The Great Escape

The seizure of power by the military in Pakistan was accompanied by the dissolution of Parliament, the suspension of the Constitution and the incarceration of the ousted prime minister Nawaz Sharif. None of this occasioned any surprise. Sharif's subsequent conviction and jail sentence were also along expected lines. But Sharif's exile last month to Saudi Arabia has introduced a new twist to Pakistani politics. Sharif's release flies in the face of the military regime´s pledge to conduct "fearless, honest and bipartisan accountability" of recent rulers. For Sharif, the price of freedom is 10 years of exile and an undertaking not to take part in Pakistani politics for 21 years. In addition,  the government claims it has confiscated
bank deposits worth PNR 300 million (USD 5m), as well as five industrial properties, five residential plots and 24 hectares (60 acres) of agriculture land.

Whatever the circumstances that compelled Sharif's release, the military regime has now lost the very raison d'être for its present control of the country. As for the Pakistan Muslim League, it has been deprived of its leadership, while the Pakistan Peoples Party has egg on its face, having just concluded an alliance with Sharif against the military regime.

More to the point, Sharif's release has ramifications that advert quite substantively to political fundamentals. Even granting that there was much to the charges levelled against Sharif that were fictitious, his 'political' release, bypassing the due process, imparts a discretionary inflection to the administration of justice. Judicial independence is undermined by the political expediencies of the executive and there can be no clearer illustration of this than the continued confinement of Sharif's former ministers, aides and associates. Sharif´s allies, like former Sindh chief minister Ghaus Ali Shah, former Sindh police chief Rana Maqbool, and Shahid Khaqan of Pakistan International Airlines, are still in jail despite being acquitted by the courts. The pursuit of such expediencies by the government has raised awkward questions. As Benazir Bhutto put it, "If there was no criminal case against Sharif, why was he sacked, arrested and punished? And if there was a case against him, why has he been set free even though convicted by a court of law?"

The strategy pursued by the Musharraf regime also raises the possibility of a political vacuum of serious  proportions and call to mind the consequences of Benazir Bhutto's self-exile two years ago after being hounded by Sharif. The prescient warning that the vacuum created by the weakening of the legitimate opposition would be filled by undemocratic forces was then unheeded. It was this politically corrosive strategy that led to the overthrow of Sharif's government by the military. As things stand now, the leaders of three major political formations are conveniently out of the way. What effects this will have in the elections, when they do happen, remains for the present a matter of speculation.

For the military regime, Sharif's exile is not without risk. Clearly, Musharraf's coterie felt it necessary to have the only consequential politician remaining in Pakistan to be eased out, presumably to arrest any possible increase in his popular base. While the government would have it that it has been the net beneficiary of the outcome, the effusive welcome that Sharif received in Saudi Arabia will not be lost on
the many in Pakistan who hold the Saudi establishment in great reverence.

What then could have induced the military regime to make this gamble? It appears that Sharif's popularity was on the rise even after he was declared guilty of terrorism and handed a life sentence. The military rulers tried to counter this first by amending the Political Parties' Act to legally bar disqualified leaders from holding party offices. When even this met with little success, the regime decided to break up Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League. But since most of the leaders assigned to carry out the job has no stature nationally, and were themselves tainted, the strategy failed to take off. To add
to Musharraf´s worries, the failure of his government to ensure sufficient nominations for the first phase of local elections coincided with Bhutto's PPP and Sharif's PML entering into an alliance to oust the present regime. It was this that prompted Gen Musharraf to make the deal, purportedly brokered by the Saudis, or the Americans or perhaps even by both.

Reactions to Sharif's exile have been varied. The major newspapers in Pakistan have reacted angrily, as have the Pakistan Peoples Party and the main Islamist party, the Jamaat-e-Islami. But in terms of future possibilities, there are divergent views. There are those who see Sharif's removal as an important step towards the military government's promised return to democracy, because his presence in Pakistan was the most important constraint for the regime. His departure could therefore encourage the military to restore the electoral process. But even if this does happen, the status quo ante is unlikely to be restored given that most senior politicians are in prison, exile or under house arrest.

The army may well try to set up a group of politicians to do its bidding, but the political credibility that such a grouping can acquire is another matter altogether. A more optimistic postulate is that the space created by Sharif's departure could be occupied by a new generation of Pakistani politicians who may be more inclined to etch a better profile for their country.