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The
Salwar Revolution
Thought to
be ‘Muslim’ by some, but originating in the land of the
five rivers — Punjab, east and west — the salwar kameez
has nearly completed its conquest of the South Asian
clothesline. What politicians, diplomats and activists have
not been able to do, this piece of stitched cloth has.
Early on in her presidency,
Pres-ident Chandrika Kumaratun-ga wore a salwar kameez
to a formal occasion. By the next morning, her attire had
produced shrill headlines in the Colombo newspapers. How could
a Sinhala woman, who, to add insult to injury, happens to be
from Kandy, which is least sullied by colonial influences,
wear an alien dress, instead of the frilly Kandyan saree? It
was tantamount to denigrating the Sinhalese nation.
The building of the nation
state in South Asia manifested itself, in quite important
ways, in the evolution of official cultural codes, including
those concerning national attire. So long as such concepts
evolved as a mark of political rebellion against the indignity
of cultural dictation by the colonial power, there was little
to cavil about. But in the post-independence period, the
matter of clothing and attire has become enmeshed in competing
communal and ethnic politics, majority-minority stresses and
competitive nationalism.
Attire quite frequently is a
signpost of identity for social strata, groups and
communities. It therefore comes as no surprise that the elite
of post-colonial South Asia, in the process of consolidating
individual statehoods, felt the need to evolve a national
dress. The national dress was meant to become the flag bearer
of a unified nation, harking back to tradition as well as
reflecting the values of modernity that are deemed to be
appropriate to that tradition. But, in a region whose
countries host such a multiplicity of communities and
plurality of traditions, this begs the question—whose
tradition and whose dress?
Not surprisingly, therefore,
there is exclusionary politics stamped all over the choice
(and imposition) of a national dress, as it often is with
national language. What one wears makes one person belong and
another feel distanced; an indication of proximity to the
power centre to some, as well as a deliberate denial of that
very power centre by others who reject the certified standard.
The so-called ‘national dress’, the patriotic badge of
pride in one’s country and tradition, therefore, becomes
all-too-often in itself a source of division and conflict.
Such dress codes are often
unwritten, but are not, for that reason, any less mandatory.
Imposition of a particular attire necessarily, and in every
country of South Asia, will officially exclude a range of
attires intrinsic to particular cultural groups. Women in the
Indian Foreign Service know they cannot don the salwar kameez
for official events, not so much because it is seen as
informal but because it is understood to be a Pakistani dress.
So where does that leave India’s Punjabis or Muslims? The
same is the case with government officials in Pakistan, who
are not allowed to wear the sari because it is not seen as
Pakistani or Islamic.
Such enforcement of collective
codes is not restricted to state institutions alone. Movements
that resist the centralising tendencies of unitary states are
just as susceptible to the pull of standardisation. Sri Lanka
does have a Muslim minority, and before the rise of ethnic
violence the Muslim women’s dress was not any different from
that of the Jaffna Tamils, and they were not wearing the
Kandyan osariya saree. But after the LTTE (Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam) ordered the expulsion of Muslims from
Jaffna, the community leaders endeavoured to construct a
distinct god-fearing Islamic identity, mostly by way of a
dress code for women. And so the women took to the veil.
A million sartorial mutinies
But while officialdom and
ethnic politics draw markers that divide and regiment in the
name of a constructed identity, there are "a million
mutinies" that challenge such sectarian impulses. For
women, one of the most visible among them is the salwar kameez
or the "Punjabi suit". It has emerged as one of the
strongest signposts for the identity of South Asian womanhood,
a dress which has been accepted by women all over, all of it
without planning or consultation. At any South Asian ngo
conference, you will find most women participants wearing the
salwar/churidar kameez—be they Sri Lankan,
Bangladeshi, Nepali, Indian, Pakistani, or even Maldivian.
Evidently, the South Asian ngo stratum has transcended the
barriers of national and ethnic boundaries to opt for the
salwar kameez, as both a convenient dress and signifier of a
South Asian female identity.
But it is not just the ngo
world that has been swept by the salwar revolution. Its is
fast spreading to challenge the orthodoxies of culture, class
and fashion, not only in the big cities but also in small
townships and villages, and even beyond South Asian shores.
