Bombay to Kashmir

On 26 November, as news channels in Pakistan began to flash breaking news of the attacks in Bombay, Pakistanis were, like Indians, instantly glued to their television sets. They stayed that way for the next three days. Since cable operators were not allowed to show Indian news stations, the main sources of information were private local channels, which relayed footage from India's CNN-IBN, Times Now and others. The view of dead bodies at the Chhatrapati Shivaji (formerly 'Victoria') Terminus and of the siege of the Taj Mahal and Oberoi-Trident hotels inevitably reminded Pakistanis of the September attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad.

But the attacks engendered further shock. Bombay is not an alien place for many Pakistanis, after all, as many have travelled countless times through this city while watching Bollywood films. They are familiar with the names of Juhu, Chowpatty and many other places, as with the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and the Taj Hotel. "When my wife and I were watching the news, we were angry with the attackers," said Sajjad Hussain, a resident of Karachi. "My wife hoped that no Indian actors, like Aamir Khan or Shahrukh or Akshay Khanna, were in any of these places."

The second, desperate response of every Pakistani was hope that their country would not be blamed for the incident. At first, many assumed that an Indian group, such as the Indian Mujahideen or Hindu extremists, would end up being found to be behind the attack. "In the beginning, I didn't think they were Pakistanis," said Mahawish Rezzvi, a young TV journalist in Karachi. "I know there are many insurgencies within India, and I thought there was a link with them." This was not a mere knee-jerk reaction, but rather came from an easy familiarity with the tactics behind many recent attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere. "If it were a suicide bomb or any other bomb, then I would have thought about al-Qaeda," Rezzvi continued, "but not this hostage taking."

At first, Pakistani news channels simply attempted to cover the story as straight as possible; be objective was the aim. But within a few hours, this pattern was already changing. As they watched the aggressive tone emanating from the Indian channels, which almost instantly began to blame the state of Pakistan for the attack, the channels moved towards increasingly opinionated journalism. Zarrar Khurru, a journalist who was working at the international desk of Geo News as the action in Bombay began to unfold, said that he was not sure who was behind the attacks, but that he quickly realised that the blame would ultimately settle on Pakistan. "When I was asked to go on air during the bulletin," Khurru said, "I said that there were many potential beneficiaries of such a heinous crime. I also mentioned the fundamentalist groups in India, as well as the upcoming elections."

In those early hours, Mahwish Rezzvi was able to watch the Indian news coverage in her office. She said that it was evident from the very beginning that the Indian news anchors were presuming the attackers to be Pakistani. "I remember thinking that it wouldn't be long before the Indian government began to accuse us of having a hand in the attacks," she recalls. This, of course, is exactly what happened. By late evening on 26 November, Pakistani news channels were informing the public that the Indian media had launched a "campaign to malign" Pakistan. This was how the people of Pakistan came to discover that, in addition to what was taking place in Bombay, a crossborder media war had broken out.

Experienced in covering bomb blasts and extremist outfits, Pakistan's media have long since concluded that militant organisations are working independently, challenging states ranging from Pakistan to the UK to the US. It is for this reason that even before the Islamabad government began to issue its official reaction to the Bombay attacks, commentators in Pakistan had begun taking an aggressive stance against the Indian media, simply due to the accusations that the latter was levelling at Pakistan. Journalists in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and elsewhere began to highlight the fact that in recent years Pakistan had been hurt badly by the militants, who have been blowing up schools, attacking security forces and generally terrorising the population in many parts of the country. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto was referred to many times.

As the aggressive tone of the Indian media escalated, says Zarrar Khurru, Pakistani journalists felt like they were left with little choice. They began to question the bias of the Indian media, which seemed to gain volume with the harsh official statements emanating from New Delhi. As the face of the lone detained attacker, Ajmal Amir Kasab, began to appear on television screens, many news organisations quickly sent crews to find Faridkot, in Punjab province, from where Kasab is said to hail. Interestingly, some television channels were trying to establish his links to Faridkot, while others were busily attempting to counter the claim. The latter kind seemed fervently on the warpath of 'patriotism', where objectivity does not prevail.

