International ‘commitment’

In the labyrinthine corridors of 'Af-Pak' politics, an arrest is not an arrest and a crackdown is not a crackdown. Currently, Afghanistan and Pakistan are engaged in a shadowy tussle over Mullah Baradar, the operational head and second in command of the Taliban. Baradar, whose real name is Abdul Ghani (baradar is actually a form of 'brother'), was arrested by the Pakistani authorities sometime in early February, though the official announcement of the arrest was delayed. So far, so good.

Arresting insurgents taking shelter in safe havens on the Afghan side of the border is what has been demanded of the Pakistani government time and again. But apparently, not this time. Kabul officials have made it clear that Mullah Baradar was engaged in high-level negotiations, thus suggesting that his arrest was a Pakistani attempt to sabotage the ongoing talks. Confirmation of this has come from none other than the former head of the UN in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, who has criticised Pakistan for its action while confirming the UN's engagement in these talks. Eide said the effect of the arrests on the possibility of continuing the process had been negative. In doing so, of course, the controversial Eide has efficiently eroded the veil of secrecy for his successor, the Swedish-Italian diplomat Stefan De Mistura, who arrived at his Kabul posting on 13 March.

The allegations around Baradar's arrest are in keeping with broader concerns about the selective crackdown by Pakistani authorities on those insurgents and extremist groups that are unwilling to toe Islamabad's line. The Afghan government has now asked the Pakistani authorities to hand over Baradar and other Afghan insurgents who have been detained. However, Baradar's efficacy in actually arranging negotiations might be severely curbed if he has lost operational control of the commanders while in custody.

As Himal goes to press, it is unclear why the arrest got the nod from the American authorities, who were clearly in the loop right from the beginning – even prevailing on the New York Times to withhold news of the arrest for several days. Indeed, US policy on reconciliation in Afghanistan has remained ambiguous. While President Barack Obama's government has backed the process of reintegration (basically the co-option of insurgent foot-soldiers), it has refused to join the multinational trust fund that has been set up for this purpose, preferring to carry out the task through military commanders on the ground from a separate fund instituted in the US Department of Defence. Meanwhile, on the issue of reconciliation (with the insurgent leadership), opinion within the US is apparently divided, with a section insistent that the 'ideological' members of the Taliban cannot be absorbed, while another section urging the induction of individuals who do not constitute a direct threat to the US – though opinion may now be veering around to when the reconciliation should take place, rather than if. While some are currently urging a substantial degradation of operational capacity of the insurgents before any reconciliation, others feel that waiting too long could strengthen rather than weaken the insurgency.

Murky jirga
Talks about the talks are now set for 1-2 May in Kabul, when the Afghan government will host a 'peace jirga' of members of parliament, community elders, tribal leaders and others to chalk out a plan for reconciliation. Civil-society groups and women's organisations are concerned that they will not be included in the discussions, and that reconciliation aimed at 'stability' might compromise their hard-won rights. Their fears are compounded by an assessment that an international community keen to wind down its participation in Afghanistan could be willing to look the other way on such compromises, in favour of a temporary stability that allows a graceful exit.

Evidence of this was visible in the recent news of the murky passage of legislation dealing with amnesty. Introduced in 2007, the law, which gives all those involved in past, present and even future hostilities (there is no cut-off date) immunity from prosecution, was shelved after protests from the international community and human-rights groups. Critics had pointed to the law's breach of Afghanistan's own Constitution, the government's obligations under international law, the denial of justice to victims of 30 years of conflict, and the self-serving nature of the amnesty, which stood to benefit commanders and warlords in government. However, only in recent weeks it was revealed that the government had quietly re-introduced the law late 2008 – and had chosen not to make this public.

In publicising the law now, President In publicising the law now, President Hamid Karzai's government has exhibited superb timing, aimed at deflecting criticism. With donor countries keen on a political reconciliation, few are eager to oppose a law that is being touted as the first and necessary step for political negotiations. Despite considerable uproar within the civil-society groups who have come together to oppose this law, as has the country's statutory Independent Human Rights Commission, the international community has kept its own counsel – lending further credence to Afghan fears for the future in which international evacuation will be part and parcel.

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