In the deeply stratified Hindu
society, upper caste women are required by tradition to wear a
saree. In Nepal, there was a time when after marriage no
god-fearing caste Hindu woman would wear anything but a saree
or its plebian counterpart the plain cotton dhoti. But
today the situation is very different, as even upper caste
women have taken to the salwar. Working women, in particular,
have set the trend and it has now been picked up by the elite
classes as well as the labouring poor. The choice seems to
lie, first and foremost, in convenience, and the added
revolution that Kathmandu women have brought is that when they
ride pillion on motorcycles or scooters they sit astride the
machine. The salwar kameez is by now ubiquitous not only in
Kathamandu, but also in Biratnagar, Nepalgunj or Bharatpur,
and it is not only the young who are wearing it any more.
A recent SAARC television
capsule, designed to showcase the cultural diversity of the
South Asian Seven, highlighted a Dhaka fashion show exhibiting
the latest in salwar kameez wear by young Bangladeshi
designers. So, the cultural bastion of the fabled Dhakai saree
has fallen to the salwar kameez wave! And in the chic circles
and among the development set, the Dhakai dupatta has
become symbolic of this metamorphosis. On prominent display in
the chic Aarong shopping outlets, the shoulder shawl has
become all the rage, and is on the shopping list of the South
Asian visitor to Dhaka. (Nepal, too, has evolved one of its
traditional weaves—called, incidentally, Dhaka—to provide dupattas
for Kathmandu’s development set and women on the move.)
On the other side of the Bengal
border, the bhadralok of Calcutta lament that their
city is fast being taken over by Punjabis, such is the speed
with which the salwar has spread. And the unkindest cut comes
from their own young women happily slipping into various
designs of salwar. The older generation is a bit more hesitant—my
Bengali mother-in-law has resisted the salwar invasion
largely, I believe, out of the fear of getting accustomed to
the comfort and practicality, thereby letting go of a critical
aspect of tradition. This, in any case, is what happened with
my mother who hails from Multan.
Subversion, renegotiation
The salwar kameez combines
utilitarian and aesthetic virtues, which partly explains its
quick spread across boundaries. In contrast to the flowing
saree, the maekla chador, or the ghagra, the
salwar kameez is a stitched, divided garment that facilitates
mobility. The versatile dupatta that goes with it is both
functional and decorative. The salwar kameez is therefore seen
as eminently practical, democratic and modern—an alternative
to appearing either Western or traditional.
There is another reason why the
dress appeals to so many women. There is the definite
perception of the South Asian salwar kameez wearer as a modern
and empowered working woman. At a time when women are emerging
more prominently in the public sphere, it is only natural that
such an image contributes enormously to the appeal of the
salwar kameez, to the detriment of the saree and other forms
of dress assigned to women by patriarchal societies. Take a
look, again, at Kathmandu’s middle and upper middle class
women. Definitely, a part of their leanings towards the salwar
had to do with the runaway success of Pakistani serials over
the 1990s, which showed self-confident women, beautiful, smart
and working in modern professions.
While the salwar epitomised
rebellion, howsoever understated, the saree has represented
the integrating factor in the modern history of the
Subcontinent. It is a versatile wear, worn in different ways
— Kandyan, Gujarati, Maharashtrian, Bengali, Parsee, as the
maekla chador of Assam or as dhawani in South
India. For many women the saree has also opened up windows
into the cultural and geographic landscape of the region—South
Indian silks from the weavers of Kancheepuram, cotton
Chanderis from Madhya Pradesh, fine muslin from Dhaka. The
variation in fabric is itself a study in diversity, and Andhra
Pradesh alone offers the Dharmavaram, Narayanpet, Gadwal,
Pochampalli and Venkatagiri varieties. Indeed, the saree is
unique in that a single dress gave rise to a diversity of
local expression and spanned a geographic landscape now
divided by state and national borders. But the fact is that,
increasingly, the saree is being folded away in cupboards, to
be pulled out only as a rites-of-passage ceremonial dress.
The salwar’s displacement of
the saree, its image as the dress of women liberated from
domesticity, as well as the perception of it as a Muslim and
Punjabi dress, has contributed to the orthodox reactions it
has evoked in parts of India. Rimi Chatterjee, a Calcutta
working woman, recalls how her Bengali mother growing up in a
traditional Hindu family in Bihar, was forbidden to wear
salwar kameez as it was "Musalmani".