Undeniable request
The next three weeks were hectic days for diplomats, too. The outgoing US secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice rushed to New Delhi and Islamabad. For Pakistan, the visit was a breath of relief, as the common perception, among the politicians and people of the country alike, was that only US intervention could bring calm to the region. In New Delhi, Rice adopted a tough line, asking Islamabad to "cooperate with India". As the Indian establishment had been clear in its demands, Islamabad knew that Rice would eventually land in Pakistan bearing a list of these requests. This, it was clear, would include a ban on the militant Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and its front group Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), along with the handing-over of many people.

In fact, such a list was not new for the Pakistani establishment. But the change now was that everyone knew that Pakistan would have no choice but to fulfil some of these demands. The question, though, was when this would happen. Lashkar-e-Toiba was already a banned organisation, but Jamaat-ud-Dawa was a different case. It had earned a good name following the Kashmir earthquake of 2005, when its volunteers worked hard to assist those affected by the quake. One JD official says that it has been running 156 free dispensaries since that time, in addition to providing health services in some 73 cities.

Such work provides significant opportunity for outreach. Through the 2005 relief work, a large number of youths came in contact with JD for the first time. A worker with another NGO recalls many Jamaat-ud-Dawa flags flying throughout earthquake-affected areas. Hafiz Abdul Raouf, head of JD's Public Help Department, says that the organisation is currently spending around PKR 5 million every month, providing food and other assistance for nearly 5000 poor families and orphans, in addition to digging wells in Sindh and Balochistan. A political worker with the organisation, Umar Khan, says that the post-earthquake period was when many youth joined the JD. The continuous welfare activities have meant that the organisation remained accessible.

Amid the noise from India and international pressure, the government clearly had to act to buttress its position. So on 30 November, it called an all-parties conference. When this ultimately took place, on 2 December at Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani's house, it was attended by nearly all political parties in the country, large and small. Indeed, this was a rare show of unity among the politicians of Pakistan. Leaders such as Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan Muslim League (Q) President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain met with leaders of the former religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Maulana Fazalur Rehman. Across the board, however, the assembled parties extended their support to the government, unanimously adopting a resolution stating:

The people of Pakistan share the grief of the people of India and extend their sympathy to the families of the victims. All political parties and democratic forces firmly support the government and the armed forces in defending Pakistan's security interests. Pakistan abhors any act of violence perpetrated against innocent persons. That the political parties take strong exception to unsubstantiated allegations made in haste against Pakistan. The [all-parties conference] expresses Pakistan's desire to pursue its constructive engagement with India in a comprehensive manner with a view to building confidence and mutual trust for establishing friendly and good-neighbourly relations with India on the basis of settlement of all outstanding disputes.

There were, of course, some disagreements during the meeting. Many rightwing parties urged the government to withdraw its military forces from the western border. Considering the US-led 'war on terror' and the interests of other countries in this ongoing conflict, however, the suggestions were disregarded by the others.

Thus, when Secretary of State Rice landed in Pakistan on 4 December, Islamabad had a political mandate with which to deal with the situation. For many, it was clear that Pakistan would be willing to impose bans on certain organisations, in addition to what had already been done in the past. During her visit to Pakistan, Rice publicly recognised the fact that that the country was suffering from militancy, but she also asked that the Pakistani government act on any information offered by India. Islamabad's stance on this was clear: the Pakistani state was not involved in the Bombay attacks, but it would take action if New Delhi were to provide evidence about the involvement of any Pakistani citizen or organisation.

Although Rice's visit to Pakistan was seen as an important step by officials in Islamabad, the fact that the US was acting as interlocutor was problematic, given the complex role that has been played by the US establishment in the country. Accepting an Indian demand through the US was doubly complicated. But while Islamabad could not take direct dictation from India, demands emanating from New Delhi could also not be disregarded. In the context of local sentiment with rightwing parties openly alleging that the government was conducting a military operation in FATA only to placate the US, the government was aware that instant action against Kashmiri groups would further complicate the situation. The government claimed that it would act against these elements, but that the Indian government should conduct a thorough enquiry first. Thus, many suggested that the safest way to deal with the situation was through the UN Security Council. And with all major parties willing to cooperate, there were no problem in accepting the Security Council's resolution. On 11 December, the Security Council formally declared Jamaat-ud-Dawa a 'terrorist' organisation, and its top four leaders as 'terrorists'.

