7th Panos Himal Roundtable

PAKISTAN

Syed Talat Hussain
Executive Director
Aaj TV

Mujibur-Rehman Shami
Editor-in-Chief
Daily Pakistan

Hameed Haroon
CEO, Dawn Media Group

Imran Aslam
President – Geo TV

Kashif Haneef Abbasi
Anchor, ARY One World TV

INDIA

N Ram
Editor-in-Chief, The Hindu

Khursheed Wani
Executive Editor, Etalaat

Shahid  Siddiqui
Editor-in-Chief, Nai Dunia/M P Rajya Sabha

Kumar Ketkar
Editor, Loksatta

Uday Shankar
CEO, Star TV

Shravan Kumar Garg
Group Editor, Dainik Bhaskar

DISCUSSANTS

Shamshad Ahmad
Former Foreign Secretary,
Government of Pakistan

Salman Haidar
Former Foreign Secretary,
Government of India

ORGANISERS

A S Panneerselvan
Executive Director,
Panos South Asia

Mitu Varma,
Director Programmes,
Panos South Asia/Country
Director, Panos India

Sahar Ali
Country Representative,
Panos Pakistan

Panos South Asia, in association with Himal Southasian, has by now held seven India-Pakistan 'gatekeepers' retreat' since May 2002, when the first get-together was organised near Kathmandu. These retreats, which bring together senior journalists and experts with in-depth knowledge of the bilateral processes, spring from the faith that in a world of changing equations and moods, rapprochement  between New Delhi and Islamabad is a key factor for a safe and prosperous Southasia. All seven retreats have been moderated by Kanak Mani Dixit, editor of Himal. The full transcripts of all seven retreats can be accessed at Himal's website, himalmag.com.

Introduction

Re-imagining India-Pakistan relations

By A S Panneerselvan

The relationship between India and Pakistan is at the cusp of being re-imagined. Since 1947, the two neighbours were governed by mutual antagonism, and the Cold War drove further wedges into a relationship that was drifting into narrow nationalistic jingoism. The end of the Cold War did not help matters, and the geopolitical equations of the early 1990s created a new flux. The Kargil incursions, the nuclear tests at Pokhran and the Chagai mountains, the attack on the Indian Parliament and Operation Parakaram all overshadowed the Lahore initiative and the Agra Summit. While policymakers were not swift enough to change gears and see things in terms of the new reality, the people of the two countries embarked on a journey to redefine the relationship. And the media leaders helped us to constantly map and document the new imagination.

Panos South Asia and Himal Southasian realised that the most significant factor to contribute to any mutual trust deficit is a lack of information. As such, in 2002 we invited some prominent editors and owners of media houses from both of the countries for an open, informal and informed sharing of experiences and information. This was to be a site for mutual learning of new realities and unlearning of past prejudices, a wellspring to cleanse the scourge of stereotyping the other. We were conscious that the media in these two countries are vast and multi-layered, and we knew that this undertaking would not be an easy task. We learned a lot on the job, discovering that in order to give a sense of continuity and to generate momentum; the editor's retreat should be a proper mix and match combination. The principle was continuity with discreet change.

Year after year over the last seven years, we pursued this goal relentlessly. Senior journalist Siddharth Varadarajan, in 2002 at our Nagarkot retreat, observed: "India and Pakistan are not reported about as normal societies in each other's media. Indian coverage of Pakistan is almost exclusively restricted to bilateral issues, and official concerns … Even when some attempt is made to delve into Pakistan society, there is very little attempt to deviate from these standard types. This is true of Pakistani coverage of India, as well. The kinds of stories picked up tend to reinforce negative stereotypes." By the time we met for our fourth retreat, in 2005 at Istanbul, the idea of self-criticism percolated even into our cosy informal set-up. Neither the Indians nor the Pakistanis were reluctant any longer to talk about the failures of their respective nation states, media and civil societies. And at the next meeting, in Cairo, there was a clear hunger to understand the other's viewpoint and its legitimate dynamics.