Ironically, she and her sisters were allowed to wear ‘frocks’,
even sleeveless ones, at home though it was always sarees when
they went out.
The salwar is thus a
subversion. After all, women are projected as physical markers
of tradition and community identity. The reaction was
therefore bound to be severe. Women’s expansion of cultural
choice, implicitly entailing a ‘re-negotiation’ of
tradition and identity, has been fiercely contested by the
traditional forces. Battles have been fought every inch of the
way. Two years ago, a college student, Shalini challenged the
unwritten dress code of colleges in West Bengal. She wore a
salwar kameez. The then principal of Ashutosh College debarred
her. However, in the controversy that followed, public
sympathy was with Shalini and the salwar now rules the roost.
Ethnic dress, ethnic stress
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As
for the men,
There
is
an unwritten code evident in what the male political
class wears. In India, the Nehru jacket became an
early standard, as did the achkan churidar. But
newer cultural standards emerged over the decades.
Southern politicians donned the ‘Thiru’ attire,
consisting of a veshti or mundu, the
characteristic ‘undivided’ flowing dhoti of
the south, white shirt and the angavastaram or
shawl draped over the shoulder. This was after the
fashion of C.
N. Annadurai, the fiery DMK
leader from Tamil Nadu, who bore the standard for ‘Dravidian’
resistance to North Indian domination. The ‘divided’
dhoti and the kurta became the norm in
the Ganga plains, but it did not extend north to
Kashmir, nor to the Northeast. Under the
circumstances, a single national dress for the Indian
male could not emerge.
Pakistan
however, has been remarkably successful in evolving a
male national attire for ceremonial as well as
everyday wear. The awami suit, both practical
and democratic, is a salwar kameez, the dress we
associate with the Pasthoons. In addition, Pakistan
also has the Bhutto jacket for the more formal
occassion. In Bangladesh, which has its own Mujib
jacket, the style and colour of dress of politicians
are imitated by rival student groups in Dhaka
University as marks of their political affiliation.
Sri
Lanka’s Sinhala politicians have fashioned a
national dress which owes much to the dress of
the Jaffna Tamils, observes Nira
Wickramasinghe. It is the white cloth or sarong—banian
and shawl—worn during ceremonial occasions. Former
presidents J.R. Jayawardene and
R. Premadasa, were particularly careful not to be seen
in the Western suit. Politically, this is a most
useful dress—the sarong hides the upper class
identity while the banian emphasises the working class
one.
In
Nepal, while there are as many attires as the country’s
myriad enthnic groups, it is the labeda (or daura)
suruwal introduced by the Thakuri rulers, who
united Nepal two centuries ago, that has come up as
the national dress. This attire, with its double folds
held in place by strings (tuna) over tight
round-the-calves suruwals, harks back to its origins
in Rajasthan, from where the Thakuris claim their
Rajput descent. The emphasis on creating national
identity under the Panchayat system (which lasted 30
years till 1990) also led to de rigueur
popularisation of the labeda suruwal; King Birendra in
particular introducing the world to this ensemble
during his international state visits. ‘Ensemble’
because the labeda top is covered by the Western
jacket (called ‘coat’ in Nepal), which is
unfortunate as it manages to completely hide the
distinctiveness of the labeda, both the tying
mechanism and its handsome front.
But
the national dress is merely a costume, everywhere in
South Asia. It is the Western shirt and trousers that
make up standard wear for the urban working man, and
the socially mobile rural man, whether it is in the
Punjab plains, Kathmandu Valley, the Kandyan
highlands, or the delta of the Brahmaputra-Ganga. |
But parallel to this regionwide
one-wear—let us call it the salwar kameezisation of
South Asia—there are equally robust and even violent
affirmations of cultural distinction. In the sporadic
re-assertion of community identities, the focus of the male
protagonists tends to fall particularly on what the women
wear. South Asia’s cycles of ethnic politics does not allow
any neutral space for dress. It becomes a way of
distinguishing one’s own from the ‘other’.
Writing about his work in
Majuli, the island on the Brahmaputra’s midstream in Assam,
the social activist Sanjay Ghosh drew attention to the bitter
criticism his organisation Urmil drew from militants espousing
a separatist identity from mainstream India. The main charge
against Ghosh, who was later killed by the ULFA (United
Liberation Front of Asom), was that his work undermined
indigenous culture. Local women workers and volunteers of the
organisation had shed the traditional maekla chador to
wear the salwar kameez or jeans, both of which allowed them to
ride bicycles to work.
