Southasian front

In the run-up to the December Copenhagen conference, the question of whether a unified Southasian vision on climate change can help the region's countries be part of the effort to stabilise greenhouse gases and adapt to changing climate is a critical one. A unified front would offer a number of clear advantages. First, the weak bargaining position of most of the Southasian countries is well known. Climate negotiations are complex and unwieldy, with the consensus rule of the UN's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) requiring serious diplomatic prowess to reach any acceptable resolution. As such, with resources pooled under a single platform, the Southasian states would almost certainly be able to get a better climate deal at Copenhagen than otherwise.

All the same, will the negotiated Southasian stance be something that will actually advance the interests of all the countries of the region? Such a mutually beneficial platform would require either that India make major concessions by accepting emission cuts, or that other countries agree with New Delhi and refuse to make binding emission cuts. In this sense, a common Southasian front does not seem a necessity if the sole goal of the individual countries is to obtain a better deal in Copenhagen. Indeed, there are other ways in which the objectives of the individual countries can be met. Most Southasian countries are either members of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) group or of the G7 plus China, two forums that have proven far more effective than SAARC in achieving tangible outcomes at international negotiations. LDCs – though at the cost of stalling the Doha Round, have been effective in pushing their agenda on agricultural goods at the World Trade Organisation. SAARC, on the other hand, has been held hostage to regional tensions, with little progress made on the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and other fronts where cooperation has been agreed upon.