Flood of Hope
A review of the output of the techno- exuberant school of thought.
By the mid-1980s, it was already apparent that something was seriously amiss with the much-vaunted Himalayan hydro bonanza. The Farakka Barrage was souring relations between India and Bangladesh a s the impasse over lean se as on water sharing became more intractable. Nepal was wasting its available soft credit on the fourth feasibility study of a high dam on the Karnali with a multi-billion price tag, even though few really believed that the effort would bring India and Nepal any closer to meaningful agreement.
Within India itself, social and environmental activists were challenging conventional and official thinking on the Tehri and Narmada dam projects and highlighting hitherto hidden costs. It was obvious that the conventional school had failed to deliver, but what could be a new approach? There were two schools of thought beginning to develop: one (to which this reviewer belongs) said we need to try something different that is less centralised or bureaucratised, more sensitive to the grassroots farmers or consumers, and appreciative of the tremendous uncertainties in Himalayan waters and societies; the other said let´s move on the same track charted earlier, but faster, more massively.
It was at this moment of quandary that a three-country non-governmental study, funded by The Ford Foundation, was initiated on regional cooperation in harnessing what is now called the "Eastern Himalayan" rivers, namely the Ganga, the Brahmaputra and the Barak-Meghna.
Hopeful Waters
The output of this effort has been in the form of four books: three country perspectives, published or in draft form by 1993, and one joint synthesis volume in 1994. But in a conceptual sense, all four books present themselves as annexes to B.G. Verghese´s 1990 volume entitled Waters of Hope, {see Himal review May/Jun 1991). In that 446-page work, Verghese attempted an ambitious task of transcending national segmentation and departmental myopia to put forth a regional perspective—covering Nepal, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh as well as sectors such as electricity, irrigation, flood control, navigation, fishery, pollution, water laws, displacement and seismic hazards—that would highlight the limitless cornucopia in the waiting and simultaneously help overcome mistrust and fears of the regional riparians.
Given that he came from the old school of thought based on technological exuberance, Verghese achieved a remarkable success within the limitations posed by that school, to propose grandiose possibilities of regional cooperation in alleviating poverty in the region through water resources development.
In dealing with the problems of India´s riparian neighbours—Farakka with Bangladesh and storage dams as well as past projects such as the Sarda, Gandakand Kosi with Nepal, India´s knee-jerk panic denunciation of the Barcelona Convention on navigable waterways—Verghese sounds much more sympathetic and admitting of problems than India´s water bureaucracy. However, in his lucid arguments for water transfer from the Brahmaputra west to the Ganga or for large dams in the Nepal Himalaya, in his dismissive treatment of fears of resettlement, seismicity, and macro-economic risks as "exaggerated", or in his oversimplifying social and environmental concerns as "romanticising the noble savage", Verghese articulates the perspectives and interests of water bureaucrats as they themselves have never managed to. These arguments and viewpoints are merely updated in the Indian country perspective presented in Harnessing the Eastern Himalayan Rivers.
Except for a faint note of dissent in a chapter by Khattri on Seismic Hazards in the Himalaya, this school of thought rolls on in the Indian volume like a juggernaut that would crush all cynics under its weight of high hopes and dreams. Given India´s dismal record of irrigation, embankment-building or resettlement, the constant refrain in these volumes that all fears are exaggerated, that the situation is quite under control requiring only some tightening of rules and tinkering with procedures, that past mistakes will not be repeated on a larger scale. sounds convincing only to water bureaucrats and none else in India´s riparian neighbourhood, perhaps even less so in the Indian alternative community.
One can hardly blame Verghese for choosing like-minded experts to represent as the Indian perspective, views only of this particular school of thought. No Lokayan or Down-to-Earlh here, in case you were wondering. No discussion of how Nepalis can hope to increase affluence under a monopsony cost-plus development regime of power pricing by selling electricity to Indian state electricity boards which have arrears of billions in unpaid bills to Government of India-owned power companies.