Of course, expediency makes
even die-hard ultra-ethnicists relax on tradition, as in the
case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and its
need to recruit women cadres. Before the "manpower
shortage" hit them, the LTTE’s identity politics was
focused on reinforcing the traditional image of the Jaffna
Tamil woman in full saree, bound by caste, and ritually
sequestered. But their need for mobility—it is hard to
conduct guerilla warfare swathed in a saree—freed the LTTE
women. Touted as ‘Birds of Freedom’, the female brigades
of the LTTE, clad in trousers or salwar kameez, had the
unintended effect of sartorially liberating Tamil women as a
whole.
The image of Danu, the suicide
bomber who assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, has fixed in the mind’s
eye the image of the Tamil woman terrorist in salwar kameez.
In Sri Lanka, whether you are Sinhala or Tamil, chances are if
you are wearing a salwar kameez, the security forces will be
extra vigilant. Early this year, in the heavily guarded Fort
area of Colombo, a young woman in a salwar kameez was sighted
in the evening wandering up and down the avenue. Accosted and
searched by security, this suspected Tamil guerilla did not
have explosives strapped on her person, ready to detonate. She
was actually a Sinhala sex worker from out of town.
In moments of ethnic stress,
the dress one wears can become a dangerous identifier of one’s
background. Sushobha Barve, a Maharashtrian social activist,
still remembers the words of a fellow traveller in the
suburban train: "Aaj galat kapre pehan ke ayee
hai" (You have worn the wrong clothes today). It was
November 1984, and prime minister Indira Gandhi had just been
assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards. Waves of anti-Sikh goons
were on the loose. And Barve was wearing a salwar kameez. In
the compartment were a couple of Sikhs. The mob was dragging
them out, bent on killing them, which they did. She tried to
stop them, but was instead badly roughed up by fellow
passengers who believed she must be a Sikh, perhaps a
relative, because of the dress she had on. It was perhaps the
fact that she spoke Marathi that spared Barve, but those
words, "aaj galat..." haunt her to this day.
It is precisely the meanings
that dress conveys which makes the salwar kameez both an
expression of choice and an object of disapproval. For us,
women of the immediate post-colonial generation, there was the
hangover of the Anglo complex, that is, the need to
distinguish oneself from ‘chi-chi’ Anglo Indians,
and to valourise a nativist ethnic identity, rejecting Western
clothes.
Our children, the inheritors of
a globalising economy, in which our countries have become the
sweatshops of the world’s garment industries, more easily
slip in and out of Western as well as ‘nativist’ ethnic
clothes. Indeed, the spread of the export-oriented garment
industry all over South Asia has made for an explosion in the
availability of Western clothes. In Sri Lanka, the step-up for
the second and third post-Independence generation, is more
likely to be from the skirt to the saree, without the salwar
kameez stage in between. Among the culturally differentiated
peoples of Northeast India who are largely Christian, or the
myriad hill ethnic groups of Nepal, there is a much greater
propensity to wear Western clothes.
Which raises the obvious
question: Is the salwar’s takeover of the South Asian
landscape just a transitional phase, a way station towards the
even more free clothing favoured by the West and so easily
taken up by the women of Southeast Asia? As the distance from
traditional dictates increases, will the demure ladies who
still try to protect their ‘modesty’ with the dupatta
shawl, fling the salwar away in favour of trousers, skirts and
other imported dresses?
The men have long ago given up,
of course. To put it differently, all over South Asia the
males readily gave up their own national or ethnic attires for
the basic shirt and trousers, while shifting the burden of
cultural and ethnic sartorial responsibility on the women.
