Modi’s uncoordinated approach on Tibet gives China the advantage

This story is part of ‘Modi’s India from the Edges’, a special Himal series presenting Southasian regional perspectives on Narendra Modi’s decade in power and possible return as prime minister in the 2024 Indian election. To read the series and support Himal’s work on it, click here.

In April this year, India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, outlined his priority on India–China relations་ in an interview to Newsweek. “It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us,” Modi said. The very next day, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry responded to the comment, saying, “The boundary question does not represent the entirety of China-India relations, and it should be placed appropriately in bilateral relations and managed properly.”

This latest public exchange between India and China draws attention to an unstated but critical issue between the two countries – Tibet. The “borders” or the “boundary question” are nothing but references to the Indo–Tibetan border, which became a point of contention between the Asian behemoths after the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1959. In less than a month, in the wake of India’s ongoing general election, Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may form a government in New Delhi for a third consecutive time, or the Indian National Congress and its allies may cause a major upset and take power. The new Indian government, however it is constituted, will have to contend with a poor near-term outlook for India–China relations, with Tibet continuing to be the elephant in the room.