Whither the Afghan war?

After nearly a month of US-led military strikes in fi.Afghanistan, the future of the country is less certain now than at any time since 1996. The Taliban emerged from Afghanistan's chaos after Soviet troops withdrew. Does the US have a viable plan for ensuring stability after the bombs stop falling?

The 'War against Terrorism' is not quite going the way it was planned. After the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagonin Washington the United States responded with a number of immediate measures. It identified Osama Bin Laden and his network of terror as being responsible for the attacks. It then mobilised its formidable military machine in pursuit of the objective to "smoke 'em out, get 'em and bring 'em to justice", as President George W. Bush put it. Fairly early on, the objective of apprehending bin Laden was fused with the goal of removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Even though the US declined to publicly furnish proof against Bin Laden that would stand in a court of law, much of the world signalled its support for the drive to get him. Subsequently, the US Defense Secretary was reported to have said that Bin Laden may never be found. By that time the overriding objective had become the removal of the Taliban regime in Kabul.

This is, however, a task that is not as easy as it may have seemed. There is now increasing talk from Washington and London about how the Taliban are proving to be formidable foes. Given the track record of the Afghans, most recently against the erstwhile Soviet Union, this was not entirely unexpected. But the premise was that the Taliban are a highly oppressive regime and hence hugely unpopular. It was therefore felt that though they may seem to be in virtually complete control, the Taliban presides over a brittle structure of power that can be rapidly undermined with the right combination of force and incentives to powerful commanders to switch sides. US policy envisages that after the collapse of the Taliban regime, a broad-based government led by the former King Zahir Shah in a transitional role will be installed. The Northern Alliance is expected to be a key partner in this new dispensation.

Limping to the future

Doubtless, the Taliban have presided over what must be one of the most intolerant and oppressive regimes in the world. So, why is the plan not going entirely according to the script? For one thing, the US-may have misread the nature of the popular resentment against the Taliban. Or, it could well be that the latter have had some success in persuading the largely Pashtoonmajority areas of southern Afghanistan that the new order effectively implies the rule of the Northern Alliance, with King Zahir Shah playing the role of an ineffective US puppet to provide the requisite legitimacy. The Pashtoons of the south have grim recollections of the time when the Northern Alliance ruled between 1992 and 1996. Ahmed Shah Massoud, the operational leader of the Alliance, was highly regarded for his many battles and brilliant outmanoeuvring of the Soviet forces during the war. But in peace he could not keep in check the rampaging forces of Alliance partners, like General Rashid Dostum. In Kabul and beyond, the memories are bitter.

But what of the other key player—former king, Zahir Shah? There is a wide-ranging consensus that he remains virtually the last hope for getting Afghanistan back on the rails. The king, who ruled Afghanistan for about 40 years, has in the perception of many Afghans a kind of historical legitimacy. If he were to call a representative Loya Jirga (tribal council), the basis for a new government could be put in place. But this is not a simple matter either. Ten years ago the Zahir Shah option was a more optimistic one. At that point, when Afghans looked back after more than a decade of being ravaged by war, Zahir Shah's reign seemed to them to have been something of a golden age. The king had not done much for his people by way of development but he had kept the peace. And peace had retrospectively come to acquire a very high premium among the Afghans. Though Afghanistan remained in the Soviet sphere of influence after the second world war, the king skilfully kept his distance from the Soviet state's ideology since that would have created unrest in his Muslim-majority population. It is important to remember that the king had not been deposed as a result of a popular movement, as in Iran, but was ousted in a coup in 1973 while on a vacation in Europe.

But ten years ago, the US and all the neighbours who are unanimous today in supporting Zahir Shah's candidature opposed it for different reasons. The US felt that he had, during his long reign, been far too close to the Soviet Union and that a more suitably inclined regime could be put in place in Kabul. Pakistan had its own favourite, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and so had no time to waste on Zahir Shah. Iran, given its bloody struggle against the monarchy at home, found the idea of restoring the king in Afghanistan repugnant. But now, despite this consensus on his candidature, why is their still such a problem?

A kingdom for the king?

At one level, the problem now is much the same as it was then. It is the personality of the king. He is an extremely cautious man. As before, he wants everything in place. He is unwilling to force the issue on the ground, because it entails taking risks of the kind he is averse to. In the cauldron that is Afghanistan today that may be unavoi-dable. At another level there is the change in circumstances. Zahir Shah's hoped-for return has now been preceded by a US-led campaign that has resulted in the killing of a large number of civilians, including women and children. This has obviously generated intense resentment among ordinary Afghans. The danger is that the king will now be perceived as being associated with the US camp. The Taliban are highlighting the connection, declaring that the king cannot come back to Kabul riding in on American tanks. The chilling episode of the well-known, pro-King, Afghan commander Abdul Haq's execu-tion by the Taliban in late October when he attempted to rally dissident Afghan commanders against the Taliban may be indicative. In all likelihood he was betrayed. The problem may also equally have something to do with the growing Afghan anger against outsiders and with the growing perception that the Taliban are possibly the lesser evil, a view that may be especially strong in the south and east of the country. It does not help either that the king is now seen to be actively engaged in negotiations with the Northern Alliance for a future broad-based dispensation.