In a whisper then in a rush, as
the Subcontinent’s middle and upper class women make their
way out of the home and into the marketplace, they will
obviously experiment with more than one form of dress. And
what they will wear tomorrow is what they would like to be
seen in and what is comfortable. The variety of wear is bound
to increase. But there is no question that the salwar, while
it may have to share cupboard space with an ever-increasing
variety of dresses both Oriental and Occidental, will remain a
critical aspect of hundreds of millions of South Asian women
for a long time to come. Besides, it will always have the
pride of place of being the attire that helped in the process
of the liberation of the South Asian woman. |
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Retro-Reaction
in Rawalpindi
There are
those who have learnt to ‘filter’, and have emerged with a
wardrobe which is Western in thought but desi at heart.
by Ayesha
Javed Akram
For
quite some time now, peo-ple in Pakistan have started
believing that fashion can be literally anything. The problem
is that it ends up being just a few people’s anything. Most
women in Pakistan dress up not the way they want to, but the
way others want them to. For a lazy day at home, the BMW Set
will inevitably go for faded Levi’s, the Toyota woman might
decide on a sleeveless cotton salwar kameez, whilst the 800cc
Suzuki owners have probably never experienced something even
remotely resembling “a lazy day at home”.
Grandmothers
and even some mothers have begun to blush at the mention of
how their daughters are dressing up. What the elders cannot
comprehend is why their kin has suddenly taken to baring
themselves? Though excessive skin exposure is still far from
the norm in Pakistan, plunging necklines and seductive designs
are fast becoming the accepted dress code at upper crust
parties. One fashion journalist refers to this craze for
showing skin as “a retro-reaction”—to the opulence
Pakistani culture has been praised and, in some cases,
condemned for.
What is wrong
with opulence, you may ask? Nothing really, but at times
Pakistanis have been known to forget that opulence should have
its limits; what else would you call a five-day wedding
celebration (where the bride is a divorcee and the groom a
widower), during which the bride’s mother had a hard time
limiting her dresses to five, each costing the equivalent of a
honeymoon in Singapore?
Maybe it is
the increased exposure to the West (Pakistan does have a large
number of Internet and satellite television addicts, and the
super-elite travels easily to the West) that has made
youngsters develop this distaste for something as anti-West as
our culture. Maybe we’re just suffering from a bad case of
neo-colonialism. Or maybe (and this is a distinct possibility)
all the international bashing that our country’s leaders
have been receiving has forced us to downplay our own worth
and so blindly follow the West.
But not all
are blindly following the West. True there are those who troop
to “5th Avenue”, wave wads of cash, and end up with what
the shopkeepers confidingly disclose to them (and every other
comer) as “the look everyone is sporting this season”. But
then there are those who have learnt to filter; they observe
Aishwariya’s dress (Rai, not the queen of Nepal), carefully
pore over Vogue, turn half an eye to local fashion shows, and
end up with a wardrobe that, though Western in thought could
easily fool many into thinking that the wearer is a desi at
heart.
Amongst these
gora mems are those who are truly able to sport this East
meets West trend, simply because they themselves are the
products of an upbringing that symbolises the union of the
Orient and the Occident (in the case of one such family,
mother America-born, dad a national capitalist, yearly foreign
trips...). Since these people were bred in Urdu but speak
English, they can wear this look with all the ease and chic
that it deserves.
But this ‘foreign-Pakistani’
look is far too tempting to remain within a limited realm of
class. The rebel daughter of the maulvi and the graduate of
the madrassa are both drawn to it and end up donning it with
no understanding of the philosophy behind this dress code.
These are
the women the world sees swapping their burkas for tank tops
en route to the US. Many might dub them hypocrites. They shrug
and say: “Hey, it’s simpler this way—everyone stays
happy including
me.” Happiness, of course, has always been the Pakistani’s
foremost priority.
Feminist
dupattas
The
explosive impact of Western culture via the electronic media
has not merely brainwashed natives against their own culture
but has also given an almost zealous angle to what has always
been a gently murmuring movement—feminism. Feminists in
Pakistan face one major hurdle—getting the men to listen to
them. Every group of feminists has devised its own method to
deal with this problem. There are those who would like to
ignore the Pakistani men and what they are up to, and so they
concentrate on international seminars and symposia. Their
dress-code ranges from carefully faded salwar kameez
in-country to tailored Gucci trousers (for meetings abroad).
Then there
are the feminists who are interested in getting the native XY
on their side as well as gaining the support of the
international media. Consequently, their wardrobes host a wide
spectrum of salwar kameez, some with chaddars, some with
chiffon dupattas and some with neither—to be used according
to demands of the time. A much smaller group of feminists
believes that the only way to win is to make a statement that
gets people (read men) traumatised and foaming at the mouth.
