Afghanistan: Too much, too little

Do the Afghan national security forces have the necessary capacity to take over security operations from the international military forces stationed in Afghanistan? It depends on who is asking. In late November, the NATO summit in Lisbon signed off on a 'timetable' for handing over responsibility to Afghan forces in a process expected to begin in the spring of 2011 and be completed by 2014; US troops are expected to start their 'drawdown' in July 2011. While the beginning of the withdrawal does not imply an exodus of the troops, it will see the beginning of gradual reduction – and, more significantly, decreasing participation of the troops in forward operations.

Ahead of and following the Lisbon summit, a broad section of the donor community was at pains to draw attention to security 'gains', linking success to the high 'attrition rate' (ie, the killing of) militants, a narrative designed to show that conditions are being created for the transfer of security responsibility. Missing from this narrative is the high attrition rate within the pro-government civilian and military ranks, too, as the insurgents step up their operations, moving deeper into Afghan villages. Frequent briefings claim the success of large-scale operations, especially in southern Afghanistan, as well as the larger role of Afghan forces who are sometimes credited with taking the 'lead' in some security operations.