One of the key departures that the Panos-Himal annual retreats managed to achieve was to bring in the question of Kashmir, not as divisive issue but rather as a humanitarian crisis that the two countries need to address by keeping in mind the aspirations and political will of the people of Kashmir. This is vindicated by one of the most considered voices from Srinagar, Khursheed Wani, when he declared at Barcelona: "At the moment, in Kashmir Valley, since the militants started in a different context and also because people are by and large fed up with violence, the role of militants is not there. The protests were peaceful. People poured into the streets with one clear idea: that India and Pakistan should come closer and settle the issue of Kashmir according to the aspirations of the Kashmiris."

After these years of constant interaction and opening up each other's media for voices of sense and moderation from either side, within the directional geopolitics, most of the editors and hence the dominant media of the two countries have come to a new equation: the problems for Pakistan have been shifted from its eastern border to its northwestern borders; and for India, the shift is from its western borders towards its eastern borders. Though this has given space for better synergistic interaction, these notions are still fragile, and some of the old ghosts are still active. Only by remaining ever vigilant can we keep those past ghosts from haunting us.

Dealing with the new unipolarity

Shamshad Ahmad: Given the current political situation in both India and Pakistan, along with the new regional and global dynamics, the peace process may have gone into slow motion. Hopefully, it will not collapse and will be able to transcend all the speed-breakers. Where do we stand in this process after 11 years? Are there any milestones that give us any hope on addressing the outstanding issues? What about the confidence-building measures (CBMs) and their impact and implementation? And finally, what is the likely trajectory of India-Pakistan relations, now that we have a democratically elected government in Pakistan? It is always the democratic dispensations in the two countries that have provided a conducive environment for both to move ahead. In order to understand the challenges in moving the peace process forward, we must look at regional nuclearisation, Kargil, the attack on the Indian Parliament, the 9/11 fallout on Southasia, and Musharraf's historic turnaround in May 2000.

First, the history of India-Pakistan relations and the legacy of mutual conflicts since Independence. Second, the complexities of the issues involved that have kept them in an adversarial mode throughout. Third, the centrality of the Kashmir issue. And fourth, the world's post-Cold War transformation. The nuclearisation of Southasia has altered the fundamentals of international relations and, for that matter, the problems between India and Pakistan are no longer the exclusive concern of India and Pakistan alone. While all other issues are amenable to easy solutions, the Kashmir dispute invokes intense feelings among the people of India, Pakistan and Kashmir. The historical experiences, cultural diversities, religious fervours, scars of Partition, wars, conflicts, India's desire for regional domination and somewhat hegemonic stature in the region, the liberation struggles in Kashmir, and the resurgence of violence and terrorism in recent years – all of these come together in a curious convergence in the unresolved dispute of Kashmir. It is a question of acknowledging the fundamental right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people, pledged to them by the international community as well as both by India and Pakistan.

As for the post-Cold War challenges, the focus has shifted from perpetuating disputes to bringing them to an end, no matter how. The economic adventurism of the 19th century is back in the form of a new unipolarity, and terrorism is the new scourge afflicting our world, a phenomenon that transcends all boundaries. Unfortunately, the 'war on terror' has not gone beyond retribution and retaliation, and will remain ineffective as long as the underlying political and socio-economic problems remain unaddressed.

The post-9/11 world has in particular witnessed unprecedented erosion in the authority and credibility of the United Nations. Unabashed use of military power without any legality is now the universal norm. Today, the UN is no longer a meaningful arbiter on issues of global relevance and importance. Washington, not New York, is the focus of world attention for actual decision-making on major global issues. In our own region, the problems are being compounded by a new geopolitical configuration, with the US sitting in Afghanistan and leading an Indo-Afghan-US nexus that has serious implications for the balance of power in this volatile Southasian region. For whatever reason, the US is obviously concerned about the energy situation in Central Asia. India may have its own designs. In Afghanistan, Karzai has no long-term strategy or plans, and seems to be just playing into the hands of the US. Now, the deepening India-US strategic partnership, with all its ramifications, raises serious fears in Pakistan about its impact on the overall regional security environment, including prospects of durable peace in Southasia. With overt nuclearisation of the Subcontinent, Southasia's problems are no longer an exclusive problem of the region itself.

