accepting its claims of sole representaion. always look up India as a mother protecting its children. Tamils may be angry at India for the betrayal of turning its rage on them. But they never condone such a horrendous crime of killing of Rajiv Gandhi. It was the LTTE and its bunch of minions that celebrated in this heinous crime and ordinary tamils, the silenced majority, want no part of it. Bear in mind that, despite repeated LTTE's calls to come to their territory, tamils in Trincomalee, cross the tiger heartland of Wanni to go to India, risking their lives on the way. If they believed LTTE would protect them, they would have sought refuge in Wanni. Ironically, it is the LTTE that is struggling to keep tamils from leaving their area to government controlled areas. LTTE media might suggest otherwise, but Tamils in general know that without India's involvement, they are politically at the mercy of Sinhalese. Tamils view LTTE as their defenders, not as their rulers. They believe that only LTTE can protect them from the SL military onslaught. But they don't envision LTTE as their rulers. They have enough experience to know how LTTE, as rulers, will deny their basic rights. India owes it to the tamils for the unfinished business of its failed mission. What is the other best way to win the broken hearts and minds of tamil people? In the era of political decisions being made on national interests than 'doing the right thing', it is also in the interests of India to have a stable Sri Lanka. India has national as well as economical interests in Sri Lanka at stake. Its interests range from Oil storage to exploration, from business ventures to Sedhu Samudhram and it has much more to gain in peaceful and stable Sri Lanka. Its involvement will thwart the others' attempts to use Sri Lanka to disturb the regional stability and keep extremist elements in Tamilnadu in check. While Tamils want peace with dignity, Sinhalese want peace with guarantees against secession. Political solution to Sri Lankan ethnic question is not an easy task, given the number of parties involved and their varying political interests. Besides satisfying them, to implement any solution, the Constitution has to be amended, which in turn, needs two third majority. With the divided electorate and Proportional Representation, having a majority government is a thing of past. Governments that are blackmailed by minority parties don't have the guts to do the right thing, fearing collapse. Above all, the main parties, depending their time in power, change stances not to give credit to the other for solving the crisis and, competing with extremists to deny them any political mileage, portray any kind of solution as a sellout.
Peter Tosh

