Throes of a Fledgling Nation
Hill Hinduism, monarchy and the Nepali language — the conventional symbols of a historically weak Nepali nationalism — are all presently under attack. A crisis of identity prevails among Nepal's educated.
Hidden among the advance sample tables from the 1991 Nepal Census is data that is politically significant. There has been a net decline of 5.14 percent among Nepalis who say that Nepali is their mother tongue — from 58.36 percent in 1981 to 53.22 percent today. Although preliminary findings for population distribution by religion have not been published so far, there are strong indications that the percentage of population reporting Hinduism as its religion will also decline significantly. If these findings are confirmed, they would constitute major reversals of national trends. Population percentages in both these categories had been on the rise in all previous counts.
To a large degree, nationalism is a matter of loyalties and emotions, which are charged with religion, language and other cultural elements. When a significant portion of the population shifts position on who they are or who they should be, the corporate 'self' of the nation will be affected accordingly.
In the case of Nepal, Hinduism, the Nepali language and monarchy have been considered the three pillars of nationalism. What does it mean, then, that all three are seen to be in decline? One cannot, of course, exaggerate the trends. There were those who had warned that the nation state of Nepal would collapse with democracy, but this did not happen. Probably the Nepali language and Hinduism are no weaker than they were, only the perception of how strong they are has changed. And after the initial phases of rejection, the position of monarchy too is probably heading towards equilibrium, albeit at a less exalted level.
Nevertheless, given the obvious trends, there is a need to analyse Nepali nationalism and whether there is a need to tinker with the super-structure.
Newar, Tarain and Janajati
The wider freedoms available to the Nepali public since the political change of Spring 1990 has brought sentiments long suppressed to the surface. An array of organisations have been stridently challenging the established notions of nationalism, including numerous ethnic, linguistic and regional forums, as well as far-left ideologues, ultra liberals, and champions of extra-indigenous religions.
Hridayesh Tripathi, stalwart of the Sadhbhavana Party, which champions the cause for an autonomous Tarai, says that there is not much in the Nepali State with which the madhesiya can identify with. "Unless the madhesiya people get due representation in the political process and decision-making, and their regional aspirations are satisfied on an institutional basis, there can be no common nationalism," says the MP from Rupendehi District. "The Tarain can never be integrated with the hill mainstream on cultural and linguistic terms."
Among the Kathmandu Valley Newar, considered one of the three privileged groups of Nepal, there simmers a resentment against the other two, the Bahun and Chhetri, which are considered the ´hill mainstream´. "The Newars carry a psychology of the vanquished at a subconscious level and view the Khasas as the victors," says Malla K. Sundar, journalist and Vice ¦President of the Nepal Bhasa Manka Khala, a ´mass organisation´ which seeks to promote Newari culture and language.
On the hill ethnic front, the Limbuwan Mukti Morcha, Khambuwan National Front, Mongol Liberation Organization, Rastriya Janamukti Party, and a host of smaller organisations have, in varying degrees, asserted political, cultural, linguistic and religious separateness from the hill (parbatey) mainstream. In Kirat lands of eastern Nepal, the last and the least subjugated, by the Gorkha state, some Rai and Limbu groups last year boycotted Dasain and Tihar festivals to emphasise their rejection.
Nepal´s Far West, which had been free of political mobilisation thus far for geographic and economic reasons, too, seems to have become agitated. A recent meeting in Kathmandu tentatively put forward a demand for autonomy for the Karnali region, a present-day backwater which is actually the place of origin of the Khasas, who can be said to have provided the defining stamp of Nepali nationalism. A sense of having received a raw deal from Kathmandu pervades the Karnali´s intelligentsia.
The demands, then, are for recognition of group identity and federalism on ethnic, linguistic or regional lines. Are the country´s political and intellectual elites, who have been so dishearteningly preoccupied with party politics of the lowest order, even capable of searching for new definitions?