It is against this backdrop that we need to take a realistic view on the India-Pakistan equation, and the likely trajectory of their peace process in the coming months and years. One thing, however, is clear: both India and Pakistan are now nuclear-capable states, and can no longer afford a relationship of conflict and confrontation. No one should expect miracles; there will be no quick fixes, and we should be prepared for a long, drawn-out process. And frankly, there is nothing wrong in being optimistic; but given the volatile history of India-Pakistan relations, one would be better off being realistic.

India and Pakistan must join together in fighting terrorism, because it is a common threat. It is also time to asses the pros and cons of better bilateral trade relations. Pakistan might have valid apprehension in cooperating with an economy that has a much larger manufacturing base and capital, but there is no justification for denying overland transit between India and Afghanistan. Even in the most optimistic scenario, Kashmir would emerge as an overarching factor that casts a shadow on the rest of the agenda. Both sides will have to involve the Kashmiri people in the dialogue process – they are the arbiters of their own destiny. In my opinion, the likely trajectory of India-Pakistan relations under the new democratic dispensation in Pakistan would be linked to the fact that relations between the two countries always saw better times, whenever civilian governments were in place.

The US presence

Syed Talat Hussain: I think the India-and-Pakistan equation is moving away from Delhi and Islamabad, and shifting increasingly towards Afghanistan. There is a bilateral consensus within the US that the next war has to be fought within Afghanistan. As NATO and ISAF beef up their forces, as the US asks for more resources and troops are mounted along Pakistan's border, India is in agreement with all that is happening. I think what happens in Afghanistan is going to be far more important from India's and Pakistan's point of view than what happens within India and Pakistan. Iran is another very important factor because of Pakistan's equation with Iran, India's with Iran, and how the US looks at Iran. This too is going to be taking the issue of peace between India and Pakistan, and away from the two countries.

Anybody who was at any level engaged with the Musharraf regime would know that his system, of course, could not have been sustained, if it was not complemented by the Manmohan system. They would have also known where the actual debates were taking place; how the US State Department was preparing parallel papers; how diplomats were running not between Islamabad and New Delhi, but between London and Washington. We are not being realistic if we keep on pretending that India and Pakistan are independent actors, when it comes to important issues of regional security in a global dimension. I don't think we are going to make realistic headway that way.
 
Shamshad Ahmad: I think what Talat has said is correct, but let us not start seeing demons where none exist. Everyone in this world knows that the US and UK have diplomats to spare, and have been involved or have been trying to be involved in this region for the last 60 years. They have been making pitches, publicly and privately, to resolve the issue, but India and Pakistan have allowed them to be involved only when it has suited their agendas. So I don't think that we should think that the US involvement in the region has increased dramatically. What has happened is that Southasia's role has changed or the implication of what happens in Southasia has begun to impinge on American lives far more than it ever had, and that is why there is a much larger involvement. That does not mean that every time the US State Department calls, everybody starts looking for cover in New Delhi.
 
Salman Haidar: Maybe we are reflecting different perceptions of the US, different national experiences of relationship with the US, which may weigh more heavily in Pakistan than it does in India today. I would also add that India is getting fairly sure of itself. It knows what it wants, and this is the result of a few years of good economic growth, and an international perception of India's expanding role and ability. New Delhi does not feel the same vulnerability towards the outside world that it once suffered from. When the perception is that we may be falling under US influence, then very sharp reactions ensue, as we have just seen in India. On the Kashmir issue and on India-Pakistan relations, I am not aware of attempts to nudge us or push us in a particular direction. The direction we have chosen is essentially from within our own perceptions and, of course, take into account the fact that we do not live just in a world consisting of India and Pakistan. There are many other players who cannot be ignored, but the essential impulse comes from within.
 
