This summer's thaw in Pakistan-India relations has breathed new life into track two processes between the countries. The region's pacifists have risen with recharged spirits, with visits and exchanges following the recommendations that evolved in countless earlier seminar discussions. The most recent such visit was undertaken by a group of Indian parliamentarians led by veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar, an independent member of the Indian upper house. Organised by the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy, the visit (to Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi) was in reciprocation to a journey in May by a delegation of Pakistani legislators led by Ishaq Khan Khakwani of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam).
Speaking in Karachi, in the last week of June, Nayar and his compatriots sent out a strong message of peace and friendship to an appreciative audience. There is a "Subcontinental consensus", said Nayar, that war was not the answer to our problems. "We have to ask ourselves two questions: are we ready for peace; and are we ready for a commitment to peace?"
Track two diplomacy between Pakistan and India, a phenomenon linked with civil society's growing consciousness of and confidence in itself, has developed since the late 1980s. Through escalations of tension, as manifest in the 1998 nuclear tests, 1999 Kargil conflict and the exchange of nuclear threats in the summer of 2001, practitioners of this track of diplomacy have tenaciously held on to informal talks. The Neemrana dialogues, which began in 1991 with American support, have facilitated exchanges between educators, ex-military men, ex-bureaucrats, artistes, businessmen, parliamentarians and members of the media.
While the sincerity of these conflict resolution practitioners has never been in doubt, the Pakistan-India track two runs the risk of being only occasionally relevant to track one, which refers to the official diplomatic exchange between the governments of the two states. The tension, apparent in the most recent exchange of legislators, between representing a state and representing an ideal arises from the typical limitations of track-two diplomacy. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is imperative that track two representatives resolve the tension with the state if their efforts are to bear the fruit of peace. Ordinarily, this would begin with influencing the minds and agendas of the ruling establishments in each country, but if we accept that the national power elites have an entrenched interest in sustaining a slow-burn conflict, that is easier recommended than done.