No grand designs

Three recent events have brought the unique relationship between India and Nepal strongly back into focus. Exactly as Nepal's political crisis was spiking, with the Maoists planning to resign from the government, the Indian foreign secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, visited Kathmandu to pass on a stern message to the prime minister and the Maoist leadership: New Delhi wanted to see elections in November. A few days earlier, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala had made a statement saying that Nepal's sovereignty was under threat. Sections of the media played up the statement, and pointed to India as the source of the threat, even though it is unlikely the prime minister had New Delhi in mind. Add to this a rise in the number of voices, among both Nepali politicians and international agency officials, blaming India for fomenting trouble in the Tarai. One increasingly gets the sense that Nepal, after a stint of feeling secure in the aftermath of the People's Movement of April 2006, is going back to the bad old days of blaming the 'foreign hand' for all its many (and expanding) troubles.

India-Nepal ties cannot be understood in the conventional framework of inter-state relations. New Delhi has traditionally wielded a disproportionate influence in Nepal's politics – from brokering the Delhi agreement between the Ranas and the king in 1951, to backing the 12-point agreement between the Maoists and the political parties that forms the basis of the current peace process. It has subsequently helped to micro-manage the peace process. Indeed, India is almost a local actor in Kathmandu politics.

Varying policy priorities have determined New Delhi's choices over the years. So in the past, the Indian establishment may have had an interest in propping up monarchs to counter popular democratic politicians, who were close to India's opposition leaders at the time. In the democratic interlude, it may have likewise taken steps to prevent left parties with a distinctly anti-India plank from becoming too powerful, much less forming the government. But over the past few years, possibly for the first time, India has evolved a coherent Nepal policy that emphasises stability. This is also a part of New Delhi's larger regional vision.

Indian diplomats have realised that if they want their country to be a world power, they cannot afford to have a burning neighbourhood. The realisation that a peaceful periphery is essential has driven India's efforts to broker peace with Pakistan. As a part of the same policy, India wants a stable Nepal – it is not in New Delhi's interest to have a civil war raging within its northern neighbour, with which it shares an extensive open border along the densely populated Ganga heartland. The decision to engage with the Maoists and bring them into the mainstream, as well as the effort to engineer a logical peace process that culminates in polls for the Constituent Assembly, are all a part of this plan.

In this context, fears about India hoping for the 'Sikkimisation' of Nepal, or having grand designs to snatch away its sovereignty, cannot have a grounding in reality. For the same reason, it is unlikely that India is engineering the trouble in the Tarai as part of national-level policy, even though one cannot say that one or another state administration or intelligence agency might not be playing mischief. When the Madhesi movement emerged in the early part of 2007, New Delhi was undoubtedly happy to see the Maoist influence weaken in Nepal's southern plains, and it may even have provided quiet encouragement. The nature of the open border and crossborder relationships means that there are inevitably layers of political and criminal linkages. But to assume that the Indian government is supporting private armed groups in the Tarai, not to mention inciting communal riots, cannot stand up to reason. In the absence of any kind of proof, it is best to go by logic, and contemplate how an unstable Nepal and a burning Tarai would be in the interests of the Indian state and its mainstream political players. New Delhi is obviously aware that a turbulent Madhes will not only derail the peace process in Nepal and create instability, but will also impact on politics in north Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh.

For now, it is clear that the interests of the Indian government coincide with that of the Nepali people and politicians. But there will be times when this will not be the case, and it will be difficult to stand up to New Delhi, given its enormous leverage and influence. That will be the real challenge for Nepali politicians and civil society: to be willing to engage and persuade India, or to withstand New Delhi's pressure, in order to ensure that decisions are made in the interests of the Nepali people. It would be wise for Nepali politicians and civil society to prepare for just such a challenge, and to be confident about their own ability, rather than stewing about imagined grand designs.      

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