Post-Mandal, post-Mandir (INDIA)

There is a major political churning underway in North India. The region affected most by the Mandal and Mandir politics of the 1980s and 1990s finally appears to be crossing over to a new phase. From the confrontational caste- and religion-based politics, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are moving towards the formation of social alliances between erstwhile rivals with fundamentally different interests. With the two states contributing the most MPs to the central Parliament, this change is bound to have an impact on national politics. Those political forces that stick to old exclusivist slogans will miss the bus.

For two decades now, UP and Bihar politics have revolved around mobilisation along one's own caste and religious lines, and have not gone beyond catering to identity-based aspirations. This was important in itself – marginalised groups attained political power and a sense of dignity, which allowed them to stand up to exploitative structures. Laloo Prasad Yadav's decade-and-a-half rule in Bihar was based on a shrewd Muslim-Yadav alliance, and he delivered to his constituency; there was no communal riot in Bihar throughout his rule, and the Yadavs managed to assert themselves as never before. In Uttar Pradesh, Mulayam Singh Yadav relied on the same coalition, while Mayawati stuck to her Dalit constituency – with both giving a sense of empowerment to their supporters, as well as access to administration, and economic and political opportunities.

But the forces that led this change tried to ensconce themselves in the establishment by assuming that exclusivist identities would remain the sole determinant for political choices, and that there was little need to do much else. In fact, Laloo Yadav was often quoted as saying that he did not believe in development, since it would not win him votes. Ground-level realities, however, were constantly shifting. People were happy to be finally enjoying citizenship rights in the true sense, but now demanded more. Aspirations were changing and expectations rising. The citizenry could see that some cities had managed to corner most economic opportunities, and they wanted a share of the pie. Meanwhile, identity remained central to their self-definition and social structure, but this was no longer rigid; erstwhile social barriers were being broken down, and upward mobility and new social alliances were emerging.

In Bihar, Laloo Yadav was forced to give way to Nitish Kumar, who allied with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to carve out a coalition of upper castes and the extremely 'backward' castes. Laloo's Muslim-Yadav formula no longer worked because, to his surprise, even his supporters said they wanted more-substantial improvements in their lives, from education to health. Recognising this, Kumar is now making an effort to concentrate on law and order, bringing investment to the state and encouraging the creation of first-class universities. (Laloo himself, as railway minister, has also belatedly woken up to this, bringing about a remarkable turnaround in the functioning of Indian Railways, suddenly converting it into a profit-making enterprise.)

In Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati has successfully forged a Brahmin-Dalit alliance, an almost unthinkable proposition till very recently. She realised that the real rival of the Dalit was the intermediate-caste landowner at the ground level. She also knew that the time for harping on confrontational politics was past – that now was the time for a political programme championing social harmony based on equal rights. The only party that has yet to wake up to these realisations is the BJP, which still believes there to be a large constituency for Hindu fanaticism. Just prior to the UP polls, BJP apparatchiks brought out a virulently anti-Muslim DVD, and made a serious attempt to elevate cow protection to an election issue. As a result, even its Brahmin base swung towards Mayawati.

The message emerging from UP and Bihar is clear: marginalised communities want respect, but also real economic dividends; identity is critical, but identity fundamentalism has little support; and finally, people want political stability and social harmony. To the credit of the Indian democracy, this message has come from the ground, and will have an impact even in Delhi politics.