2008-09-07 09:09:28
To begin with, LTTE doesn\'t even have any politics to speak of. In a civilised world, politics is built upon the basic human rights and democratic principles. While it is respecting the human rights within reason, it gives the people the freedom to choose their own leaders. Democracy might have its own shortcomings and those who manipulate it. But it exists there at least for the sake of the name. But, Such politics doesn\'t exist in Tigerland. Simply put, politics of LTTE is politics of murder. It is an organization which views murder as a necessary modus operandi, not an inevitable byproduct of third world politics. LTTE has got to where it is at now simply by killing the tamil politicians, moderate and militant, depriving the tamils of talented leadership and multi party democracy. If tamils are left with a handful of independent politicians now, it doesn\'t simply mean that LTTE stopped killing them. It is only because LTTE couldn\'t get their hands on them yet. Or at least it couldn\'t get them into total submission like those in Tamil Naitonal Alliance. Above all, it is that fear of murder that silenced the majority of tamils and it is propagated as support for LTTE. Any difference of opinion, internally and externally, is dealt with the gun. LTTE mastered all forms of killings, be they murders, assassinations or massacres. It never believed in the politics of dialogs or democracy. LTTE has such a contempt for democratic politics that it is hellbent on distrupting any elections and eliminate those who had the courage to contest in them. It doesn\'t even leave those who want to vote. It will intimidate, even chop the hands of those who vote. LTTE\'s electoral abuses and violations in the last election were well documented in a report done by the EU commission. Though it claims to be the sole representative of the tamils, it doesn\'t have the courage to contest in elections under its name, like Sinn Fein. Such is the politics LTTE had sofar. had political leaders, it only had spokespersons. There were Lawrence Thilagar of Paris and Anton Raja of London, who were much sought after by media for their comments that usually ranging from \'categorical denials\' to \'ball is in their court\'. These spokepersons fell from their grace and sank into obscurity. Always, they had Balasingam as a \'political advisor\', but he was never called a \'political leader\'. of dissension is not tolerated and only dealt with death. Cadres are expected to be loyal and ready to kill themselves (and others) in the name of the National Leader. Whoever exceeds these expectations, and lucky to be alive, rises in rank. A few who had leadership aspirations dared to have their own loyalists, but were eliminated, as traitors like Mahathaya or martyrs like Kittu, in purges. Learning from that, those who are careful not to have their own clique will be rewarded with commander roles and anyone who could show some strength in talking (even if it lacks sense and logic), was thrust upon with the greatness of political leadership. These obedient servants would recite, like parrots, whatever they are told to. Nothing more for the fear of being seen smarter, nothing less for the fear of being seen incompetent. Above all, they are not supposed to make decisions. They will \'get back to you on that\' after \'consultations with\' the National Leader. Valued as much as disposable diapers, they can be elevated, sidelined or disposed by the National leader at will. But they are free to say anything whenever they attend gatherings to hoist flags. They are not expected to say things in unison. These political leaders had the luxury to improvise as they go. In east, someone will say \'India shouldn\'t ignore the reality\' and recognize LTTE. Then another in Jaffna will warn that \'India shouldn\'t forget the past\' and shouldn\'t sign the defence agreement. Then another, in Zurich, would growl at India and promise \'we will teach a lesson again\' amid applause from cheering \'revived tamils\'. Unaware of all these developments, another at Peace secretariat will say \'we welcome india\'s role\'. Being an official organ, Tamilnet will report these speeches dutifully, which will eventually make it to international media where pundits would analyse the paradigm shift in LTTE\'s fundamental thinking. Nobody will be disciplined for these contradictions as they don\'t mean anything at all, as far as LTTE is concerned. This is the kind of political leadership LTTE has. from the international community with their political leadership, while the military wing holding the ground. Even the tiny East Timor was successful in this regard. Generally, the military and political leadership are so intertwined that it\'s hard to differentiate them. But those political leaders, who are themselves leaders on their own right, rub shoulders with statesmen everywhere, many of them cultivating personal friendships and using it to their advantage to convince them to put pressure on the aggressors. It is the political leadership\'s role, being the face of the struggle, to elicit sympathy by propagating the aggressor\'s atrocities, though at times it ends up defending the atrocities committed in the name of liberation. As it is the one facing the international pressure to \'get back to table\', political leadership has to convince the military leadership to cease fire and talk, cashing on the military advantages to find a political solution with the support of international community. Politics is not a simple matter of getting military advantage. It can only be used to advance the cause politically. It should always be a political head and a military tail, not the other way around. In this regard, \'political leadership\' of LTTE is more like Sinn Fein of IRA. Though it was an open secret and nobody wanted to talk about it in order not to damage the peace process, now it is acknowledged that Gerry Adams et al are integral part of the IRA\'s military command. For their atrocities and refusal to lay down arms, they are no more welcome in many host countries and shunned even by their own people. its murderous mindset and to give an impression that it is interested in a political solution. Just like the emperor\'s clothing. As they say \'If you look hard enough, you will see whatever you want to see\'. This is how international community seems to see LTTE\'s \'Political Leadership\'. If international community really wants to find a solution, it should talk to the leader himself, instead of wasting its time with this political leadership. Like all the explorers, and aliens, international community has to demand \'Take me to your leader\'. Any political solution agreed by this political leadershp can be made null and void by a single bullet by the leader, as it was demonstrated in Oslo and in Mahathaya-Premadasa talks. Unless international community make him personally accountable for his actions, it can\'t bring LTTE to accept any solution.
Patriotic Srilankan

2008-09-07 09:09:01
It will help you in improving your understanding of the conflicts all over the world
to fawad

2008-09-06 06:09:46
To say that there is no scope for political scope within the LTTE is to ignore totally the causes of their origin and sustenance due to serious systemic governance failures by the state over decades from long before they were even born! The ethnic and religious evolution of the state into a Sinhala Buddhist one using unilateralist approaches in its constituion making in 1972 and later and its abysmal failure to implement even its own constittuional provisions with regard to use of the Tamil language, even in the north and east, to this day defies reason. What is far objectionable is the impunity with which the state has denied the physical security of Tamil citizens, their rights, their freedoms and opportunities which are very symptomatic of an Apartheid totalitarian state rife with racism and religionanism in combination with ethnic cleansing under an ethnic Sinhala occupation force. All this has been made possible under the draconian law called Prevention of Terrorism Act under distorted policies borrowed from former South Africa.It failed there totally and the state itself became defucnt because it used this evil legislation and its methods to practise open racial discrimination and the killing of 70 black people in Sharpeville. The open bloodletting, the undisguised dicrimination and gross crimes against humanity and war crimes unleashed by the (Sinhala Buddhist) Sri lanka state against Tamil people makes what obtained in former S.Africa pale in significance. The initial history of the events oulined in the article wriiten by a so-called anonymous "Tamil democrat activist" is correct in many respects. In what was a rebellion fomented by in teh mide 1970s by a few grew in stature ansd support because of the policies and brutal methods adopted by the anhilist policies and actions of the state resulting in mass graves starting with Chemmani. What he should also consider is the way democracy in what was a plural society in 1948 been distorted and bastardised to serve the majoritarian race and religious group people only resulting in divided people from top to bottom along ethnic and religious lines. What is good for the Sinhala Buddhists should be also good for the Tamils and the Muslims. That is why each group should be entitled to the "right of self determination in their respective areas of long standing habitation under a UN supported free and fair referendum, as is their right under international law, to stem the governance rot and more open bloodshed, a shame to all those involved.
Saravan

2008-09-05 04:09:19

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