Despite evidence to the contrary, as has happened with the Japanese Global Infrastructure Facility or World Bank funding for Arun III as well as Narmada, no offer here of proof that "there is sufficient indication that international funding and technical assistance will be forthcoming in ample measure if the Basin-states decide cooperatively to harness the waters of these mighty rivers". With S A ARC forbidden to look at controversial issues, no convincing insights as to how cooperative institutional mechanisms would be established when the water bureaucracies of all three riparians are in an intractable impasse, spending more energy justifying their past and protecting their narrow turfs than forging new paths.
Himalayan Uncertainties
On the whole, in the books under review, the Indian concerns are well articulated and a way forward is sought by highlighting the benefits from Utopia and, in parallel, trying to make sceptics feel guilty of preventing such bounty from accruing. One is, however, terribly dis¬appointed with the Bangladesh and Nepal volumes. They do not succeed in bringing forth the official stances of their countries nor do they come up with new approaches.
One of the best argued chapters in the earlier and the updated Indian presentations is the rationale behind Farakka, the historical antecedents that relate to the partition of Bengal and the adjudication that favoured flushing Calcutta port, and why water transfer from Brahmaputra is both in Indian and Bangladeshi interests. The Bangladesh country presentation, on the other hand, is so laconic and bland on Farakka as to give a third-country reader the impression that Bangladesh has given up arguing its case altogether. For the garrulous Bengalis, the concerns colourlessly expressed over water reductions in Sylhet from the Tipaimukh storage project verge on near-acceptance, especially when contrasted with the Indian offer to Bangladesh for joint participation in the project.
Moreover, the Bangladeshi book repeats the standard scientific myth of flood ills emanating from deforestation in the hills, something that the Indian presentation no longer presses in the update and is instead quite well versed with the scientific debate on this topic.The Bangladesh volume brings between two covers a large volume of data but fails to synthesize lessons for regional cooperation in water management or elucida tea Bangladeshi perspective that could elicit sympathy in a third country.
The Nepali presentation exposes an equally sorry picture. The chapters by different authors are lumped together without a uniting thread. The conclusion of one contradicts the conclusion of another, justifying fears that the different members of the research team never talked to each other or the editors. References are listed that are not referred to in the text, and, vice versa, those in the text are not found in the reference list, indicating a very sloppy cut-and-paste job.
One simple example of inconsistencies is the use of five different figures in five chapters for the annual run-off out of Nepal, ranging from 125 to 209 billion cubic meters. One author of two chapters goes on to use two different numbers—175 and 207—in two places. Three authors use three rates of sediment yield for the Kosi that differ by a hundred percent. Admitted that there is great uncertainty on a Himalayan scale when it comes to water and land data—which is a point made well in the book— the reader is entitled to expect from such a research endeavour a minimum of consistency and reasons given for discrepancies in the original sources.
As an exposition of Nepali viewpoints, the book is not very helpful. The consensus in Nepal behind Clause 126 of the 1990 Constitution is not explained in a manner that would tell Verghese and Iyer that conclusions in their book are faulty. What is written about solving the Tanakpur imbroglio is more a collage of press statement platitudes than an analytical framework to move beyond the impasse. For example, instead of saying "get adequate water for irrigation of the total command area of Kanchanpur district", or "increase Nepal´s entitlement of power generation from Tanakpur keeping in view the flow and site contribution of Nepal to the project", the researchers should have come up with specific proposals on how precisely to do what they suggest.
Sacrificial Paragraph
At a conceptual level, the book on "Nepalese perspectives" fails as a research effort. While relying heavily on consultancy-genera ted papers and donor documents, it is unable to critically assess the numbers or conclusions therein. For example, the chapter on hydropower simply pulls out the tables and conclusions from the World Bank funded consultancy study Reconfirmation of Arun 3 Hydroelectric Project without attempting even back-of-the-envelope analysis of the numbers to see their obvious flaws. The book misleads when it states that "agreement has recently been reached between the governments of the two countries in this respect (sale of Arun III power to India)."
The chapter on irrigation seems to have been culled from several government documents with no underlying theme. The chapter on water transport claims that it is the cheapest mode without looking at its infrastructure development costs. It is based on a table taken out of an unpublished and un refereed work with no explanation of underlying assumptions.