Ahmad: The idea was not that the US is nudging and urging both India and Pakistan to reach an agreement on the major issues. You would recall that till the late 1990s, the US was not involved in our affairs, and did not affect our dialogue process. It was only after the nuclearisation of the two countries that the Americans started engaging themselves and, even then, they did not interfere in the India-Pakistan relationship. But now they are. Whatever the US is doing in this region is directly linked to their energy preoccupations in the context of Central Asia. All the post-2004 India-Pakistan engagements have been under constant and direct pressure from Washington. Musharraf needed US support in order to remain in power; he had to establish his relevance, and he did so by dragging the US against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and entering into dialogue with India. The latter was a not a bad initiative, but when you are under pressure from outside, you can never achieve immediate or durable peace.

One of the things that did happen after 9/11 was that suddenly, on the streets of Pakistan, the US was now Enemy Number One, rather than India. India is the nice guy now. When people in Pakistan talk about India, they now refer to the cinema, the music, the culture, and so on. But on the other hand, India seems to have completely shut down on images from Pakistan. It is very difficult to find an Indian friend who will be able to name three television actors from Pakistan.

Civilian governance

N Ram: The evidence does not seem to support the assertion that all progress so far has come only from civilian governments. In fact, the evidence seems mixed. I don't mean to say that we should prefer dictatorships, but I think the facts that you have called to attention do not substantiate a clear-cut generalisation that only civilian governments or mainly civilian governments or predominantly civilian governments have contributed to an advance in the peace process. It looks more mixed than that.

Hussain: Okay, just a couple of submissions. One, I think the great enigma that we have been talking about is how Kargil happened. We believe that it was disastrous – in the way it was conceived, in the way it was executed, and the results certainly proved that. And there is a near consensus within Pakistan that an episode like that should have no tolerance or sanction from anybody. How did that happen? I would say that there is a tendency within systems to allow a couple of powerful individuals to hijack processes. There are four or five people, who sit around the table and decide the destiny of these great nations.

Shahid Siddiqui: In India, we are still unable to fathom how Kargil happened. That is where we doubt the civilian dispensations, and we still don't have faith in them. Today, there are three major players in India-Pakistan relations – India, Pakistan and the US. In the US, they are heading towards a new dispensation; and with a new president, no one knows how things will work out. Similarly, in India the political situation is very unstable at the moment. We may have elections sometime in November or next year in February, so I don't expect any major decision or any major step to be taken before that happens. In Pakistan as well, in spite of all the faith you have in the civilian dispensation, we don't see any stable situation at the moment, and are not sure what may happen in the next few weeks or few months in Pakistan. Kashmir, meanwhile, is on the boil.

Mujibur-Rehman Shami: We are discussing Pakistani politics and the role of the military, but what about India? What has been the role of democracy? I think, sometimes, it has proven to be as short-sighted as the military dictators of Pakistan.
 
Ahmad: I agree with the observation that politicians themselves have been squandering their authority to the military. And the military has always taken advantage of this. The military has always been a forceful factor in Pakistan. But if the politicians can put their house in order through political consolidation, I am sure that the military will behave. Pakistan's external problems are rooted in our domestic failures. So when it comes to problems with India, we can trace our domestic failures and the weaknesses of successive governments. So there is no substitute, no alternative to having a strong and stable political system in Pakistan.

Hussain: We do not believe that the armed forces of Pakistan have turned the corner, as far as their political role and profile is concerned. They have been forced in a circumstance and a situation where they thought it fit and proper to keep a decent distance from the day-to-day management of Pakistan's politics. But do they have the capacity to pull off another coup? I don't want to make a forecast but going purely by the situation that they are in, it is not going to be for the love of democracy, but for the love of maintaining the sanctity of the uniform that they are going to stay away from politics. Pakistan cannot be governed in any more effective way than Musharraf was able to when he was at the peak of his power.

