Fallacy of the basic idea

The two-nation theory is used as a form of social control by Pakistan's elite.

The single most important event in Pakistani his tory is the secession of the eastern wing and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971. Yet, the imperative sentiment behind Pakistani nationhood remains the two-nation theory. The interest groups that comprise the Pakistani state are entirely reliant on this theory to justify the security paradigm that underlies decision-making, and allocation of resources. And yet, the single most important event in Pakistani history remains strangely peripheral and misunderstood, misrepresented as it is by the elite. To understand the concept of Pakistanhood that has been propagated over our 55-year history is to understand the political economy of this country.

All state structures that are fundamentally undemocratic rely on means of social control, whether they are coercive or subtle. This social control is usually founded on a basic idea, on a singular ideology that permeates all aspects of life. In Pakistan's case, this ideology in its essence asserts that Muslims are unable to co-exist with Hindus. Created as a home for the Muslims of the Subcontinent, Pakistan today teeters on the brink of political bankruptcy. It is described by a ravaged economy, all-consuming societal ills, and a political culture that resembles a modern-day monarchy.

The assumption that Muslims were inherently a single nation separate from the nation of Hindus, India, was proven false by the events of 1971, when it became apparent that the Bengali identity was dearer to those who lived in East Pakistan than the Muslim identity. Today, there still are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan. And, have we forgotten that there are still over a hundred thousand Biharis in refugee camps in Bangladesh that the Pakistani state refuses to accept? Still, the two-nation theory continues to inform Pakistan's polity in a profound way, by providing the energy for its Kashmir preoccupation: Kashmir continues to irk because it is symbolises a failure to fulfil the two-nation dream. The fallacy of the two-nation theory has been proven time and again, its contradictions undermining its credibility, but the tragedy for Pakistan is that the theory continues to be employed by the elite to perpetuate a system that has clearly failed to cater to even the basic needs of its citizens. The fact that the majority of Pakistanis still subscribe to this theory underlines how powerful a means of social control it is.

The Pakistani body politic was dysfunctional from the word go. At the time of partition, the Pakistani military was a marginal actor. Neither was the religious clergy a major player in the politics of the new nation; in fact, the Jamaat-e-Islami had been opposed to the break up of India. The Hindu intelligentsia and entrepreneurial class from entire regions, including the Siraiki belt and Sindh, had packed up and crossed the new border to India. At that stage then, it was the landed elite that had emerged as the most influential lobby within the Pakistan movement which held the reins of power. The rest was an unnatural amalgamation of different interest groups aspiring to state power. And from the outset, the Kashmir dispute defined the national psyche.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah is often quoted as having said that religion should not interfere in the affairs of the state. He is said to have asserted on numerous occasions that Pakistan would be a secular state, albeit with a Muslim majority. However, he also made it very clear that Kashmir was Pakistan's "jugular" and the new nation was incomplete without it. Jawaharlal Nehru was similarly uncompromising, promising on the one hand to give Kashmiris the right to decide their own future, and on the other, initiating the militarisation of the area by sending thousands of troops to fortify its frontiers. At the very outset, the leaders of the freedom movement made the Kashmir issue contentious, and this has since weighed heavily on the entire region. A mentality that Kashmir must be made part of the country has dominated the public discourse in Pakistan, and as such, has given the military and the religious right an easy excuse to propagate their destructive ideologies. Meanwhile in India, the establishment continues to mandate gross violations of human rights in Kashmir, claiming it is a secular, democratic state at the same time.

The inordinate amounts of money spent on defence, the extraordinary and unnatural rise of the religious right in the last 25 years, and the degeneration of political parties in Pakistan all have something to do with the security paradigm of the state. Essentially, it is the threat perception from a bigger and stronger India (and therefore, the argument goes, the ten times as many Hindus on that side of the border who thirst for Muslim blood) that gives license to the establishment to accord special privileges to itself in the name of protecting Pakistan and its Muslim population. The rise of the religious right (and the proliferation of jehadi elements) and the thwarting of the political process are, then, outcomes of the inordinate power that the military establishment exercises. These trends have been reinforced by the whims of the United States both during the Cold War, and now.

Pakistan reached a critical point when General Ziaul Haq took over the country in 1977. A year later, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and as the definitive conflict of the Cold War shaped up, Pakistan emerged as western capitalism's point man on the Subcontinent. It is now common knowledge that the US supported the Afghan mujahideen and the many splinter jehadi groups that have since become the US's primary enemy in the "war on terror". Nevertheless, then it was the Islamisation of the country that made it possible for General Zia to propagate the notion of jehad against communist Russia.

This process of Islamisation had actually begun with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Having come to power on the slogan of Islamic socialism, Bhutto proceeded to oversee the writing of the 1973 constitution in which Ahmadis were infamously declared non-Muslims. In 1974, the "peaceful" nuclear test carried out by India provided impetus for a new wave of hysteria in Pakistan. Bhutto launched the Pakistani nuclear programme, with the slogan ghaas khaenge ("we will eat grass" if we have to but we will make the bomb) to emphasise his commitment to the creation of an Islamic bomb. Once the need to combat the perceived Indian threat was re-established as the primary policy concern of the state, it was less important for Mr Bhutto to make good his populist election promises of roti, kapra, makan (food, clothing and shelter) than it was to stand toe to toe with India.

In many ways, Bhutto's tenure was dominated by efforts to banish the disaster of 1971 from Pakistan's collective memory. The nationalist movement had proved that not only did the Bengalis not have any allegiance to the Kashmir cause but that they also disputed the special privileges accorded to an army that was almost exclusively based in the western wing. Indeed, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman consistently and accurately alleged that East Pakistan's export earnings from jute were being used to fund the army and an industrial complex in West Pakistan rather than to cater to the needs of the eastern wing.

