JOINT TASKS
The concept of partnership between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) assumes concrete form in the Joint Task Force charged with overlooking the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the north and east. The terminology of 'partnership' emerged for the first time during the first round of peace talks in Thailand in September. Those talks saw a major breakthrough when the LTTE virtually renounced its demand for an independent Tamil state. Given such a step forward on the LTTE's part, it seemed fitting that the government should consider the LTTE to be its partner in the raising of international funds for the north and east.
The government's acceptance of the LTTE as a partner marks a paradigm shift in its approach to Tamil militancy and is welcomed by those who have sought an end to the civil war. From the inception of the militant struggle to obtain Tamil rights and independence, the government and the LTTE have seen each other as mortal foes. Even during previous periods of ceasefire and peace talks, the competition between them did not cease, especially the efforts of the government to edge out the LTTE from the sentiments of the Tamil people. The transformation of mortal foes into partners is a remarkable feat in any society at any time.
The terms of reference for the Joint Task Force that appeared in the Daily Mirror at the end of October have not been publicly acknowledged by either party as an official document. It is likely that this is a draft version of the paper that will be finalised at the second round of peace talks in Thailand scheduled to begin on 31 October. Whoever leaked this document probably made a calculated decision – the leak's likely purpose would be to obtain constructive feedback from society. Otherwise, given the nature of the present high-level peace process, civil society, the political opposition and society at large would all be excluded from making constructive inputs into many critical aspects of the peace discussions.
A group of civil society analysts brought together by the Centre for Policy Alternatives to discuss the draft document pertaining to the Joint Task Force had two important observations to make. One was that while the terms reflected many modern ideas of development, including the mainstreaming of the values of human rights and sustainable development, focus on vulnerable groups and called for consultation with civic and NGO groups, it had missed many ground realities. It neglected to address the potential pitfalls in implementation: currently many ministries handle the task of the rehabilitation and reconstruction, and it is likely that they will be unwilling to hand over their mandates to the Joint Task Force for reasons of turf-protection. There will be bureaucratic confusion, which is harmful in itself, and the risk that the LTTE will lose its patience over what it might see as wilful tardiness is real.
The other was to note that the document stressed the unique partnership between the government and the LTTE. This partnership has been formed to improve the living standards of the population in the northern and eastern provinces through a policy-formulating body that raises financial resources and oversees the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.
The government's willingness to make the LTTE a partner in the affairs of the north and east, and endow it with command over economic resources is understandable. From Colombo's point of view, this is the best way to ensure that its relationship with the LTTE remains within the ambit of the peace process. However, from a democratic point of view the question arises whether it is appropriate to make the LTTE the only partner in the task ahead.
During the last general elections in December 2001, the vast majority of Tamil voters in the north and east cast their votes in favour of political parties that supported the notion that the LTTE was the sole representative of the Tamil people. This unusual democratic mandate clearly gives the LITE a very special status in the north and east. However, it is also true that the vast majority of the Muslim and Sinhala voters in those areas did not share an attachment to the LTTE, but voted instead for other political parties. It is in this context that the exclusive partnership between the government and the LTTE becomes problematic.
Ceasefire model
In fashioning the conceptual underpinnings of the Joint Task Force, the government and the LTTE appear to be using the two-party model of the ceasefire agreement that they signed in February this year. However, they need to draw a fundamental distinction between the two situations. The ceasefire agreement was drawn up to bring the war fought by the government and the LTTE to a halt. For all practical purposes, these two were the only parties fighting out the war. Therefore, the signing of the ceasefire agreement only by them was appropriate.
However, sustaining the ceasefire and ensuring that the living standards of the people of the north and east improve cannot be the purview of only the government and the LTTE. The Joint Task Force has enormous responsibilities that impact the lives of all the people living in those areas, including the Muslims and Sinhalas. While there were only two parties waging the war, there are many more involved in the post-war democratic public life existing today.
According to the terms of reference that made their appearance in the Daily Mirror, the Joint Task Force is a mechanism for "improving the living standards of the population in the northern and eastern provinces of the country". It is to formulate policy guidelines for the identification of needs, prioritisation of work and for funding rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. Making the LTTE the sole partner of the government may be to the satisfaction of most Tamil people. But the danger of restricting participation in the Joint Task Force thus is that the body will be seen to be biased, insensitive and illegitimate by a significant proportion of the population in the north and east.
The recent incidents of mob violence in the east are a warning of the possibility of social unrest in the near future in areas that will be under the Joint Task Force's mandate. When the power of guns was present, it was possible to cultivate acquiescence among the people. But when people feel that the guns are muzzled it is difficult to stop them from asserting themselves. This has been marked in the case of the Muslim population of the east, which is resentful about LTTE land expropriations and tax coercion. Tamil civilians recently stoned heavily armed camps of the security forces since they had been oppressing them. More recently still, there have been reports of Tamil people defying unreasonable demands of local level LTTE cadre concerning taxation and the forcible recruitment of children.
Given the emerging situation, the government and the LTTE need to recognise that in the peace process there are more actors than just the two of them. They also need to be aware that the Joint Task Force is likely to be perceived as the nucleus of a future interim administration for the north and east. Its composition could influence thinking on the nature and composition of the interim administration itself. Clearly, all points of view, especially those of the ethnic minorities in the north and east, will need to be reflected in the interim administration. Consequently, those points of view also need to be accommodated in the Joint Task Force.
The draft terms of reference hold that the Joint Task Force will be composed of three members each of the government and the LTTE and that Norway will play the role of facilitator. As a practical measure, it would be appropriate if the principle of plural representation were respected by the inclusion of two Muslim representatives on each side to the currently proposed number of three each from the government and the LTTE. Subsequently, the Joint Task Force could be further enlarged to include other interests until such time as it is subsumed in or by the interim administration.
The value of the discussions surrounding the Joint Task Force is that a start has been made in good faith and in a spirit of partnership by the government and the LTTE, two former mortal foes. However, there is no substitute for rigorous analytical thinking and research that sets out the problems that are to be dealt with in their full complexity. A proper analysis is required before valid answers are found and presented. In particular, the prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe's, oft-repeated admonition that the peace process will be a long and slow journey needs to be borne in mind.