No more talk fests

As another SAARC Summit rolls along, it is time to ask rather pointedly, Where exactly is Southasia heading? From the day SAARC opened its doors, the conditions necessary to establish a Southasian identity have remained elusive. Only strong economic ties that move goods and people across borders could have provided the objective basis of forging such a regional alliance. In the absence of these, the leaders talk about agreements to end human trafficking, to control narcotics, to help each other during disasters. Meanwhile, the objective basis for developing economic ties has remained elusive.

The reasons for this are historic, and entirely due to the path taken by India. That SAARC will live or die on the magnanimity of the 'big brother' India was known from the day it opened its shutters. Early in the 1950s, India closed its borders to its neighbours, and embarked on a mission of "building socialism in one country", thus fragmenting the Southasian economy. This inward-looking economic-development strategy cut off the smaller countries of the region from the opportunities and benefits of integrating with one of the world's largest and growing markets. The road and rail links, so assiduously built by the British to integrate the Subcontinent, were disrupted. By the mid-1960s, border clashes and skirmishes led to the uprooting of railway lines and bridges. The only exception in all of this was Bhutan, with unfettered access to the Indian market; but its insignificantly small economy was hardly in a position to leverage the advantages. Though Nepali nationals had the right to participate in the Indian labour market, the goods produced in Nepal (and Bangladesh) have attracted high import duties.