The introductory chapter on macroeconomics of megaprojects is in the name of a macro-economist with conclusions at such wide variance with his past pronouncements that one asked around, and investigations revealed that changes which went to the heart of the argument had been made apparently without his knowledge. The original paragraph in his´ ´conclusions" where the macroeconomist had offered his ideas on the Karnali and on the proper development of Nepal´s hydropower resources appears nowhere in the book. Instead, in its place one finds a paragraph bland as it is subservient to the dominant themes espoused by all the books under review. The original paragraph (made available to this writer) and the one that replaces it have nothing in common—the rewrite is complete.
In the original, the economist states: 7s it wise for a small country like Nepal to undertake a single project which is larger than its current GNP? The Nepalese economy is likely to be held has tage by such a project, given all its technical and financial risks. Secondly, the opportunity cost of projects such as Karnali in terms of other economic projects and social programmes that will have to be foregone will be enormous, no matter how generous and concessional the outside funding arrangements may be. A Kamati project may make the government of Nepal rich but not necessarily its people. Increasing financial resources in the hands of the government is not what economic development is all about…. As the millions of dollar –so fun utilized foreign aid money committed to Nepal show, the lack of financial resources in the hands of the government has not been the critical factor leading to Nepal´s current low levels of development. Conversely, we should not expect much if such financial resources available to the government be vastly increased with Karnali type power sales revenue.
In its place, we are now given the following: One of the principal attractions that Nepal sees in these mega-projects is the revenue to be earned from the sale of power which can make positive contribution to the long-term economic growth and structural transformation of the Nepalese economy. Increasing financial resources in the hands of the government can augment investment capability which in turn can be channelled to critical sectors of the economy thereby contributing to the social and economic development. If one were to forward a case and look at one project as being ahead of others, the Karnali project would be the choice in the immediate future…. A lot of time and money has gone into it. It is time a breakthrough is made before long to facilitate entry into another phase of cooperation leading to improved socio-economic well-being of the people of the region.
What could thus have been a major exposition of a sound and well-articulated. Nepali perspective on macro-economic uncertainty was sacrificed at the altar of conventionality. It is grossly unfair to the researcher, and unfair to the basin riparians and the financial community at large as it gives the impression of unanimity about the Nepali macroeconomic scene which does not exist in reality.
In sum, because the output of the entire exercise emanates from the conventional rather than the alternate school o f thought, it misses vital South Asian perspectives which will decide much of the future in this arena, as Arun and Tehri have already shown. Even as this collaborative study was being undertaken, there were other viewpoints in the region spearheaded primarily by social activists whose fears and concerns remain unanswered.
All in all, this exercise supported by The Ford Foundation would have been a useful exercise if team-members from South Asia´s smaller riparians had used Verghese´s 1990 book as a starting point to conduct a dialogue on those issues with which they agreed and others with which they did not—without wasting time and pages on culling tables from myriad documents. The Centre for Policy Research Verghese´s institution in New Delhi, could have come out more convincing if it had included, besides the official and conventional viewpoints, the Indian alternative schools which are already interacting intensively with other like-minded professions elsewhere in South Asia. As such, it is only Big Brother who comes out a winner in this exercise, as his is the only voice that is well articulated.
In a deeper sense, failures of this kind lie really at the doorsteps of the grant-making agencies, The Ford Foundation in this instance. Because of their penchant for "policy studies" to influence policy-makers while neglecting basic scientific research, because of their predilection for ex-bureaucrats with access to public data, they get, for all their dollars, a reiteration of the conventional past.
Howsoever talented and experienced ex-bureaucrats may be, the more senior they are upon retirement, the more they need to justify a lifetime of conventional performance. This predilection does not allow wholesome academia to flourish. Rather, it promotes a bureaucratised intelligentsia anxious to uphold a failed order even at the expense of discomfitting truth. It also starves the alternative schools and denies them access to funding. South Asia ultimately remains poorer than before, with poverty in thought and initiatives added to its already empty rice bowl.