Jambudweep. No?
The efficacy or life of a new idea depends upon whether it is able to stir up controversy. After all, anything novel or transformative is bound to disturb some political status quo, whether it is communitarian, ideological, nationalist, ultra-nationalist or dealing with economic relationships. And as a result, rejection or condemnation is to be expected. In this sense, the idea of 'Southasia' must thus far be considered a failure, despite three decades of trying. Had the idea of Southasian regionalism been at all threatening to the individual national elite, centred in each of the capitals, there would have been a hounding of the votaries of the idea. Instead, there is an indulgent tolerance of these incorrigible romantics, and the SAARC organisation is left to try to keep the idea of regionalism within the control and confines of the individual foreign ministries. It can be said that SAARC allows each of the state establishments from keeping 'Southasia' from emerging as an idea that is too threatening.
Should the idea of Southasia finally begin to gain traction – as one of the means of introducing peace, economic justice, good governance and rule of law in a region that houses nearly a fourth of the world's population – a fierce resistance to the idea is sure to emerge, in contrast to today's benign neglect. As and when some of the mainstream commentary begins to give credence to Southasia as a living, growing concept, the rejection will come from every sphere in each of the countries, including politicians, bureaucrats, scholars, professionals and even activists. At that time, the opponents will use whatever tools are at hand, the more extreme and rejectionist the better. From some hints that have been received in the past in only mildly threatening terms, one can predict at least some of these rejectionist positions.