Two years on (Bangladesh)

Photo: BILASH RAI

On 11 January 2007, it was easy to see that change was in the air in Bangladesh. The military-controlled Interim Government that swept into power on that day rode the coat-tails of public outrage over the violent power politics practised by the two major political camps, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Awami League. A cabinet of ‘advisers’ comprised of the good and the great of Dhaka’s civil society had fronted the decision-makers in khaki, promising a sea change in political culture and governance, and they were publicly celebrated for their promises. The elections scheduled for 22 January were postponed indefinitely at the time, with the new regime promising to draw up a new voter roll that would eliminate the 15 million or so phantom voters that the previous BNP-led alliance had reportedly worked into the rolls.

In the months that followed, over a hundred former ministers and politicians – and scores of powerful businessmen – including BNP supremo Khaleda Zia and Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina, were arrested, charged with corruption, extortion and abuse of power. It was an era of unprecedented optimism for those who had utopian visions, and who had been so distressed by the two-party bickering that they were willing to try any experiment. Indeed, no one had ever imagined that the two former prime ministers who enjoy autocratic power within their parties and have overseen regimes accused of corruption on a grand scale – could ever be embarrassed for abuses of power, let alone be legally prosecuted. Two years on, the optimism has run aground.

Both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina have led their parties into the elections, largely cleared of the charges against them, apparently unrepentant and vindicated, with a stronger grip on their parties than ever before. If, before the changeover of 11 January 2007, the two plutocrats might have considered democratising their parties, the term ‘reformist’ is now a slur within the parties – a word used to refer to those who collaborated with the interim regime to oust the two ladies. The BNP has even gone so far as to hand out proxy nominations to the wives of many of their former MPs barred from elections because of convictions. It must be conceded, however, that the Awami League has axed a number of high-profile criminal godfathers from nominations to lists for electoral seats.

Meanwhile, the Anti-Corruption Commission, one of the few decrepit institutions that the interim regime had revitalised with great bombast, is now mired in controversy, unable to make most of the charges it brought against the major politicians stick in courts of law. It is widely believed that both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina negotiated their way out of jail when it dawned on the regime that, despite their best efforts, no politically significant faction within either party was willing to defect and participate in elections that Khaleda and Hasina were barred from. Ironically, the past two years have served to help these leaders separate the chaff from the grain in terms of personal allegiance. Indeed, many second-tier leaders competent enough to usher in gradual reforms with the leaders’ faith and trust have now been replaced by sycophants whose only virtue is a cult reverence for their respective party chiefs. Cleaner politics and governance, it seems, is yet to emerge, despite the military takeover, or maybe because of it.

Whatever the results of the 29 December elections, there is a lesson here that civil society across Southasia needs to learn. The answer to a faltering democracy can only be more democracy; not a khaki-clad intervention, no matter how well intentioned the architects may be.