So I would say that the army's going to withdraw, but if politics is going to precipitate a crisis that is perceived by the armed forces of Pakistan to be threatening, for the very existence of this country I think I would not rule out the possibility of another 'political arrangement'. This time around, probably in consultation with the larger political forces – ie, Nawaz Sharif, etc. I do not think they are in a position to take over because there is too much on their plate: they cannot be dealing with the US tightening the screws on them, and the demand by NATO and ISAF that Pakistan does more.

Economy and the stream of jihadis

Hussain: The new flow of Taliban needs to be seen in terms of people driven by frustration and by sheer hatred of the US presence in Afghanistan. And the Taliban militants are mixing with Pashtuns and nationalists, who want to fight for the independence of their land. It's a long tradition. From Bajaur down to North Waziristan, there is a 1000-year history of resistance to occupation forces. And these madrassas of local leaders, long dead and gone, get the last laugh, as they are being worshipped in a new manner. There's a lot of money that is coming in, driven by drugs. There's a lot of external funding that is coming in. Interestingly, some of the arms that were seized in Korum agency had the bearing and serial numbers that were typical of NATO arms. The Afghan army and NATO arms – there is something happening in this region that cannot simply be explained with reference to the clichéd matrix that we have been using. But the beating that the military is getting at the hands of these people leaves no doubt in my mind that there are other factors at work.

Could it be the Americans doing it? So India has had an internal issue with regards to militancy. Something is happening inside Bangladesh as well, which needs to be factored in. And Kashmir has already been mentioned. Again, for a change, it is being conceded, though grudgingly, that it is a genuinely independent movement, independent of Pakistan's manipulations. There are these domestic regional factors that are coming up that are going to be decisive in shaping the direction of the India-Pakistan equation. Finally, on the domestic dynamics, I'm not very hopeful that the present situation in India and Pakistan shows any sustainable opportunity, to talk about durable peace. After Musharraf, the initiative has decisively shifted towards the newly elected government. But as we speak, Nawaz Sharif has set a deadline for Mr Zardari, to restore the judges either by Sunday evening or by Monday morning. Otherwise, he is going to quit the coalition government.

So when the decision-making has moved from the military towards the political leadership, and the political leadership is consumed by its internal wrangling, I don't think anybody is going to be looking at the peace process with India. And that is going to continue. The other internal factor that needs to be considered is the state of the economy. If there is going to be increasing pressure on Pakistan, then the thrust is going to be towards stabilising the country's economy, which I'm afraid is going to tie us even more tightly to the apron strings of the foreign donors and force us to look more towards Washington than ever before. This means that stabilisation of the economy is going to take precedence, and foreign influence is going to increase. What I'm saying is that whether it is Zardari or Nawaz Sharif, you simply cannot do away with the economic pressures that are being faced by Pakistan's economy. And if the economy is hit for a six, the whole idea of a stable equation with India is also going to go into tailspin.

Militancy within and without

Uday Shankar: People have moved on, but the memories still remain. Nonetheless, it is possible for India to make a breakthrough in relations with Pakistan or on the Kashmir issue, but only if both sides are able to take a very clear view on terrorism. Even if it is not state-sponsored terrorism, the fact that terror attacks happen in parts of India cannot be forgotten, when people have a perception that a lot of these terror attacks are being committed by people who come from across the border.

The fundamental question being asked in India amongst middle-class homes and in the middle-class minds is whether Pakistan can afford to focus on peace with India at this time. We need to take into account the political contradiction of the current government in Islamabad, the threat of the military staging a comeback and interrupting the whole process, economic pressures, and fundamentally what's happening due to Pakistan having become a theatre of regional and international terrorism. If all of these are the factors, then you still need to include the perspective of Kargil, because Kargil is important in India for a very different reason. The significance of Kargil is that the most important decision-makers and opinion-formers in Indian society today are the Indian youth, and Kargil was their first exposure to the kind of threat that India faces from its neighbours.

