The Subcontinent of South Aisa
When faced with a challenge, a problem, the South Asians of the northern (problematic) part of the Subcontinent scratch themselves behind the ears and say, "aisa hi hai", adding, "kya karein?" The languages may differ, but the idea is the same. Translated, it refers to a fatalistic acceptance of things, and there is enough of that to warrant that at least this portion of South Asia should be called South Aisa. Nowhere is fatalism and willingness to suffer mayhem (as long as it is in the next state, city or mohalla) more obvious than in the easy acceptance of death due to political violence.
Look at the facing page, and study the incomplete list of political killings in our region over the course of October 2002. Do not bother yet about a full count, just check the column inches. Where do most South Asians die for a 'cause', get killed for fighting for that 'cause'? Jammu and Kashmir, that incredible haven of peace and tranquility of the 1960s where Shammi Kapoor and Sadhana used to cavort in the meadows of Gulmarg. J&K takes the skull and crossbones trophy for October as the place where the most South Asians died, and where Kashmiris suffer under the twin onslaughts of jehadis exported from Pakistan and the lakhs of Indian troops meant to lock the region into the union.
Next, the column-inches take us to Nepal – the kingdom that deluded itself into thinking it was the abode of peace only because tourism brochures said so and because the Buddha happened to be born here in a nondescript patch of the tarai two and a half millenia ago. For being a far smaller country than Pakistan or Bangladesh, notice how poorly Nepal stacks up against eternally violence-prone Pakistan with all its sectarian violence, especially in Karachi. As a columnist wrote in the Nepali Times, "Mahakal, the deity of death and destruction, is performing his Tandava in Nepal without bothering to take a break". The state and security in Nepal do not even seem to notice the dead and dying all around, and Kathmandu valley's cocoon is as yet intact from the brutality in the hinterland.
Sri Lanka would have been right up there, and even above J&K, for much of the last two decades. But it is at relative peace today, with discussions going on between the LTTE and GOSL across the waters in Thailand. Even the Indian Northeast seems to have tired a bit of mayhem, if you consider the consolidated inches for Tripura, Nagaland, Assam and Meghalaya. And could it be that we have missed out on Maoist activities in Bihar-Jharkhand and in the Deccan? Gujarat has gone mostly quiet, the terrible Mr Modi apparently unable to cause more harm.
Perhaps there is a cycle to these things. Everywhere, in the absence of a 'naturally' evolved state – and South Asia's states are such – there is a premium on the quality of political leadership. When that leadership is found wanting, for being rampantly corrupt and selfcentred, for not providing the minimum of governance which leads to economic uplift, or for not listening to the urgent voice of minorities and those who have been crowded out of state power, you can rest assured that the flare-up will come. In places where the government cannot even see an explosion staring it in the face, as in the case of the Kathmandu-centric sarkar of Nepal, then the flames rise as if out of nowhere. Elsewhere, when the government is far (physically or psychologically) from the place of inequity and is able to send in the paramilitaries to suppress the initial sparks, the problems fester. But when they do come to the surface, they last much, much longer.
Perhaps, therefore, there is an element of predeterminism in all of this, the killing and murder for political purpose. Since democracy is imperfect in most parts of South Asia, we can take it that the politicians will not as a rule look to the long term. Which means that they are programmed to turn away those who seek justice and release from discrimination on the bases of ethnicity, language, religion, region, caste, class. And so, the dispossessed will rise when under manipulative and opportunistic leadership, and when they do the state and establishment will without exception respond with the stick.
Depending upon the local specifics, the depth of discontent, the fractures within protest movement, the importance of the 'prize' for the central government, and the involvement of outside powers, the war will go on for decades or it will be tackled in a few years. But the battle will happen. If we are right, then the only thing to hope for is the emergence of leaderships all over that can understand the trend and decide, once the flare-up begins, to address root causes so as to shorten the duration of the pain.
Sri Lanka has had a long tragic innings, and hopefully it is on the mend, although we would be correct to collectively hold our breath. J&K and the Indian Northeast are clearly travelling on a longish road of violence, while Nepal will likely self-destruct if the violence of the kind indicated in the facing page goes on much longer. But if there is indeed predeterminism in South Asian violence, look at the regions that are today at relative peace, particularly in the problematic Northern half of the Subcontinent, starting from Balochistan, all the way to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Have they had their cathartic experience yet?
Meanwhile, have you noticed something else? The complete absence of South India in our column inches out there? How do we account for that?