A protester holds a placard with the three-finger salute in front of a military tank in front of the Central Bank building during a demonstration. February 2021, Yangon, Myanmar. Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Wire.
A protester holds a placard with the three-finger salute in front of a military tank in front of the Central Bank building during a demonstration. February 2021, Yangon, Myanmar. Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Wire.

The machine that went rogue

Learning from Myanmar’s unsuccessful ‘Third Force’ movement.

Early on the morning of 1 February 2021, a convoy of armoured vehicles carrying fully armed soldiers approached the parliament, where elected officials were ready to take office after another landslide victory for the ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The Myanmar military detained President Win Myint, de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and hundreds of lawmakers and government officials. Television and radio broadcasters and internet service providers found soldiers at their doorsteps, who ordered them to discontinue their services at gunpoint. Later in the day, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing declared a state of emergency through a televised speech, citing possible voter fraud, and promised to hold a new election at an unspecified time in the future. The coup took place after the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a party of former generals, lost the election in November 2020. Unable to accept the election results, the USDP demanded a re-run of the election, levelling accusations of voter fraud, contrary to observations from independent election watchdogs that the election results were credible. But the military backed the USDP and ousted the newly elected government.

The Third Force and the army in politics

The 2021 coup is a proverbial slap in the face for everyone who believed that Myanmar's military could be a force for good. During the transitional period from military rule to partial democracy in the 2010s, many observers assumed that the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which protects the political and economic powers of the military, was the best power-sharing agreement between the praetorian military and pro-democracy groups supported by the masses. A group of intellectuals informally known as the 'Third Force' in Myanmar were at the forefront, pushing for political changes during this decade. It is hard to say exactly who the Third Force are because it is a network of loosely connected intellectuals and civil-society groups. But Myanmar Egress, a Yangon-based think tank, is widely considered to be the main driver of the Third Force movement, together with other less well-known civil societies. Founded in 2006, Myanmar Egress made it evident that its intention was to engage with the then military government as its now-defunct website says they are "nationalists committed to state building through …working relationship with the government and all interest groups".

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