They do this by puffing cigarettes, walking with a swagger,
and donning spaghetti straps. So who exactly are the feminists
of Pakistan? As a reputed local socialist once commented, “At
this time, every educated Pakistani woman houses a feminist
inside her.” Which might explain why a walk down Lahore’s
Liberty Market provides all the above categories in abundance.
Real Armani,
fake Paktel
A
diverse culture will have its cultural extremists, and so we
have ours, mostly among the male half. Some are known by the
hold-all term ‘fundamentalist’. Frustrated by joblessness,
angered by the lack of opportunities, they start dressing up
to suit their moods. Those who turn to god in this time of
need are soon seen with turbans or topis on their heads and
luxuriant beards, often left untamed for months.
There are
also the cultural extremists who turn to women and wine, but
manage to emerge with bodies toned at gyms (or kept supple by
street cricket), and wardrobes shipped from England. Don’t
be surprised if you see a young boy in a silver button-down
shirt two sizes too small whip out his own fake Paktel on
seeing an Armani-clad man barking into his cellular as he
speeds past. Which one is Pakistan? Your guess is as good as
mine.
Pakistan too
has its share of the middle-class, whose members tread the
safe line in both dress and mannerism, but are nevertheless
conspicuous by their numbers more than any other attribute.
Some claim that it is this middle class that is “the true
representative of Pakistan”, but don’t you be fooled.
Those who really know this land of the pure will tell you that
no one class or group can be representative, which is probably
why democracy has it so difficult here.
Perhaps the
only fulsome praise that can be lavished upon the men and
women of the middle class is that they exhibit more shades of
Pakistan than all other classes combined. It is also clear,
that it is here that one gets to see why proponents of
Hindu-Muslim unity still enjoy a faithful following. In every
era of Pakistani fashion, typical Rajasthani attire has always
featured in the middle class wardrobe, in part or in whole. In
fact currently, there is a craze for anything Rajasthani—from
bindis, to henna tattoos, from innovative saree-lehengas to
fitted cholis. Indian sarees count amongst those few outfits
in our wardrobes that remain evergreen. Weddings in Lahore now
come sprinkled with a heavy dose of Bombay.
Maybe I’m
being a little too hard on us Pakistanis. It is not as if the
transfer of fashion has merely been a one-way traffic. The
West has taken more than its share of ideas and inspiration
from our side. Madonna and her mehendi tattoos is just one
example (though the debate over whether she was inspired by
India or Pakistan will probably never be resolved). One of our
fashion gurus, designer Rizwan Beyg, once dressed Princess
Diana, while Libas’ collection has steadfastly maintained
its cult following in London. Tit for tat is what it has
become these last few years. |
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Let’s
not please the men
by
Durga Pokhrel
My
absence from Nepal over the last 17 years allows me to see
clearly how much change has overtaken my countrywomen and men
during this period in terms of what they wear today and what
they have discarded. If I were to allow myself to think like a
conservative, middle-aged woman, the change would seem
shocking. Fortunately, I may be middle aged but not
conservative by a long shot. I therefore am able to gauge the
changes without the attitude of a woman frozen in the past.
And certainly, the women of Nepal have changed the dress code,
and this is obvious in what my mother wore, what I wear, and
what my would-be young adult daughter would have worn (I do
not have one).
After the
editor of Himal asked me to write about the sartorial
transformation that has overtaken the kingdom, I asked all of
50 provocatively-dressed young Kathmandu women why they chose
to dress the way they did. Was the choice dictated by peer
pressure, social demands or a need to display economic
wellbeing? I, not conservative at all, did a double-take when,
with the exception of one, 49 women replied that they selected
their fashions to look “sexy”.
To be more
precise, most said that their boyfriends told them they looked
sexy if they had a slim body and substantial chests, and those
too enhanced by wearing tight, sleeveless, above-the-navel
blouses, and tight, under-the-navel pants, dyed hair, heavy
make-up, and high-heel shoes. Among these ‘daringly’
dressed girls, only five were from the Bahun, Chettri and
Newar groups. Most of the girls came from Indian or British
Gurkha families, or of parents engaged in the export-import
business. Most were in college, some in high school, others
working as secretaries, and a few were “doing nothing”. I
met all these young women within the space of a week in
various restaurants around Kathmandu.
