The indigenous Jumma continue to endure violence and conflicts over land in the militarised spaces of the Chittagong Hills.
The indigenous Jumma continue to endure violence and conflicts over land in the militarised spaces of the Chittagong Hills.

Part-time peacekeepers

The Bangladesh Army’s record in the Chittagong Hill Tracts belies its prominence in UN peacekeeping missions.
The indigenous Jumma continue to endure violence and conflicts over land in the militarised<br />spaces of the Chittagong Hills.<br />© EU – Photo: <a href="" target="_blank">EC/ECHO/Pierre Prakash</a>
The indigenous Jumma continue to endure violence and conflicts over land in the militarised
spaces of the Chittagong Hills.
© EU – Photo: EC/ECHO/Pierre Prakash

In July 2014, Herv́e Ladsous, the United Nations Under-Secretary General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) paid a three-day visit to Bangladesh. This was supposedly the highest-level visit to the country from the DPKO yet, and signified not only the importance of peacekeeping operations to Bangladesh, but also the DPKO's interest in further nurturing the relationship. Through this symbiotic relationship, Bangladesh benefits economically from the earnings of its peacekeepers. It also keeps the military's nose out of the country's internal political matters, and projects a positive image of the country's armed forces to the rest of the world. The UN, meanwhile, profits from employing peacekeepers with a credible reputation. Indeed, many commentators argue that political elites, the military, civil society and the international community all benefit from Bangladesh's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations.


Where is Sodi Shambo? by Sharmila Purkayastha

A garrison state? by Tisaranee Gunasekara

Lines of control by Gita Viswanath

States of denial by Seema Kazi

Thinking beyond Huntington by Ayesha Siddiqa


Political developments in recent years seem to support these observations. While in 2007 the military intervened when the two major political groups – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Awami League (AL) – involved themselves in election-related violence, in late 2013 and early 2014 the military remained quietly watchful, contenting itself with providing the necessary security support on election day, and maintaining a safe distance from partisan involvement in the violence and blockades that brought the country to a virtual standstill for months. It may be safely assumed that the military did not want anything to damage its international image and its future peacekeeping prospects.

This unwillingness to intervene hasn't always been the case. The independent country's first president, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was killed in a coup in 1975, after which General Ziaur Rahman became president in 1977. Rahman was killed in an aborted military coup in 1981, and was succeeded (after a brief period in which the country was ruled by Adbus Sattar) by General H M Ershad, who assumed power in 1982 and retained it until 1990. Political analyst Syeed Ahamed termed the domination of civil and military bureaucrats over the decision-making structures of the state a 'marriage of convenience'.

Given this history, the actions of the military during the reign of the 2007-08 caretaker government are inconceivable without considering the threat of restrictions placed on the military's participation in UN peacekeeping missions. As academics Rashed Uz Zaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas write, "the military's complete takeover would have raised serious questions about its credibility in imposing democratic and legitimate governments in other parts of the world under UN auspices." Despite the fact that the military-backed caretaker government of 2007-08 was the most significant military intervention in national politics in recent times, talk of setting up a National Security Council (possibly along the lines of the one in Pakistan), was dropped, arguably as a result of peacekeeping concerns.

While of late the army has, very clearly, been conscious of damaging its democratic and humanitarian credentials, this discretion has not inhibited its continued presence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The military was deployed to the CHT in the mid-1970s when an indigenous insurgency began in the area as a reaction to a constitution that failed to recognise the distinct identity of those in the CHT, as well as policies that encouraged cultural assimilation. After two decades of violence characterised by massacres and targeted rapes of indigenous women by the military, a 'Peace' Accord was finally signed in December 1997. The Accord demanded the rebels surrender their arms in exchange for a general amnesty, and, among other things, stipulated the removal of all temporary military camps from the CHT – a region which occupies over 10 percent of Bangladesh's land mass. Although the rebels fulfilled their part of the bargain in a grand ceremony with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and although the military, at certain points in time, claimed to have dismantled some of their temporary camps, the overall presence of the army remains strong. Not only does the military continue its role in providing 'stability' (despite being accused of fomenting communal attacks on indigenous people), it is also involved in development work and owns a number of commercial tourism projects in the CHT.

An insidious presence
The deployment of the military in the CHT in the mid-1970s resulted in attacks on indigenous villages, as well as sexual abuse, detention, torture and disappearances. There was a near media blackout at the time, and even today, there has been no official, state or military acknowledgement of the massacres committed by security forces in the CHT.

Beyond everyday violence, the government also implemented a transmigration programme to change the ethnic make-up of the CHT irreversibly. In the late 1970s they brought in poor, landless Bengali people from the plains with the promise of land to till and free food rations. In an article in the Daily Star, the then Deputy Commissioner of Chittagong (1978-81) expressed his shock at the decision of the military government, saying that they were "transporting civilians to the mouth of this Vesuvius". These 'settlers' were strategically placed in guchcha grams (cluster villages), firstly to occupy land belonging to the indigenous people, and secondly to allow the military to manoeuvre themselves through the areas comfortably. Today, the presence of these settlers is one of the biggest causes of friction in the CHT. This, along with the fact that major clauses of the 1997 Accord are yet to be implemented ('temporary' military camps remain, while land disputes are ongoing) have meant that rights violations and violence continues.

In recent years, there have been a number of arson attacks on the homes of indigenous people in the CHT. The biggest attack took place in Sajek in February 2010, when a few hundred homes were burned to the ground. Several allegations were made against the military at the time, accusing them of protecting the arsonists and shooting two indigenous hill persons. The European Union aired their concerns about the military's role in the tragedy, and was blasted by political groups for doing so. The matter was quickly buried and forgotten, and the impunity of the military was strengthened.

Loading content, please wait...
Himal Southasian