MILITARY DEMOCRACY?
The commonwealth team that visited Pakistan at the end of October to make an on-the-spot assessment of the official, political and public opinion in the country, will have found that the military takeover of 12 October was greeted largely with relief. Sent by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) in order to take a decision on whether to suspend Pakistan's Commonwealth membership, the team was unable to obtain any time-frame for the restoration of an elected civilian government. However, they did obtain a firm commitment that the new chief executive will achieve certain benchmarks of progress on "the desired objectives", which include building institutions and carrying out reforms that can promote "true democracy" in Pakistan.
It is this expressed desire, if implemented, that will soften the unconstitutionality of Gen Pervez Musharraf's position, especially in the eyes of the world. An endorsement has already been received, as expected from the oil-rich Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, usually the first stop of any new Pakistani ruler, civil or military; Gen Musharraf has proved no exception. The support from the Gulf is sought not only for financial reasons, but also because Saudi Arabia is considered to be the custodian of Islam, and its approval confers an additional legitimacy to a new set-up.
Musharraf has termed his takeover as "not a coup but a counter-coup", a reference to Nawaz Sharif's attempt to have the army chief removed, first through elements within the army (whom Musharraf promptly forced into retirement on learning of it), and then by abruptly dismissing him while he was on an official visit to Sri Lanka.
Over in Washington DC, the Clinton administration was caught on the wrong foot by this 'counter-coup', since it had practically backed Musharraf's removal, and his replacement as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) by a Sharif clansman, Gen Khawaja Ziaduddin Butt. Sharif had appointed Butt as head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the same day Musharraf was appointed COAS last October, and without consulting the latter. Indeed, Musharraf's appointment may well have been a stop-gap arrangement as far as Sharif was concerned, before replacing him with Butt.
Relations between the COAS and the prime minister were thus strained right from the beginning. Kargil only increased these rifts, particularly following Sharif's face-saving dash to the US, where he contended that the army had moved in without consulting him, and therefore was solely responsible for this potentially disastrous (given the nuclear capability of both) clash with India. The army chief publicly denied the prime minister's version. Hence, the military take-over following Sharif's dismissal of Musharraf and the army's refusal to accept Butt's command (ostensibly on technical grounds), was not accompanied by a great amount of surprise in Pakistan.
For several weeks leading to the coup, the political buzz had been about a change at the helm. It was not considered likely that Sharif would manage to complete his tenure despite his parliamentary strength. The events of 12 October merely ended the suspense, and re-emphasised the military's supremacy; it has always been a force, visible or invisible, in the country's politics.
Those who hail the military takeover forget the fact that the military's involvement has been the major factor in Pakistan's chronic political instability. For one, there is the huge budget it consumes. Funds meant for the social sector get diverted, contributing to economic instability, which in turn exacerbates the political situation. All the talk of accountability would be a lot more convincing if the armed forces were to be also made answerable.
Military budgets have never been allowed to come up for discussion in Parliament, and the amounts are passed without any breakdown of the heads of expenditures. It is unlikely that a change in this procedure shall follow now. Secondly, the military's repeated interventions in times of political crisis, ostensibly to provide security, are among the factors that have prevented the democratic process from taking root. In neighbouring India, by contrast, the democratic process is not without its hiccups, but has been allowed to evolve without the reality or threat of military intervention.
Pakistan's new self-appointed chief executive may be very sincere in his mission — he has even reached out to religious minorities and promised to uphold fundamental rights—but he has also made it clear that his orders cannot be challenged in any court of law. And the agenda he has set for himself is no short-term one. He may be called successful only if he does what no other ruler in Pakistan has been able to achieve: allow the implementation of the rule of law, and break the back of feudalism that has such a stranglehold on the polity.
He might also ask the people what they want —not in the form of a one-sided referendum, but through public debates and open discussions held without fear or favour. He might find his attention drawn to issues that concern people the most: lack of housing, education, food, and jobs. Regional peace and friendly ties with neighbours, most importantly India, should also be on the cards. And the way to improve matters is to continue the down-sizing of the army, a process that Sharif had started, and to divert that "peace dividend" into the social sector.
What kind of democracy is likely to be demanded by a nation with more than its fair share of illiterate, hungry and shelterless people? Constant neglect is more likely to push them into the jaws of 'Talibanisation', and to the further development of a mentality that welcomes messiah-like saviours, rather than seek political empowerment. How did matters reach the point where the toppling of a democratically elected government by the military caused no grief? Sharif's departure saw no protests, not because of a great love for military rule or dictatorship, but because his government had, like its predecessors, taken on the traits of dictatorship.
Democracy in Pakistan has obviously been a sham, where people have not been given access to decision-making or allowed their due share in resources. The elected representatives have neither represented the people, nor have been representative of them. But this is no reason to give up on the system. On the contrary, it is time to make even greater efforts to strengthen it. As they say, only more democracy can save democracy.