The national-economic-security state

Talat Hussain, director, News and Current Affairs, Aaj TV Let's look at the fundamental factors influencing Pakistan's outlook, primarily towards India and generally towards the rest of the world. The 'national-security state' term can be modified to explain the pre-9/11 foreign policy of Pakistan. Pakistan has always been, ever since its creation, a national-border-security state. Its borders have been the drivers of Pakistan's defence and foreign policy – the desire to protect these borders, secure these borders, reinforce these borders, to defend these borders, and also I would daresay the desire to expand these borders. The ideological factor was there, but frankly, at one level, the speed with which we discarded the Taliban indicates that the ideological factor was not exactly a big factor. Post-9/11, while the national-border-security state was still concerned with its border, there was an inner debate that was emerging. If you were to look at Pervez Musharraf's first seven points to begin the reform process, economic security was a fundamental point that he was raising then, and has been hammering every since. The national-security operators in Pakistan came to the conclusion after the Kargil war that the cost of war is a bit too much for them to take. Rebuilding the economy has been the central theme of Pakistan's outlook as far as foreign policy is concerned. Post-9/11, the national-border-security state is trying to now become the national-economic-security state. This means you have to have economic stability, you have to have the depth of the economy, enough foreign-exchange reserves, enough integration through trade in order for you to have not just a good international image, but also enough in your pocket to sustain your defence and foreign policy. This has had a rather sobering effect on Pakistan's external conduct. If you look at the entire thrust of Pakistan's foreign policy after 9/11, there isn't a single speech that Musharraf has made, isn't a single statement that the prime minister has made, there isn't a single core commanders' meeting that has taken place after 2000 in which the economic factor is not debated thoroughly. In fact, even in the National Defence College, which deals with pure and hardcore defence, there is a whole new course that has been evolved on national security driven by the economic factors. The sobering effect is that it has made the military think, and analyse situations available to them. The other is that it has worked as a break on the controlled, resistant elements within Pakistan's security establishment, because their ambition cannot be funded anymore. Let's also look at the anecdotal history post-9/11. Accepting the US cooperation in the 'war against terrorism', and before that starting with the dislodgement of the Taliban, had a lot to do with hard-nosed economic calculations and what Pakistan would get in return financially. Similarly, the entire peace process with India is now being posited in the overall context of the economic benefits. Yes, there is a border-security issue – with the Afghanistan border in the state that it is, it makes sense for a border-security state to stabilise the border. But it also makes eminent sense, for an economic-security state, to derive some economic benefits out of it. China and the Middle East is another case in point. Pakistan's cooperation with China is increasingly acquiring an economic dimension that needs to be figured out. The operation in Balochistan was undertaken not just to bump off an 80-year-old man, but to clear the path of the seeming obstacle in the way of bringing in investors who could utilise the remarkable natural resources of the area. There is something happening in Pakistan that our friends in India need to look at. If we continue to use the old prisms of two different trajectories being developed by two different types of states, then we will fall easy prey to a cliché that hasn't taken us forward. India and Pakistan are potentially the most vibrant economies. There are immense opportunities, ranging from joint investment ventures to joint building of dams. Whether India and Pakistan will be able to make use of this change of the national-border-security state into a national-economic-security state or not hinges purely on the level of confidence. There are two flip-sides to it, and that is where we need to probably be more forthright in assessing each other's weaknesses and strengths. Only a higher level of mutual confidence and resolution of conflicts will allow both of the countries to maximally exploit this potentiality. So economic cooperation will depend on where our defence and foreign policies are going. The more dangerous flip-side is that with economic stability comes arrogance. Both on the Pakistani and Indian side, there is the possibility of new wealth and new confidence in economic stability being channelled into challenging each other. Once you have money in your kitty, you can either spend it wisely, or you believe that now you have a license to slap each other on the face. I am a little fearful of this flip-side because of the international arms-purchase report which has just come out. This reports that while Asia is the biggest purchaser as a continent, India is the biggest arms purchaser in all of Asia, to the tune of USD 12 billion.