So the security paradigm emerged with renewed vigour after General Zia came to power, courtesy the Afghan war. Along with it came the shocks that split the nation along religious, sectarian, and ethnic lines. The promulgation of "Islamic" laws such as the Hudood Ordinance which openly discriminate against women in cases of sexual abuse, the formation of the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) that disturbed the delicate ethnic balance in Karachi and fomented unrest, and the explosion of sectarian conflict, all took place during the Zia era. The de-politicisation of society was accompanied by the politicisation of the intelligence agencies. Political parties remained sidelined for almost a decade. By the time elections took place in 1988 by virtue of Zia-ul Haq's mysterious death, state and society had been transformed.

The fallout of 12 years of unstable democracy was an intensification of the influence of the security apparatus in the affairs of the state. It is now common knowledge that Pakistan-based jehadis were at the forefront of the militarised resistance in Kashmir. As such, therefore, Kashmir policy dominated national politics through the 1990s and the military establishment in the post-Zia era has never released its stranglehold on power to any meaningful extent. Development expenditure fell from a high of 7.6 percent of GDP in 1991-92 to 2.8 percent in 2000-01. Meanwhile, expenditure on defence and debt servicing was equivalent to 88 percent of total tax revenue in 1991 and increased to over 90 percent of total tax revenue in 2000.

The stranglehold that the military establishment has on resource allocation is at least partly due to the fact that it has such a massive influence on the political process. The intelligence agencies that had been made all-powerful during the covert US operation in Afghanistan in the Cold War era have maintained their grip on Pakistani politics. Meanwhile parochial sectarian, ethnic and jehadi groups have injected a new terror into Pakistani society. Unfortunately, these forces are not accountable to anyone — they have no institutional history, and whether they flourish or wither away is a decision over which the Pakistani public has no control.

While the aftermath of 11 September has inadvertently led to the exposure of this nexus, it has not changed the way the Pakistani state is structured or the essential power dynamics that exist within Pakistani society. In fact, the military's domination has been cemented over the past few months. All civilian agencies in the country are now headed by retired or serving army officials. Two out of four provincial governors are retired generals. Three federal ministers are retired army men. The list could go on. (See Himal, June 2002.)

Many political parties have been co-opted into this undemocratic system, which is a reflection not only of the degeneration of politics in the country, but also of the fact that political parties do not expect to ever exercise authority independent of the army's wishes. Ultimately, the established political elite is aware that challenging the military's consumption of a disproportionate share of the budget, or the fact that army men are given special privileges, offices, and rights, will only lead to its own demise. Of course there is the small matter of political parties being unrepresentative and self-interested. Groups with vested interests such as the landed elite, an industrial class which derives its competitive edge through state-sanctioned cronyism, and the civil bureaucracy, have all at one time or the other allied themselves with the military establishment to serve their own needs and wants. To invigorate political process in Pakistan the nature of the state will have to be fundamentally altered.

The security paradigm and the accompanying forms of social control that allow the military to continue its domination of state and society are intact. Textbooks used in schools propagate untruths about the atrocities of the independence movement; they also promote intolerance toward religious minorities. State-run television and radio spew out long propaganda programmes highlighting India's evil designs and the need for combat-ready armed forces and modern weapons to repel Indian aggression. PTV often shows a short programme called Kashmir File after its 9 pm Khabarnama, showcasing graphic footage of Kashmiris being abused by Indian soldiers, calling for their freedom from oppression. As an example of how such conditioning begets itself, newspapers covering, say, a natural disaster in India will phrase headlines almost as if the disaster were divine punishment: "Heat wave kills 300 Indians".

Nevertheless, cracks are emerging. The military establishment has been forced to re-evaluate its role in facilitating conflicts on its western and north-eastern borders. The most recent stand-off with India seems to have been averted, and US pressure has seen Pakistan acknowledge, and make moves to arrest, "cross-border infiltration". Still, one feels that so long as it is US persuasions that compel the army to make a retreat, any retreat is only temporary.

Nation-states peripheral to the global system such as Pakistan have almost completely surrendered sovereignty in crucial affairs, and so perhaps even a US-imposed change could negate the original US created extremist threat. But US interests do not include forcing a fundamental reorientation of Pakistan's state ideology. The US military-industrial complex reaps many profits from Pakistan's hunger for military technology and infrastructure, and very much wants to maintain its market share in South Asia. Any genuine change in Pakistan must be organic and based on public recognition within Pakistan that the prevailing state ideology is untenable. Only once this happens will there be any fundamental compulsion for the military to retreat to the barracks. So far political parties have failed to play the role of challenger to the state, public frustration is ever on the rise, poverty is rampant and growing, and post-referendum, resentment towards the army is widespread. There is talk now about how much the conflict over Kashmir has cost Pakistan and its people. And there are livelihood movements that are beginning to come into direct conflict with the state.

As the latest budget is released, Pakistani policymakers are once again hard put to explain away the low growth and the poor level of poverty-related expenditure. They point to a 14 percent increase in defence spending over the past year by way of excuse. They will continue to do so until the global hegemon, international financial institutions or some other influential actor challenges their policies and the wisdom of the imperatives that guide them. The Pakistani people can hardly afford to entrust their destinies and the destiny of their political culture to a verifiably fickle international community. If anything is to really change, the will to reshape the Pakistani state must be generated by the Pakistani people themselves.