How ‘Big’ Is Big Brother?

Small nations are generally afraid of big ones, but there are occasions when the big begin to take note of the small and even develop apprehensions about them. In the last two decades. South Asia has often experienced this when India, though perceived as the “Big Brother”, has developed a scare about some of its smaller neighbours. To enumerate a few instances, Sri Lanka was seen to be threatening when it was believed to be offering port facilities to the United States which New Delhi thought was “unacceptable to Indian interests”. Bangladesh has been seen as a threat because of the “silent invasion” of large parts of Eastern India by its overflowing population, while its successive military governments were believed to be patronising a whole set of guerilla groups in Northeast India. In recent times, even Nepal has been seen as a threat as Indian policy-makers and those who inform them claim to have clear evidence of Nepal´s use as a nerve-centre for Pakistani offensive intelligence activity against north India. Pakistan, of course, is in a league of its own as far as Indian perceptions go.

This is hardly the situation, then, of Big behaving big. Nor does South Asia´s undeniable “Big Brother” come across as a Big Power, full of confidence and displaying the magnanimity that one expects of it.

Shabby Intervention
It has been more than a quarter century since 1971 and the aftermath of Bangladeshi independence, when the US recognised India´s supremacy in the region. (Time magazine was the first to call India a “regional superpower”.) The Indian nation-state has lost much of its elan as a “regional superpower” since. Some would argue that India was never a regional superpower—but even those who feel so would agree today that India´s exercise of its overwhelming might has been carried out rather shabbily. So, when Bangladesh fails to fall in line, the Ganga is choked at Farakka and more so in its upper reaches. When Nepal does not come to terms, an economic blockade is enforced to stifle that landlocked economy. And when Sri Lanka refuses to play the surrogate, Tamil rebels are armed—at great cost to India itself, as subsequent developments showed.

The morality factor is not terribly important here. In the words of the redoubtable A.J.P. Taylor: “Big states have always tried to dominate small states and will continue to do so.” Fair enough. But on two counts, there is still a lot to be critical about Indian foreign policy in South Asia. If India wants to dominate smaller states in the Subcontinent, like the USA does on a global scale, if it believes in a South Asian Monroe doctrine of its own, then it should speak the language of power and get rid of its high moral pretensions (“nation of Gandhi”, etc, etc).  If the Americans armed the Afghans, they did so after saying in so many words that they would never accept the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.  But  Indian doublespeak is unbearable—how can you accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and yet help in the arming of thousands of Tibetans, all at the same time? The era of providing regional leadership, or even global leadership, by the sheer exercise of power has perhaps come to an end. In the Gulf War it was clear that the Americans went in for the kill because the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait upset the big industrial powers as well as much of the Arab world and the use of US military might was made in a climate of global consensus. It is strange that post-colonial India, the same India which fathered consensus as a force in international relations through its advocacy of the Non-Aligned Movement as an alternative to Western-style power-politics, is beginning to underestimate the value of consensus in diplomacy and foreign relations, particularly in the regional context.

If India wants to lead the South Asian region, which it should and can, it should stop acting the bully. It should be mindful of the interests and the sensibilities of the smaller neighbours, and even of Pakistan. It should be able to generate a consensus on key issues in the economy and politics of the region, and it should be able to extract major concessions from international bodies on issues considered important by the regional countries. Delhi has to understand that almost despite themselves the small gravitate towards the Big. This is the law of gravitation and in order not to upset this natural law, the Big has to behave accordingly.

The Gujral Doctrine understands this changing fact of international relations. And the government led by Mr Gujral has its power base in the regions, not in the centre, and is therefore less likely to make an effort to flex its muscles menacingly. Indeed, it serves the rest of South Asia perfectly well to have in the seat in New Delhi a government whose power base is in the outlying regions, not in the heartland. The outlying states, after all, are the ones which border neighbouring countries—and they have as much to gain from closer interaction across the border than with New Delhi.

The states of northeastern India, and certainly West Bengal, have much more to gain by closely interacting with Bangladesh, Nepal or Bhutan. In contrast, Delhi is a distant reality. India´s regions can now carry out, with Delhi´s blessings, sub-regional dialogues with neighbours. When smaller neighbours deal with parts of India, and not the whole of it, the fears of the Big Brother will automatically subside. The Gujral Doctrine should legitimise the process of sub-regional dialogues in the ambit of Indian foreign policy making. After all, the greater involvement of states and regional leaders in foreign policy making will thrive on the principle of consensus, and this in the final analysis will give back India its pride of place in the region.