Immediately thereafter, a countrywide crackdown against the JD was undertaken by the police in all four provinces, as well as Azad Kashmir. The police raided JD offices, nabbed many of its activists, and put its chief, Hafiz Saeed, under house arrest. The four JD leaders, in addition to Hafiz Saeed, include Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the group's chief of operations; Haji Muhammad Ashraf, its chief of finance; and India-born Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq, described as a financier for the group who also served as its chief in Saudi Arabia. This list later became controversial, as Muhammad Ashraf seems to have died in June 2002 while in a hospital under police custody. On the day that the Lahore police detained Hafiz Saeed, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani told journalists that Lakhvi was already in detention.

In the context of the routine Indian finger-pointing at the Pakistani state establishment, it bears attention that in Pakistan there has been a nuanced development away from the position of blaming India for terror attacks within the country, in line with the ubiquitous 'foreign hand' theory. The Pakistani state and many of its people had previously been strongly under the sway of this theory; but the government has in recent years come to accept that internal issues were actually the cause of much of the country's militancy, coupled with the porous border with Afghanistan. Since the elections in February 2008, the new government had also admitted that a sense of marginalisation in Balochistan was feeding insurgency in the area – though Islamabad officials also did not rule out the involvement of Indian intelligence agencies. At the same time, a common perception that prevails in Pakistan is that India has serious issues within its own borders that are ripe for the promotion of violence and terror. Kashmir is considered the root cause of the problem, though the 2002 Gujarat riots and the presence of Hindu extremist organisations are likewise seen as contributing to growing indigenous militant movements in India. Nevertheless, a comparative study would indicate that the Pakistani state and media have backed away from knee-jerk reactions against India, while the Indian state and media seems to lag behind on this score.

Rightwing resurgence
The crackdown on Jamaat-ud-Dawa took place at the same time as the Muslim festival of Eid-ul-Azha, when animals are traditionally sacrificed. During this time, animal skins and meat are often considered a major donation for charity organisations such as the JD. On 10 December, just a day before the crackdown began against the group, the JD claimed to have sacrificed some 10,500 animals, the meat from which was distributed among the needy of Kashmir and other parts of the country. JD officials also announced that they would be speeding up work on building homes in earthquake-affected areas, as the winter loomed.

While the Indian media was only looking at Pakistan, it was clear to many in Pakistan that the Bombay attacks had brought the Kashmir issue back into the limelight. Within Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa were considered to be 'pro-Kashmir' organisations. Although LeT had been banned in 2002, after a brief period under house arrest, its leader Hafiz Saeed was released and had begun openly running JD. While there is no open or formal link between the two organisations, it is well accepted that the JD is a welfare front for the LeT, as Hafiz Mohammad Saeed who was heading the Lashkar also heads the Jamaat. The latter itself claims to be "not only an organisation … [but] actually a movement". For this reason, the ban on the JD or any action against Hafiz Saeed was, among rightwing parties, seen to be a significant turn in Pakistan's Kashmir policy, and one that seemed to support India's perceived aim of forcing Pakistan to stop its support for groups in Azad Kashmir.

Thus, following 11 December, the mood quickly changed in Pakistan. Many rightwing parties came out against the crackdown, including Jamaat-e-Islami, which had an active role in the Afghan war of 1979-89. Jamaat-e-Islami head Qazi Hussain Ahmad termed the actions against the JD as "cowardly". In a press release, he stated that India had failed to produce any proof of the involvement of Pakistani citizens in the Bombay attacks, and that taking action without evidence was reprehensible. Another leading rightwing party, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, which has been considered ideologically aligned with the Taliban, reacted in support of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Its chief, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, stated that the JD was nothing more than a welfare trust, and warned that the crackdown had weakened Islamabad's credibility.

