Region: Calling the shots   April 2011

The cables demystify diplomacy, and provide a rare opportunity for ordinary citizens, in whose name foreign policy is framed, to gain insights about what goes on behind the scenes in the world of diplomacy. The attempts by the US to squeeze WikiLeaks’s operations have led to some serious questions about its commitment to democratic principles and a free press. The threats and legal problems that Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder, has been facing have elements of a witch-hunt about them – though the law must of course take its own course with regard to the cases of sexual harassment and rape filed against him in Sweden. 

 

The initial revelations – published in five American and European newspapers – did throw some light on US assessments of Southasian political dynamics and its own perception of the US role, particularly in the ‘Af-Pak’ theatre. But it is with the publication of the ‘India cables’ by The Hindu of Chennai, which began in collaboration with WikiLeaks in mid-March, that one gets a real flavour of US diplomacy in the region.

 

From these documents, it is now clear that India had to pay a heavy price, both domestically and in terms of its foreign policy, to gain entry into the nuclear club through the civilian nuclear deal of 2008 with the US. Leaders of India’s Congress party apparently told US embassy staffers in New Delhi that they were purchasing votes in order to win a parliamentary vote that would give the government the mandate to go ahead with the deal. An aide to a politician close to Sonia Gandhi is even said to have shown the diplomats the cash lying around in suitcases for the purpose of buying MPs’ votes. 

 

This has provoked understandable outrage, and led to calls for a full investigation into the matter. The opposition has demanded Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s resignation. The government, for its part, has put forth a weak defence, resorting to technicalities about how the evidence is not admissible in a court of law. The communist parties, which withdrew support to the government on the nuclear issue three years ago, claim to have been vindicated, pointing to the role of big money and corrupt practices that accompanied the agreement. Questions are also being asked about what made the concerned politicians so candid with foreign diplomats, and possible US complicity in the distortion of democracy. 

 

Good books

In September 2005, India voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), sending the issue of Tehran’s nuclear programme to the United Nations Security Council. Even a fortnight before the vote, India’s then foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, is reported in the cables to have been arguing with US officials about the course of action they had adopted on the Iranian nuclear programme, and saying that confrontation could be counter-productive. But a clear conditionality was then laid down by the Americans: If you are not with us on Iran, it will be difficult to get the US Congress to support the nuclear deal. The vote, the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline and bilateral visits between these countries were all held hostage due to US pressure. In New Delhi, the strategic decision was taken that being in the good books of the US was more beneficial than building deeper links with Iran, despite India’s long friendship with that country.

 

The cables also offer insight into the nature, frequency, and intensity of the India-US dialogue on regional issues. The two sides exchange views, but their interests do not necessarily converge. The US is clearly interested in a degree of stability in the India-Pakistan relationship, as an escalation of conflict would harm its interests in both countries, as well as in Afghanistan. Consequently, it played a calming role in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks of 2008. The Americans can also be seen prodding India to play a more constructive role during the endgame in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, when the military offensive against the LTTE was at its peak. In Nepal, US diplomats questioned the Indians regarding whether certain parts of the establishment in New Delhi, in 2003, were working against India’s official policy on the Maoists. Thereafter, between 2005 and 2007 the US ambassador to Nepal, James Moriarty, was deeply critical of India’s role in bringing the political parties and Maoists together in the 12-point agreement, as well as what was, in the US view, complacency with regards to the former rebels. 

 

For those who follow politics and foreign policy closely, many of these ‘revelations’ are not startlingly new. In fact, they only confirm much of what has been suspected all along, be it in terms of India’s changing approach to Iran under US pressure, or the US hardline on the Nepali Maoists. But the cables incrementally add to our knowledge of how diplomacy works and inter-state relations in general, and the deep US interest, influence and penetration across societies and governments in Southasia. The Americans do not necessarily have their way all the time, but the India cables highlight the real challenges in building regionalism in the context of broader global power politics, where the influence of the US is undeniably immense in determining foreign policy. Politicians in the region would do well to introspect on whether being so pliant in the face of US foreign-policy concerns does not sometimes amount to harming their own long-term interests.