At the same time, it is important to underscore that uncritical academic distinctions by social science practitioners in the study of Nepali society might have further aggravated the tendency of retrenchment from the mainstream. Non-existent schisms have perhaps been dug up and mere difference of forms have sometimes been juxtaposed as mutually antagonistic categories, such as Aryan vs. Mongoloid, Hindu vs. Buddhist, and Sanskritic vs. Tibeto-Burman. When the focus is exclusively on highlighting conflict at the cost of linkages and similarities, the situation becomes reactive as people adopt the analytical labels for self-identification.
Raja, Bhesh, Bhasa
Going by the conventional yardsticks, Nepal never had prerequisites for a strong nationhood or nationalism. The physical geography itself was too hostile to development of integration or homogeneity in population. The harsh landscape, intersected by north-south river systems, isolated communities from each other and prevented the easy flow of people, goods and ideas —- so necessary in evolving a broader, inclusive national identity. Says Mangal Siddhi Manandhar, a geographer at Tribhuvan University," Inadequacy of a good ´circulatory system´ was Nepal´s greatest handicap in welding the country into one nation."
Though the Gorkhali unification campaign in latter half of the 1700screatedthe territorial unit of Nepal, it failed to provide economic integration for the nascent nation. The subsistence economies of the hills were instead progressively wedded Io the plains markets, thanks to the East India Company. Mercenary recruitment; plains employment, mercantile links, all relied on the vertical north-south link, which matured and reduced the chances of lateral integration of economy and production within Nepal. As sociology professor Chaitanya Mishra notes, "The national economy remained disarticulated; there was little Tarai to Tarai or Hill-Tarai exchange, either in terms of commodities or labour."
If the objective foundations of the nation are weak, the subjective ones are not very vigorous either. There is no belief of common ancestry or race or even common territorial loyalties among Nepalis. In the face of such heavy odds, after the conquest and subjugation by the force of khukuri was over, the Nepali language, ´popular´ hill Hinduism and the institution of monarchy took over as the binding forces that have sustained | the Nepali nation state thus far.
From the ancient period, kingship has been a central pivot of political as well as socio-cultural life. In the absence of a tangible state apparatus, the crown became the primary foci of loyalty for all communities as well as the personification of the state. "It is the empirical representation of national unity," says sociology professor Gopal Singh Nepali. The old adage raja sabaika saja (king is common to all) made everyone´s relation with the monarch an individual affair. It was for this reason that in the past, when political power was seized by ambitious families, the usurpers could not actually do away with the king himself. The crown was the legitimizing force in the eyes of the people.
The new Nepali Constitution of 1990 converted Nepal´s ´active´ kingship into a constitutional monarchy. But the transformation went further, and was marked by a significant dissipation of faith and veneration in the once vaunted institution. The rumblings of republicanism and the occasional snub from mainline political parties has greatly weakened the halo of this once seemingly invincible institution.
Religion has been the second bedrock for Nepali nationalism. Despite its constitutional label as a ´Hindu Kingdom´, Nepal was never a puritanical Hindu State. Religion in the hills in fact evolved as a blending of indigenous shaministic worship practices with classical Hinduism and Buddhism. What emerged therefore was A sui generis entity — a ´hill Hinduism´ that is distinctly Central Himalayan — Nepali — in character. As anthropologist Dipak Raj Pant says, "The larger Hindu identity, and in some areas Buddhist identity, is not the exclusive prerogative of a certain group or a majority. The Hindu identity, especially, is that broad frame of reference which links all the indigenous cults and insulates the whole, but it does neither completely unite nor create a unique type."
Nepal´s popular Hinduism, based on organic spirituality reflected through localised symbols such as particular hillocks, trees and spirits, offers one of the rarest examples of ethno-religious pluralism, Pant adds. This hill Hinduism is quite distinct from the orthodox Vedic-Puranic traditions of the plains. Whereas the plains saw conflict between Hinduism and Buddhism, the hills were witness to exemplary coexistence and overlapping of the two, with added inputs from the local Bon Po and shaministic traditions. Even the rigid strictures of caste were loosened to incorporate the non-caste tribal groups. The Mulki Ain (civil code) of 1854, although much maligned, in seeking to organise the multitudes into a uniform frame of caste hierarchy did give considerable leeway to customary norms and practices.
