Rise of the nuovo-rajas

Louis XVI of France was unseated from his throne by his own people, and met a violent end in 1793 during the French Revolution. One of the most despotic Czars, Nicholas II of Russia, was dethroned by his people in 1917 in a largely bloodless transition. In 1947, the British queen ended her rule over India, demanding the price in the form of Partition and Lord Mountbatten remaining governor-general of free India. In 2008, Gyanendra of Nepal lost his throne, and became a commoner in a peaceful transition through a decision made by the elected government. Are the after-effects of the departure of these dynasties from historical time down to the present comparable? These events are historically important, but what has humanity learned from them? On the face of it, two words that are commonly associated with these transformations, realistically or otherwise, are nation and vote-based democracy. The French Revolution is considered to be the origin of these two concepts, which quickly spread to other parts of Europe. They got further transplanted to Southasia by the British colonisers, through their institutions.

The British ruled most of the Subcontinent directly, and influenced the governance of the rest of the region through treaties and by posting 'residents' in the various capitals. With British rule in India ending in 1947, a collection of kingdoms, at least cartographically, coalesced as a 'nation', and voting based on adult franchise was accepted as the instrument for governance. This was a truly remarkable evolution. Subsequently, the kingdoms of Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim also underwent transitions to various forms of vote-based election and government. The end of monarchy is seen by most Southasians as the birth of a 'nation', the beginning of 'democratic' governance. But is it really so mechanical a transition? There has been little effort to explore the structure of these 'nations' and the characteristic features of electoral democracy. Amidst the fatalism of the tribal-agrarian cultural framework, the Subcontinent took the European model as the universal prescription for democratic governance.

Notwithstanding some of the early achievements, some serious drawbacks are emerging in the region after six decades of this form of peoples' rule. Governance is increasingly taking the shape of a sarkar raj run by 'nouvo-rajas' at various levels. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, the army truncated the democratic processes, but the cultural approach to voting-to-elect remains almost the same there as in India. In the absence of a serious search for what 'nation' means, the term is used to describe whatever one pleases. The complexity of Southasian society – defined in the four dimensions of ethnicity, caste, language and religion – makes 'nation' a tool for the new oligarchies and nuovo-rajas who have mastered the art of winning elections. Consequently, the principles and processes of voting that evolved and matured in the industrialised West have yet to be functionally adapted to this four-dimensional Southasian social space. Thus, 'democratic' governance became synonymous with the holding of periodic elections, all the while independent of the nature of the governance to be actually delivered by the elected.

The emergence of the new political oligarchy is consistent with the region's tribal-agrarian traditions. The nuovo-rajas are powerful in countries with longer histories of holding elections; it is to be seen whether late-comers to this process, in particular Nepal, can take steps to protect the people from the nuovo-rajas as its new constitution gets written.

Not a nation
In the ritual-loving Subcontinent, the counting of votes is done religiously, even while irregularities in polling are ignored. Once elected, the nuovo-rajas behave no differently from the erstwhile rajas, showing little respect for the rule of law. Winning elections is merely the mechanism to achieve personal gains from the nation, with no accountability to the electorate. In many rural areas throughout the region, voting and electoral processes have become an outright hazard for the poor. The attitude of the nuovo-raja is exemplified by the recent example, in early July 2008, of a speeding car belonging to a minister in the government of West Bengal hit an old man, killing him; neither the vehicle nor the police escorting it bothered to stop. It appears that the current institutions of governance exist simply on paper, and corruption and crookedness are what largely hold together society, above all. In the current context of Nepal and Bhutan, there is a window of opportunity to describe the nation more realistically, to design instruments of democratic governance that are culturally rooted. Not that it will be easy.

Political leadership and vision of the highest degree are needed to create an appropriate institution for democratic governance in the Southasian context. Addressing liberalisation of trade and economy is much more straightforward than is tackling basic political issues such as a dignified existence for the people, protected from the hegemonies and exploitations of the nuovo-rajas. It is nice to try to think of Southasia as a large though single entity, such as the European Union. However, the actual emergence of such an entity is highly improbable. We the people of Southasia are divided in so many ways that the region simply does not fit the received concept of a nation. Thus, 'nation' becomes an abstraction, to be used like a mantra. An example is the debate in India over the Indo-US nuclear deal, with the proponents and the opponents both claiming to be working for the 'national interest'.

Southasia has given rise to a few towering persons, such as Gautama Buddha and Mohandas K Gandhi, who have fundamentally influenced the growth of human consciousness all over the world. Today, the region is becoming known as the home of global billionaires amidst the quagmire of poverty and corruption. SAARC will prove itself worth its name only when it addresses the issue of dignity and political respect for its people, and of governance free of corruption – but this is not a traditional item on the regional agenda. Only democratic governance, inclusive of genuine electoral reform, can provide the public in various parts with prosperity and a sense of ownership. If SAARC remains traditional, awaiting some superhuman to undertake this job, it may be too late for self-rectification in a globalised world. Indications that the present situation is far from what the people expected in terms of rule of law and democratic governance are omnipresent.

Frequently, people in many parts of Southasia have resorted to the highest level of cruelty against suspected dacoits and women of vulnerable sections, exemplifying their declining confidence in the rule of law. It appears that present institutions of governance exist simply on paper and corruption largely holds together the society. The extensive discussions in the media on cash being exchanged for support in the crucial 'vote of confidence' in Parliament on 22 July that would decide the fate of the ruling coalition, does not seem to surprise many in the largest democracy of the world.

~ Jayanta Bandyopadhyay is a Calcutta-based professor of sustainable development.