At the moment, let us understand that Kashmir is not really an issue. Most people in India are willing to take a fresh look at Kashmir. But they are worried about whether the resolution of the Kashmir issue will have any impact on the physical threat of terrorism in India. The credibility of dealing with anybody in Pakistan, to create a structure of lasting peace, is very poor. And that is what creates a huge disincentive for the Indian political class, to make any decisive political interventions in a breakthrough with Pakistan.

Hussain: I never said that Pakistan was becoming the centre of terrorism. And my submission was not about the uncertainty in Pakistan – I was listing global, regional and domestic factors impinging equally. The peace dynamics in Islamabad, as we see them, are not fully in the control of official bodies. That's my submission. There are larger factors at work there. We can sit here and debate till the cows come home about how if you hadn't done that we would have been better off, and that if you were to do it again what are the guarantees available. Even with all the guarantees on the table here, our hands are tied with the kind of global, regional politics that is at work. So my submission is to look at the larger picture. We need to discuss peace between India and Pakistan in the context of the larger picture. And the larger picture is, to me, far more important than what happens within New Delhi and Islamabad.

Ahmad: This is consistent with my thinking. Somehow, I do attach importance to external factors, but my focus still remains on domestic consolidation. As long as Pakistan is weak internally, no matter what the external dynamics are we will not be able to set our house in order. The stronger Pakistan is domestically, the more well-equipped we would be to engage ourselves with India for a more durable and more equitable peace. India and Pakistan need a closer framework of principles on the basis of which to organise future relations. In contrast to the efforts that we have been following in the past – which deal with the immediate solution and then we go ahead – I think we need to do some reconsidering. And it goes without saying that it must include regular contact between the political leadership.

Hameed Haroon: The point made that Pakistan could possibly spin out of control will awaken a particular perspective in the minds of a particular urban group of young Indians, who are influential in the future of India's regional perspective. This is perfectly valid. But how do you have a relationship with an entity that springs out of control? I think what is important is that India has to find solutions outside the box, but not solutions that involve territorial ownership. After all, not all of Kashmir's problems are about territorial ownership. Let's put it this way. Within Islam itself, a jihad that destabilises and destroys state institutions, particularly one that has no chance of increasing order, is not sanctionable. So even in the military sense, therefore, let us not look at theoretical solutions as to how the jihadis see this kind of thing.

There are two theatres of conflict – Iraq and Afghanistan. And there are problems that beset the countries in between. If you were to go analyse, say, Iran, then you would want to ask yourself why the US is keen to let the ISI control Balochistan. What India and Pakistan need to do is to understand the larger problem. India's problem is no longer Kashmir. India's problem is a stable India – not only with the Kashmir situation, but with the Waziristan situation, the Afghanistan situation, the Iran situation. And how that wraps up in the whole notion of geopolitics is terribly important. So if Pakistan and India play the old game of strategic depth versus being sandwiched – Pakistan being sandwiched between India and Afghanistan – is not only not going to work, but it is the jihadis who will reap benefits from it. What we don't want is the migrations that are taking place, for example, when Kashmiris begin to move to Waziristan and become part of Baitullah Mehsood's groups, etc, or the Taliban groups operating from North Waziristan.

Siddiqui: I totally agree with that. That is why I am saying that we need a common agenda. Today, terrorism and its manifestations, whether Islamic or non-Islamic, is the real issue. Apart from what is happening globally, with the India-US nuclear deal, and apart from other consequences, India is on the receiving end of global terrorism. India is also a soft target, because India is seen to be getting too close to the US. This has been our apprehension, leading us to oppose this nuclear deal. When I say this, I am not saying that the threat is coming from Pakistan, and I am not talking of borders. The threats are coming from various sources. But the fact remains that India is a soft target for terrorists. And terrorist acts are taking place, increasingly so.