The assimilitative tendencies of religion in the hills is not specific to Hinduism, and can also be seen in the shamanistic and Buddhist traditions on the southern Himalayan flanks. This point seems to receive support from Pahal Man Singh Moktan in a paper presented at the Third National Convention of the Nepal Tamang Ghedung (association), which concluded in Kathmandu in early April. Said Moktan, "…the original Bon Po traditions were first diluted by Buddhism, and the whole is now moving towards Lamaism."
It is this flexibility, overlapping and blending of magico-religious practices and beliefs which makes religion such a shared experience for the Nepalis. Islam, Christianity, and to some extent the Buddhist Theravada sect, have not undergone this Nepali sing process due to their late arrival on the scene and their origins in qualitatively different environs.
Even before the unification process got underway, Khas Kura, the progenitor of the Nepali language, had established itself as the link language of the hills. In a sense, the spread of Khas Kura cast the die for the eventual military unification. It traversed eastward as the Khasa people migrated out of the Kamali region. Today, Nepali remains the strongest asset of Nepali nationhood and the vehicle for preserving and articulating the national spirit and the historical experience.
Balakrishna Sama, the poet-dramatist, once coined a slogan "Hamro Raja, Hamro Desh; Hamro Bhasha, Hamro Bhesh" (our king, our country; our language, our customs). This slogan was first politically articulated by a representative from Lalitpur District in the First Buddhijibi Sammelan (Intellectual´s Conference) called by King Mahendra in 1962. This slogan, modified by the Panchayat pundits to "Ek Bhasa, Ek Bhesh, Ek Desh" (one language, one custom, one country), was pushed for all it was worth during the 30 years of partyless rule. The slogan which was a logical extension of the system´s monolithic ideology.
Panchayat Years
The Panchayat years, particularly the Mahendra reign, saw the State implementing an aggressive nationalising policy. Strong efforts were made to link the ideal of nationalism with the institution of monarchy. The king, in fact, ascended to ever higher pedestals and the Jai Desh, Jai Naresh (hail country, hail monarch) slogan superseded all others.
The Nepali Rupee replaced Indian currency in circulation, and use of the latter was made illegal for internal transactions. The building-up of a modem administrative structure, investments in transportation, and communication links contributed to the emergence of a national consciousness to some degree. But it was the introduction of a standard national education system in the early 1960s that laid the foundation for ´modern´ Nepali nationalism. As a medium of instruction, Nepali foisted educational uniformity from Mechi to the Mahakali, Even more telling in its impact was the designing of national school syllabus and textbooks. Nepali history, geography, culture and economics began to be taught for the first time, enabling the new generation to be socialised into a particular image of the nation.
The de rigueur recitation of the national anthem and the stories of such mythical/ historical figures as Amshu Burma, Araniko, Jayasthiti Malla, Prithivi Narayan, Kalu Pandey, Amar Singh Thapa, Bhakti Thapa, Bala Bhadra and Bhanu Bhakta sought to implant a vigorous and forceful patriotism among the youth. Earlier, in the absence of a national education system and syllabus, the few Sanskrit pathshalas taught Indian books, and Kathmandu´s well-to-do people travelled to India for higher education. Excluding the ruling circles, there had not been among the general populace a concept of Nepal as a politico-territorial unit.
"The modern concept of nationalism is the product of the modern education system," agrees Prof. Mishra. Perhaps as a result of a nationwide peer pressure, the population which claimed Nepali as mother tongue rose from 48 percent in 1952/54 to 58.36 percent in 1981.