I wonder how
I would dress up if I were in my late teens today. In my own
case, I graduated to the saree after I completed my Masters
and took up teaching. The saree was the social norm in the
1970s, even the dress code, of a college teacher. That did not
mean I stopped wearing kurtas, trousers, or lungis at home.
Now, almost 30 years later, with nearly a two-decade sojourn
in the US, I even wear Western dresses in public. I am not
sure what my mother’s reaction would be to my wardrobe if
she were alive, but I would certainly revolt against a
boyfriend who insisted that I wear clothes to enhance
sexiness. There’s another factor to remember of course—whatever
may be his inclinations while romancing, once married the man
(now a husband) suddenly becomes more conservative than you
are.
The Nepali
Congress leader Mangala Devi Singh once told me that when she
started a social campaign in the 1950s, asking young women to
discard their shawls, she was accused of trying to disturb the
social norm. The wedding “Bahiri Saree” (outer saree) of
my mother—a mere seven-year-old then—was 40 hath long, all
of 20 yards. My youngest aunt’s was only 20 hath long, and
she was married at 10. Twenty hath was the standard length for
day-to-day use at that time. Back then, there was no custom of
wearing petticoats, panties, or bras, but they did wear a
ten-hath patuka around their waists to hold their sarees, and
also perhaps to support the back during strenuous work. On top
of their chaubandi blouse they wore a khasto shawl. Slowly,
over time, my mother and aunt came down to 12-hath sarees.
Back to the
present—the Kathmandu fashion scene seems to be increasingly
dominated by ‘Western’ dresses which would be considered
rather unconventional and even risque in the real West. There,
politically conscious women have understood that revealing
clothes are to be discarded, as they are designed thus by men
for women to look sexy. Men enslave women through fashion,
and, take it from me, male fashion designers design clothes
for the women they do not have to marry.
A year ago, I
met a Nepali film actress at a party, and was rudely surprised
to see someone else than the pretty Nepali girl in
chaubandi-saree, chura-pote, and dhago I expected. Instead,
she looked like a newly-arrived New York Hispanic with a
cheap-looking midi and moccasin-type boots. When I asked
someone from her modest entourage why she was not in a Nepali
dress, he said, “What is ‘Nepali’? Everybody wears
American clothes in Nepal these days.” Well, perhaps that
was an overstatement, but it does seem that he is right to an
extent, at least as seen in my own sampling.
On the
Kathmandu streets, these days one spots very few women wrapped
in the saree, while the kurta suruwal (i.e. the salwar kameez)
is ubiquitous. Some kurtas are so long that you can barely see
their suruwals. Others are so flappy and long-cut down the
side, you never knew you could see so much leg in this dress.
At the other
end of the fashion spectrum from the salwar kameez is
the “maxi invasion”. Women engaged in labour, whether it
be the kitchen, the bhatti bar-house or the fields, have taken
over the Western nightie and made it their own as a day-time
working dress. All over Nepal, women spend their days in
designs perfected for sleep, and who is to question their
choice? The voluminous maxi, after all, is comfortable, an
easy slip-on, and if there is one thing it does, it keeps the
grasping male at bay by revealing nothing and indicating no
desire.
While women
should be left free with their choice, one can make some
suggestions to add a dash of colour, class or style, however.
For example, it is so easy to convert a maxi into an
acceptable public dress. You could either wear a loose
chaubandi outside your maxi and shorten the maxi by six
inches, or do away with laces and have the platting under the
breast rather than above. As far as the kurta is concerned, it
should reach just below the knees—not too long, not too
tight, not too loose. Women who are too thin or too fat need
not wear the churidar shawl. My favorite is the Nepali daura
style, knee-high kurta with churidar. And, no matter what kind
of sexy, open, half-naked Western dress you choose to wear,
with a Dhaka vest on top, you beat the competition to the
prize and look sophisticated to boot.
Whether
it be the long-slitted kurta, the halter top or the workhorse
maxi/nightie, redesigned or not, in the end it is up to the
individual woman of Nepal to decide what she will wear. As
long as she is not acting to the dictates of a boyfriend, a
husband, the larger male-volent society, or the male designer,
she should feel free to wear what she chooses, when she
chooses. The last thing she should do is to choose her pahiran
to please her man, or men.
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