Promise of peace in Nagalim

This past August not only marked 60 years of India's independence, but also 60 years of struggle for Naga independence, dubbed the "oldest insurgency in the Subcontinent". In addition, 1 August was the ten-year anniversary of the ceasefire between the New Delhi government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), the most prominent Naga insurgent group. After the latest round of talks – the first round to be held on Naga soil – on 31 July, the two sides agreed to extend the ceasefire "indefinitely".

The Nagas are a tiny community, boasting less than three million people; but they have managed to wage a six-decade-long battle with the gargantuan Indian state. The armed wing of the NSCN (IM), under the leadership of Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, has proved a match for the Indian Army's jungle-warfare might. Military capability notwithstanding, the Naga struggle has remained alive for more than half a century largely because the people have identified with its cause: a sovereign Naga nation. The Nagas, who were conducting parallel talks with the British once the end of colonial rule became inevitable, argue that they never agreed to join the Indian union, and that the annexation and subsequent division of their land was accomplished through force.

The possibilities of an abiding settlement of the political questions through dialogue have to contend with some sticky factors: six decades of unrest and belligerent relations between New Delhi and the Naga organisations, as well as a number of past settlements and accords that failed to satisfy all Nagas. In fact, the Shillong Accord of 1975, under which the Naga National Council unconditionally accepted the Indian Constitution, was rejected by a large portion of the Naga population as a capitulation, and generated a more militant Naga nationalism that ultimately coalesced by 1980 into the formation of the NSCN. Despite tensions with a subsequent NSCN breakaway faction (under S S Khaplang), in 1997 the NSCN (IM) managed to enter into a ceasefire agreement with New Delhi, which included talks at the "highest" political level, to be conducted in a neutral country.

Despite the offer of unconditional talks, there appears to have been no offer of unconditional listening, and the basic positions of the two sides have not changed significantly in the past decade. The Indian political establishment continues to insist that a settlement of the Naga issue can take place only within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Even the liberal protagonists of greater regional autonomy and special safeguards for minorities do not endorse the principle of self-determination. The Naga organisations, most notably the NSCN (IM), continue to assert that New Delhi must first recognise Naga sovereignty, and only then proceed to negotiate the terms of coexistence and interdependence. It is just this differential that accounts for fifty years of bloodshed and ten years of inconclusive negotiations, and always the fear of a return to the killing fields.

Unification
Another major roadblock is the insistence on the creation of 'Nagalim', or the 'unification' of Naga-inhabited areas, which the Nagas claim were divided by external forces – the British, followed by the Indian government. These areas include the hill districts of Manipur, as well as parts of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and – across the international border – Burma. Besides the long-term implications if the Centre were to accede to re-drawing boundaries within the Northeast, there is significant opposition to the idea of a unified Nagaland from the people of these states. New Delhi must move cautiously, since the resolution of the 'Naga problem' is likely to set a precedent for the myriad insurgencies in the Northeast. It is unlikely, therefore, that New Delhi will ultimately accept the NSCN (IM)'s 30-point 'charter of demands', especially those that include a greater say in the utilisation of natural resources, a separate constitution (and flag), and control in areas like finance, defence and policing.

The nitty-gritty of negotiations apart, there has been a growing realisation that the Naga talks are not only between the NSCN (IM) and New Delhi. Naga civil-society organisations have actively consulted with not only Naga leaders and New Delhi officials, but also with civil-society groups from mainland India. There have also been attempts to reach out to traditionally hostile groups, such as the Meiteis and Kukis of Manipur, the Arunachalis, the Dimasas and other Assamese groups. Having witnessed decades of bloody confrontation with Indian security forces; thousands dead and thousands more maimed, tortured and raped; and two generations of Nagas having grown up under the shadow of the gun, the resilient Nagas will not easily give up the promise of a modicum of independence.

On the other hand, the Indian state has too much at stake. While we all have to be thankful for the guns being silent for a full decade, no one should be lulled into lethargy amidst this interim peace. It is important for the protracted peace talks to deliver an imaginative solution. Such a solution would realistically allow the Nagas within Nagaland significant autonomy, which would be enough to pull back on the 'outside the Constitution' stance and find a way to guarantee the rights and identity of Nagas in neighbouring Indian states. Burma is another issue altogether. All in all, the possibilities are that a 'fuzzy solution' can be achieved with the involvement of the civil society of the Northeast, which in the end might achieve an inclusive and participatory political regime for the entire area. A resolution of the Naga issue could be part and parcel of this package, which has hope if led by civil society – rather than merely by the state and the would-be state.
      
 

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