Turkey's initiative for working out the modalities of such collaboration will again be presented by the Taliban as being under US auspices, given that Turkey, though a Muslim country, is a member of NATO. The message will also be that while the king remains a figurehead, real power will be transferred to the Northern Alliance. On this score, too, the Taliban could end up being seen as the lesser evil by the Pashtoon majority. However, out of an array of bad choices, the former king remains, perhaps, the best available option in post-Taliban Afghanistan. But implementation of this plan will be a complex and problematic affair. In any case, what is absolutely essential is for the US, as well as the neighbouring countries, not least Pakistan, to refrain from seeking to impose their preferences with regard to the future regime in Afghanistan. That has been, and will be, a recipe for disaster.

Winning battles, losing hearts Three weeks of bombing may have knocked out most of the 'high-value' targets in a country that according to the Pentagon is not 'target-rich'. But this does not appear to have contributed to achieving the objective of generating pressure from a disgruntled populace to hasten the internal collapse of the Taliban regime. If anything, the Taliban appear to have been emboldened by their ability to survive the initial onslaught. The Northern Alliance has made little headway in taking Mazar-e-Sharif despite the bombing of the Taliban forward lines by US-led forces. Mullah Omar has challenged the international coalition to name one highranking Taliban leader that the campaign, so far, has managed to kill. The Taliban ambassador in Islamabad appears far more relaxed than when the war began and at his frequent press conferences he is prone to trade the occasional joke with the assembled correspondents.

It has not helped either that 'mistakes' in the bombing campaigns have been mounting. There are daily reports of civilians killed, smart bombs going astray and wiping out a whole village, Red Cross warehouses being repeatedly bombed and the like. The US-led high-altitude war has reached a stalemate of sorts with civilian casualties mounting and relatively little degradation of the Taliban ability to fight a deadly and protracted war on the ground. A key requirement to this end will be the continued support of the ordinary Afghans. Ironically, it seems that the bombing campaign, with what certainly appears to the Afghans as a callous disregard for civilian lives, may well have served to arrest the growing alienation among the ordinary Afghans for their oppressive rulers. The widespread mass protests in the Muslim world as well as in the West certainly serve to reinforce the view that the US-led coalition is essentially wrong in its relentless campaign of targeting one of the poorest countries of the world for an act in which no Afghan was directly involved.

In Pakistan protests, so far, have remained largely limited to demonstrations comprising by cadres of politico-religious parties such as the Jamiat-ul-Ulemai- Islam GUI) and the Jamaat-i-Islami UI). But that may change as the campaign drags on. Civil society in Pakistan is beginning to register its concern. For the first time in Karachi, in the last week of October, doctors joined in to protest rising civilian casualties. Earlier, the Lahore High Court Bar protested. NGOs with no love lost for the Taliban have been holding peace demonstrations. So far the man on the street, while condemning US actions, has kept away from the demonstrations led by the extremist lobby. But in the absence of active mainstream political parties, he may end up bolstering their ranks. In any case, it is bound to be a source of encouragement for the Taliban that thousands of tribesmen from across the Durand Line in Pakistan are now ready to join them in their struggle against the foreign invader. Ironically, it is the Taliban which has asked them to desist with the assurance that they will be invited in, when needed. Apparently, the scarcity of food within Afghanistan is one consideration for putting the proffered help on hold.

The approach of winter

President Musharraf may have anticipated up to a point the fall-out in Pakistan of a protracted military campaign in neighbouring Afghanistan. Having gone along with the US because he saw no choice, he has nevertheless continued to emphasise the need to keep the military action "short and sharp". He has also called the civilian toll "excessive." But, the US has rejected the idea of a time frame and the daily bombing runs have continued. Similarly, there are differing views in the US administration about the wisdom of continuing military action during the month of Ramzan. Given US Secretary of State, Colin Powell's record during the Gulf War, it is interesting that he appears to have emerged as the dove to the hawk brigade led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. In any case, the killing of innocent men women and children during this month of fasting will have a special resonance that will be used by the Taliban to illustrate the 'crusading' nature of the campaign.

More than anything else, however, it is the approaching winter and the developing humanitarian crisis that poses the greatest danger. According to UN agencies, nearly seven million Afghans, or nearly a third of the population inside Afghanistan, are at risk this winter owing to lack of adequate food and shelter. It is their belief that the food being dropped by the coalition forces does not amount to much more than a public-relations exercise. Any serious effort at providing adequate supplies has to be through a large number of trucks, and this is not possible until the bombing is stopped and some kind of an arrangement for the convoys to go through negotiated with the Taliban. Once snow begins to fall, which will be soon, many of the routes will be inaccessible and remain so through the winter months. In such a situation the death toll could climb dramatically with tens of thousands succumbing to the cold and hunger. This could unleash the kind of public anger in Pakistan and beyond that could have far-reaching repercussions.

The central argument of those who want the campaign to continue is that without the military action the Taliban cannot be dislodged. The Taliban, they argue, are now led by Bin Laden and his 'Arab legion' that, in effect, has hijacked an entire country. Afghanistan now cannot be rid of them without external intervention. There are, in other words, no easy choices. Nevertheless, continuing the relentless military campaign now runs the risk of creating a far bigger mess without quite resolving the one in Afghanistan.