Irreconcilable with democracy

On 23 June, hours after US President Barack Obama's announcement of the withdrawal of 30,000 US troops from Afghanistan, a controversial special-elections court in Afghanistan announced a series of rulings overturning the decisions of the independent electoral bodies that certified the 2010 parliamentary election results. The event received little attention in the tumult focusing on President Obama, his generals and Washingtonian politics. At one level, the special-court decision seemed logical – an election dogged by allegations of fraud, a special inquiry and the overturning of some results. Was this evidence of Afghanistan following due process and strengthening electoral democracy? Hardly. The special-court decision has resulted in the weakening of Parliament, currently the only national institution for participatory politics. The impact of this move, if left unresolved, could ultimately have far greater consequences for Afghanistan and its peace than those resulting from the US troop withdrawal.

A look at the composition of the 62 MPs who are sought to be replaced by another 62 contenders reveals little. In Afghanistan's party-less electoral system, no clear-cut difference exists between opposition and government. Nor do the names reveal any pattern of pro- or anti-government MPs. The move was not President Hamid Karzai's attempt to fill the Parliament with MPs loyal to him, but rather to make the House itself more subservient to the executive.

Arguably Afghanistan's nascent electoral institutions – the Independent Election Commission (which administers the elections) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (which investigates complaints relating to electoral malpractices) – did an imperfect job under tremendous political pressure in 2010. It is certainly possible that not all of their decisions and procedures would stand up to rigorous scrutiny. However, the solution to this situation was not to supersede the independence and authority of these electoral bodies by the executive branch, but instead to strengthen the electoral bodies including through much-needed electoral reforms. Moreover, the process followed by the special court – restoring some votes and eliminating others – lacked transparency in both procedure and process.

Now, no matter what the final resolution of the issue, Parliament has already been weakened. There will be doubts about the legitimacy of the 62 MPs who were earlier elected if they remain in Parliament, as well as doubts about the new MPs elected with the help of the special court if they take office. The erosion of legitimacy of the Parliament helps President Karzai, for whom the House has been a thorn in the flesh – blocking several of his decisions, including several appointments to the cabinet.

Ease of patronage

While the weakening of Parliament and the blurring of the necessary boundaries between the powers of the executive, the legislative and judicial branches must concern all democrats, they also ought to be of concern to 'pragmatists' from whom 'practical' solutions override principled positions. This section, has now been touting 'Reconciliation' with the armed opposition as the only way to peace in Afghanistan, and withdrawal of international troops has been premised on the country's move towards such reconciliation. As the international troops began handing over tracts of territory to the control of Afghan National Security Forces in July, those backing the departure argued that the political process underway would see the armed opposition laying down its weapons, accepting the Constitution and achieving its aims through political participation and power-sharing rather than violence.

Yet existing institutions that provide the platform for political participation and power-sharing are themselves being undermined systematically long before the 'peace process' can even get underway. Even those among the insurgents contemplating political rapprochement – and there are doubts about how many are – must be wondering what lies ahead for them if they do reconcile. Will they make the difficult leap from armed opposition to the mainstream only to be prevented from political participation by the whimsical subversion of political institutions? Would they make the considerable effort to join the process of political representation by contesting elections only to be divested of their seats or worse, to enter a Parliament that lacks legitimacy and authority? The current crisis must surely be a disincentive for reconciliation. Yet those within the Afghan government and the international community advocating Reconciliation do not appear concerned about the steady weakening of ways and means of wider political participation.

The current crisis, for instance, could have been forecast a long time ago. Urgently needed electoral reforms have languished with no political will, and there was little support from the international community backing Afghan voices calling for an end to the controversial special-elections court, which was allowed to continue with its work for more than half a year. In fact, the response of the international community to the announcement of the Special Court has been either rhetorical (the European Union's stated support for separation of powers between the three branches of government), silence (the US) or silencing of democratic dissent (UN Special Representative Staffan de Mistura recently cautioned MPs to 'not resort to sit-ins, protests or other actions which could provoke public unrest'). In the name of 'Afghanisation', the international community is interpreting sovereignty of Afghanistan as the right of individual Afghans to ride roughshod over their own institutions.

At the same time as the erosion of political space, there is a strengthening of the politics of patronage. While the real reason for the shocking murder of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half-brother of President Karzai, on 12 July is likely to remain shrouded in mystery, his death did tear the veil off a significant body of Western opinion, mainly seen in the media, that equates control of patronage with governance. While acknowledging the controversy surrounding his alleged links with drug trafficking, many described Ahmed Wali as the 'go-to man', the 'King of Kandahar', crediting him with getting things done rather than questioning why nothing could move in Kandahar without his acquiescence. Already there is a chorus of voices looking for the next strongman to replace Ahmed Wali in Kandahar – presumably to continue the same politics of patronage that have alienated a considerable section of the Kandahar population, pushing many into the arms of the armed opposition. The need for more broad-based power-sharing and equitable governance is apparently not viewed as necessary, either in Kandahar or in Kabul.