Anti-Indianism was a well nurtured undertone of Panchayati nationalism. It was politically expedient for the regime to point its finger at a "external threat" and allay internal discontent. Secondly, policymakers of the Panchayat astutely recognised the hillman´s ´primeval´ fear of the plains, and the more ´modern´ fear of being sucked into the great Hindustani cultural cauldron.
The two nationalist motifs of monarchy and Hinduism came together in the Panchayat´s assiduous championing of the cause of the "Hindu kingdom", and trying to contrast it to India´s secular status. But the handlers of, the Panchayat over-reached when they chose to promote an orthodox Hindu order. This elitist ´Sanatan´ dharma of the plains had little affinity with the cultic traditions of the hills. This propagation of an official version of religion alienated many com-munities who were less Sanskritic and could not identify with the Hinduism of Beneras and Ayodhya.
The fall of die Ranas in mid-century had left die country ripe for accelerated nationalistic evolution, and it was the definition provided by the Panchayat that the population had to accept or contend with — nationalism right or wrong. Perhaps a less autocratic Government would have provided a different stamp, but there is no doubt that the dominant nationalistic themes propounded by the Panchayat were palatable to the dominant communities of Bahun and Chhetris, as well as to the elites among the Newars and other communities.
A Pluralistic Mosaic
Even though the traditional symbols of nationalism have been tired out, there is still some strength left in them. And while it might not be fashionable to say so in certain parochial circles, there is something to be said for nationalism that is Nepali. It might be weak, but it exists and it is unique.
Since the first test of nation-state — survival —has been passed and a democratic politiy now exists within Nepali borders, social scientists agree that it is time for a new nationalism to be cast, borrowing from the old motifs and adding new attributes.
Nepal´s distinct identity lies not in trying to trace its roots to the Gangetic plains in toto, but in learning to take pride in its own remarkable history and in the process of Nepalisation through which a cultural and religious syncretism has emerged. Indian, Tibetan, Hindu, Buddhist and animistic influences have undergone an accommodative and assimilative process in the Central Himalaya.
According to Prof. Nepali," Nepal must build its own cognitive foundations if its claims of a separate nation-state are to be sustainable. This means generating awareness and creating pride in indigenous traditions, heritage and personalities. We seem to make much fanfare about foreign events and dignitaries, but we fail to recognise the contribution of our own Khas, Kirat and other local heroes". The scholar suggests that celebrating the memory of Yelambar, an ancient Kirat king would be a good start in tracing authentic Nepali roots. Among others, the Magars´ military prowess, Sherpas´ mountaineering feats and the Tharus´ quintessential cultural uniqueness could be propagated as national heritage. The national pantheon must therefore include personalities and events, historic as well as mythical, from all communities.
While the Panchayat decades were characterised by loud rhetoric that was long on nationalism and short on democracy, the situation has been reversed today. And as far as nationalism goes, those in power continue to flog the motifs of the past (although less so the monarchy), little realising that the time is now for innovative measures to strengthen Nepali nationalism by harking back to other traditions that can serve to bring al! Nepalis together. Initiatives are required on the cultural and ethnic fronts, but the Establishment seems ambivalent. It seems undecided between letting "a hundred flowers bloom" and retaining the overused melting pot ideal.
As in any multicultural country, the question of identity must be handled delicately. Specifically in Nepal´s context, is there a golden mean between pursuing the policy of the melting pot or going for the pluralistic mosaic? In the lack of any shared sociocultural values and historical experience, Sadhbhavana´s Tripathi feels that only a federal constitution granting extensive autonomy to regional aspirations will work in the long run. "If regional grievances are not resolved in time, a Sri Lanka-like situation cannot be ruled out and die eventual outcome will be determined by the relative strength of conflicting forces," he warns.
