On the North Waziristan town of Mir Ali, a Dawar tribesman is in the midst of shifting his family to a new home. The reason: he has just discovered local Taliban militants, together with foreign al-Qaeda forces, using an adjacent compound. "Living close to such people these days is tantamount to inviting death, as the American drones are chasing al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters like bees," he says, talking to neighbours before setting off to his new home. That the Dawar family is completely uprooting itself in search of a safer place to live is a direct result of the recent increase in drone attacks triggered by the 30 December killing of seven employees of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The event took place at the Chapman 'forward operating' base in Afghanistan's Khost province, when a Jordanian 'double agent' named Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi blew himself up.
In a videotape released after the attack, al-Balawi was seen sitting next to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Hakimullah Mehsud. Coupled with the fact that the assault took place deep inside a fortified base, the videotape forcefully underlines a newly strengthening coordination: among al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in jointly attacking US forces in Afghanistan. This is further made clear by the fact that, while the Jordanian al-Balawi was an al-Qaeda recruit, he depended on logistical support from both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to carry out his mission.
Of course, this triangle of cooperation was known well before the al-Balawi attack, as formerly disparate militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan have increasingly come together under a joint ideological umbrella. In particular, Washington has concluded that defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan would be impossible unless Afghan jihadi leader Jalaluddin Haqqani's network, based in Waziristan, is destroyed. Active in Afghanistan's Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces, which border North and South Waziristan, Haqqani exerts considerable influence in Pakistan's tribal regions. In turn, this gives the network a strategic advantage in inflicting damage on American and NATO troops across the border.
The strong support for the Haqqani network in North Waziristan dates back to the early days of the US-backed Afghan jihad. At that time, the then-ailing Afghan leader was using foreign money and weapons to strengthen his support base. Today, the hand of the Haqqani network has been evident in some of them most vicious actions to take place in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was also clear in the 30 December attack: in Khost, the stronghold of the Haqqani network, al-Balawi could not have planned the operation without the logistical support of the former's network. Furthermore, the Haqqani group has a history of not engaging with the media, instead using Pakistani Taliban groups to claim responsibility, as was the case this time around.