Taking a cue from this resentment, the government itself came out with a harsh statement against the Indian claims of JD's militant involvement. The UN Security Council resolution notwithstanding, on 14 December, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi stated, "There is no evidence that Jamaat-ud-Dawa is engaged in acts of violence." As political support swung towards the JD, many began coming out onto the streets, holding rallies in Lahore, Karachi and other parts of country. Just hours before his house arrest, Hafiz Saeed called a press conference and promised that his party would soon write to the Security Council to state formally that Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa are two different organisations. These claims notwithstanding, it is clear that the focus of both organisations is the same. Both desire the renaissance of the Muslim ummah, and both focus on Kashmir, highlighting alleged atrocities in India-administered Kashmir. Interestingly, the work of the JD was not confined to the Muslim community, but also included Hindu minorities. Among the several demonstrations held against the crackdown on the JD, a notable one was a demonstration by the Hindu community of Hyderabad in favour of the Dawa, with banners reading "Is providing water to people terrorism?"

Political heat
In the aftermath of the Bombay attacks, the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi were more engaged in seeking political mileage than in addressing the real issues at hand, which inevitably built up war hysteria. Such actions actually show that the 'emergency diplomacy' between India and Pakistan remains weak. Many of the actions of November-December 2008 were notably similar to what took place in 2001 following the attack on the Indian Parliament (though this time India did not 'mass' its army at the border): India blamed Pakistan for not doing enough; Pakistan claimed that it was cooperating but that it required proof to act; India sent to Pakistan a list of people it wanted handed over – including Hafiz Saeed, Maulana Masood Azhar and many others. Pakistan then claimed that these people could not be handed over to India, as the countries do not have a formal agreement of exchanging wanted people. Lack of coordination in dealing with security is not the only area that has been found wanting, however.

As part of the "composite dialogue" between the two countries, Pakistan and India have for several years been trying to develop people-to-people contacts, and multiple positive steps have been taken in attempts to normalise relations between the neighbours. Pakistani artists have begun performing in India, Indian films have begun showing on Pakistani cinemas. Trade points across the Line of Control in Kashmir have been opened, and talks have taken place to open additional crossborder routes.

Following the Bombay attacks, trade, art and culture have faced some of the most immediate implications. Pakistani artistes who had long been performing in India were forced to rush back home. Shakeel Siddiqui, who became famous in India performing in comedy shows, returned immediately as extremist parties in Bombay announced that they would not allow Pakistanis to perform anywhere in India. "People in India love me, they know me," Siddiqui said after returning to Pakistan. "They want to see me performing in their cities. But the political heat did not allow me to stay."

That such a change could happen so quickly, after so many years of confidence-building efforts, has caused some to be pessimistic. Siddiqul Farooq, the spokesperson for Nawaz Sharif's PML (N) party, said straight out that confidence-building measures had failed to thwart war threats in the region, and that the situation surrounding the Bombay incidents had shown that nothing much had changed after all. "Confidence building cannot be long lasting without addressing burning issues like Kashmir," he said. One way or another, many observers have noted that, by avoiding direct dialogue on that thorny issue, both Pakistan and India have been missing significant opportunities.

The common Pakistani is already beginning to feel the after effects of the Bombay attacks. Cricket was the first to be impacted with the cancellation of the Pakistan-India series, originally scheduled to begin on 13 January. The series always brings a large number of cricket fans to the grounds or has them glued to TV or radio sets. It has also become a big money-making opportunity, largely through advertising campaigns. With the games no longer taking place, the Pakistan Cricket Board alone will reportedly face a loss of nearly USD 30 million. Another consequence might be the reversal of the opening up to Bollywood films. "I don't know if I will be able to see Shahrukh Khan's latest film, Rab Ne Bana Di Jodi, in the cinema," sighed Mohammad Zaman, while searching the Rainbow Centre listings in Karachi. Before long, he and many others may well be back in Pakistan's pirating markets, furtively searching for illegal copies of Bollywood blockbusters.

~ Fahran Reza is a journalist in Karachi.