But even autonomous arrangements such as what Tripathi suggests is bound to be a short-term expedient. For, in the lack of any common rationale or loyalties at a higher level, what would be the rationale for the continued existence of a central federated structure after regional autonomy is available? Once autonomous or federal status is granted on ethnic and regional lines, wouldn´t it be logical for the Tarai to coalesce with north India and the Bhot region with Tibet on the same perceived ethnic and regional affinity?
There is another solution on offer." While local variations enrich the total cultural milieu, the effort should be to create a strong macro-Nepali culture at the national level," says Prof. Nepali. This pan-Nepali identity can bind together the local manifestations in a dynamic mainstream. Yalung Kirant, Editor of Himalaya magazine, which seeks to highlight die ethnic heritage of the Nepali hills, is also of the view that the best way lies in gradually developing an all-Nepali culture in which every one can pride while at the same time allowing local variations to flourish. "But first, existing discriminations and inequalities across caste, ethnic and class lines must be removed," he adds, otherwise "unscrupulous politicians and parties will get fuel to fan the politics of hatred to create exclusive enclaves."
While the ethnic and subnational rumblings continue, they have by no means reached Yugoslavia or Sri Lanka proportions. The bile of communalism besieging much of South Asia is also absent among the general populace, irrespective of ethnic categories. Intergroup harmony and cooperation remains very much the norm. Some of the ´extreme´ organisations and leadership are perceived to be just as distant From the common life and culture they claim to champion as are the central business and ruling elites. This was amply demonstrated in the last general and local elections, when the many candidates espousing ethnic or regional agendas made a poor showing, barring Sadhbhavana´s achievements in the Tarai.
On the other hand, the calm should not lull the politicians or the intelligentsia into complacency. For the legacy of harmony cannot forever be a substitute for equitable economic development. The regional and communal tinderbox is on a short fuse, and viable economic opportunities and social justice must be provided, irrespective of caste, class, religion or race, and with affirmative action where necessary. Only such socioeconomic dynamism will promote the ideals of liberal democracy and equal citizenship. Otherwise, the slide towards parochial and tribal democracy may accelerate beyond the point of no return.
The traditional foundations of the Nepali nation-state will have to be judiciously worked at until the society can come up with alternative values and institutions that can sustain the national ideal. Constitutionalism, democracy and a multiparty system have been ushered in as the new ethos for the country. But these are highly intellectual and subjective institutions, and largely out of the grasp of the illiterate masses for the immediate present. If it can be of any illumination, the socialist ideals could not hold the Soviet Union together even after 70 years of ardent indoctrination. Nearer home, secularism, republicanism and federalism in India hasn´t fared too well. It is solely the feat of Indian arms that keeps its troubled outposts within grasp.
These examples carry a deeper lesson for fledgling nations like Nepal. One iron rule of history is that a political entity exists only as long as its coercive powers remain greater than the sum total of centrifugal forces (existing in any system). Once the fissiparous tendencies upset the equilibrium, the entity crumbles, be it an empire or a republic, unitary or federal. In this equation, a heterogeneous federal structure requires greater ultima ratio regum for existence than a unitary one because it not only has to deal with the external threats, but also with the contending units within its own boundaries. The Nepali State, hard-pressed as it is to hold itself together in a unitary model, would find it well nigh impossible to command a federal structure, given die country´s unenviable geopolitical situation.
Before even moving towards new definitions of Nepali nationalism, the society has to determine if nationalism is such a desirable thing to have at all. There are perhaps equally convincing arguments for and against, but it is undeniable that Nepali nationalism provides die people who populate the Central Himalaya with an identity which would probably be lost if each of the individual communities were to decide to try to make it on its own. On balance, it would seem that a Gurung, Rai, or Tharu should be able to maintain his distinct local identity while at the same time donning the garb of Nepali nationalism. Once again, nationalism is only the glue that sticks a people together emotionally. It is the national economy which must seek to bind the people in self-interest. Mutual advantage is the best guarantee for the development and sustainability of nationalism.
Shah is a sociologist at Tribhuvan University and reports for Kathmandu's Rising Nepal.