Amid the war in Iran, the Saudi–UAE rivalry arrives in Southasia

THIS MAY, during an uneasy ceasefire in the US-Israeli war against Iran, Reuters reported that Pakistan had deployed 8000 troops, a squadron of fighter jets and an air-defence system to Saudi Arabia – which, as a US ally, had faced retaliatory attacks from Iran. This was the second time that Pakistan had sent military support to Saudi Arabia, having also deployed fighter jets there earlier in the conflict, in April. Meanwhile, Islamabad continued to act as a mediator between Tehran and Washington DC in the protracted negotiations to end hostilities. Its support for Saudi Arabia has raised questions about its ostensible position as a neutral party. 

As the mediator, and with the world paying minute attention to the US-Iran negotiations, Pakistan finds itself in a prominent but tricky position. A major difficulty it faces in West Asia is that it can no longer play the neutral between the two big Gulf powers – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – and benefit from the generosity of both. For decades, Pakistan maintained a carefully cultivated fiction that drove its West Asia policy: that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite their diverging ambitions, could be treated as a single, interchangeable source of financial support, security cooperation and diplomatic goodwill. Islamabad borrowed from both countries, sent workers to both and sold them both strategic services, stationing troops, seconding officers and providing security assistance. At the same time, it avoided acknowledging that Saudi Arabia and the UAE were quietly competing for influence across West Asia and Southasia. The US-Israeli war on Iran has put an end to that convenient fiction and forced Islamabad to pick a side. 

In September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement. Many of its details are still confidential, but it contains a collective defence clause according to which “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” The agreement has not only formalised and enhanced military cooperation but also obliged Pakistan to provide Saudi Arabia with military support. As Saudi Arabia and the UAE openly back rival forces in various theatres – from the proxy confrontations in Yemen and Sudan to the competing security architectures taking shape across Southasia – Islamabad’s pact with Riyadh confirmed Pakistan as a party to a Gulf rivalry it once claimed to merely observe. 

Abu Dhabi has since withdrawn financial support from Pakistan and signed a broad-based defence partnership with its archrival, India. Islamabad’s growing proximity to Riyadh has pushed Abu Dhabi away and closer to New Delhi, and Pakistan’s ambitions and manoeuverings may have brought the Gulf’s big rivalry firmly to Southasia.