Test of the treaty
Expectations were high in Bangladesh when the newly-signed Farakka Treaty came into effect on 1 January 1997. Bangladeshis swung into action to take advantage of the additional flows as the control gates at Farakka opened to release the waters. Work was begun to restore the lean season flows on the Gorai, a distributary of the Ganga, and the long-silent pumps on the Ganga-Kobadak project were restarted to prepare for the Kharif crop plantation. There was also new hope for inland navigation, fisheries and fresh water supplies to the southern Khulna region. But everyone knew that, euphoric government pronouncements notwithstanding, the true test of the Farakka Treaty signed in December 1996 between India and Bangladesh would lie in the water levels in March. And as the dry days of March approached, the Ganga´s flow progressively dwindled. On the last week of the month, the discharge at Farakka was only 46,000 cubic feet per second (cusec), much lower than the 50,000 cusec minimum threshold mentioned in the Treaty. As it was insufficient to fulfill the allocation specified in the Treaty, Indian and Bangladeshi officials met to seek a solution and immediately went into a deadlock.
The entire edifice of the 1996 Treaty actually rests on the stated availability of dry season flow in the Ganga at Farakka. The 1997 lean season, serving as its first litmus test, showed that there was not enough water to meet its elaborate allocation schedule (for more details of the Treaty, see Himal jan/Feb 1997). All in all, it became evident that the architects of the Treaty had been rather optimistic in assessing water quantum available at Farakka.
The low flow of the Ganga required a culprit, and bureaucrats and politicians began flailing at every which direction—blaming low rainfall in Nepal, pointing the finger at inadequate melting of snow in the Himalayan catchments, or withdrawal of water by upstream states of India.
While the cause and effect of snowmelt and catchment rainfall and their impact on the Ganga´s dry season levels remains an inexact science, it seemed unlikely that these were the cause of the low flows of spring 1997, show that snowmelt and rainfall were "average". The more likely cause for the declining flow of the Ganga is limitless withdrawal by upstream Indian states (which also use some barrages just within Nepal or on the border). But to verify that one would need government reports and data sheets which are still considered state secrets in India.
In the meantime, other political dynamics that have direct bearing on the Farakka Accord have begun to emerge. A glimpse is provided in a recent publication of the Government of Bihar. The state was not made party to the discussions that led to the 1996 Treaty and that is why the critical tone of the Bihari document assumes importance. The report calls for cessation of continuing upstream water withdrawals in Uttar Pradesh as well as creation of a Ganga River Basin Organisation to facilitate agreement between the co-basin states regarding allocation of Ganga waters. In a sense, it seeks region-wide discussion of Ganga as a resource which New Delhi has always been leery of. Even more important is the implication of "region-wide". In its earlier definition, it meant Bangladesh, India and Nepal, whereas in future—if Bihar´s stance is any guide—it will include the affected states of India as well, each with its own set of problems and priorities.
A statement made in the Bihar Legislature by the State Water Resources Minister Jagadanda Singh is instructive. Responding to the situation arising out of the Farakka accord, Mr Singh said: "As the Government of Bihar has made arrangements for using all the flow of the Kosi, Gandak, Mahananda and other rivers in the dry season, the central government will have to seek Bihar´s cooperation in maintaining the agreement." This position of Bihar is a stark reflection of the complexity of water management in the days ahead, for the Ganga basin involves not only the Hindi heartland states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, but also Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi, Haryana and West Bengal. Nepal and Bangladesh, of course, bring in the international dimension.
It remains to be seen how the problem of low flow at Farakka will be handled. There is no magic formula that offers a way out to meet water needs of all parties in the lean season. The stated quantum, in all probability, is unavailable.
Several proposals for augmenting water volume have been made, each of which has its own attendant social and environmental costs as well as high risks. But do they offer a way out? Even if construction of major infrastructure were to begin immediately, it will take at least a decade to be completed. Until that happens, water will still have to be provided to Bangladesh as per the Treaty in the years ahead. Inability to fulfill the commitment would be at the cost of credibility to the Indian state.
To meet the obligation in the intervening period, New Delhi has no option but to look "inward" and confront the challenges of water management head on. For its part Bangladesh should remain sensitive to India´s heterogeneity. And Nepal has to show more interest in the whole debate. After all, it sits on the Himalayan "water towers" where sites of the several proposed storage dams are located.
Despite hurdles, concluding the 30-year agreement with Bangladesh, would have been the best Golden Jubilee gift by the Indian state to its own people and the region. But the disputes seething under the surface of the Ganga, within India and across its borders, may spill out with serious consequences for the future.