To some extent, Indian Muslims are being sucked into this whole thing. This is leading towards a situation where the Kashmir issue, border issues and other issues become irrelevant. We cannot move forward, no government in India can move forward, and this is not because we are blaming Pakistan for any attacks. Rather, due to the ground situation, people will not accept that, on the one hand, you are carrying out terrorist attacks, while on the other you are moving forward and trying to find a solution for Kashmir. That is not possible. This is a reality, which is before the politicians, and no politician will be able to move forward in this direction. So the question is, what do we do about it?

Where we go from here is exactly what we should be discussing. Maybe I am very naïve, but my belief is that we have to educate the public. We have to change the public opinion in the two countries on terrorism. And for that, just joint patrolling is not going to do anything. We have to get together on various levels to fight terrorism. The people of India and Pakistan should understand that we together are fighting terrorism, and the media should be involved in this fight against terrorism.

The reality is that in India, we have various sorts of terrorists – we have the Naxalites, the Northeast terrorists. But what is called Islamic terrorism is not indigenous. Meanwhile, I believe that SIMI is a creation of the Indian intelligence agencies. It's a very small organisation, which does not have any support base among Indian Muslims anywhere, either young or old. New Delhi blames everything on SIMI because it suits everybody, especially the Pakistanis, who for their part want everything to be blamed on SIMI since they themselves were blamed in the past. So in the last year or so, Indian Muslims have been working very strongly to fight terrorism. Nowhere else in the world have mass meetings of this nature taken place, as those in various Indian towns. If we can have joint meetings of these ulemas from India and Pakistan, whether Shia, Sunni, Bareli, Deobandhi or others, who come out very strongly against this kind of jihad, it is going to help.

My view is that you have to build public opinion in the two countries to create a situation where these kind of terrorist attacks do not become the roadblocks in this peace process. To achieve that, you have to bring different sections of the society – whether film, media, culture, religious groups and others – against this kind of terrorism in both countries.

Ketkar: In my view, many of these problems stem from the inability of many groups to reach their desired levels of economic aspirations, both in Pakistan and India. The political and economic processes that are taking place in the two countries have left out Kashmir. Because of this, there is the isolated anger, isolated frustration that we are seeing in Kashmir. It is also in many parts of Pakistan, as well as parts of India. Much of Naxalism is actually bred from feeling isolated. Naxalism is nothing but an explosive manifestation of frustration, in which people are not able to participate at any level, economic or political. As far as Kashmir is concerned, there is a process of ghettoisation going on there.

The impact of India's regional politics

Shankar: The regional political parties have largely comprised of people who have shown tremendous mobilisation of their much-defined electorate or constituency, but who haven't necessarily ever had exposure to any national agenda. These are the people who are the decisive influence on India's central government. And the regional parties are not putting any pressure on the Centre to take any decision on national issues. If anything, they are acting as disincentives, or putting countervailing pressure on the government, to take decisive policy measures that could be a breakthrough attempt. There have only been a couple of Indian political leaders in the past who have had a point of view on Kashmir or India's relationship with Pakistan. Vajpayee, for instance, and Congress leaders. But not one of them has been put under tremendous pressure or has been encouraged to move on the Kashmir issue. It seems as though as long as Kashmir is not boiling, there is a willingness not to 'meddle with that affair'.

The only constituency in this scenario is the urban Indian constituency, which is conceptually or emotionally seized by the Kashmir issue, and is aware of the challenges with Pakistan and that it needs to evolve. However, this constituency is becoming increasingly insignificant. Therefore, regardless of the assertions that we hear about liberalisation or globalisation and business integration with Indian politics, urban India has found a way of leading, by building its economy despite the Indian political process, and not on the basis of the Indian political process. This political process, due to its numerical engineering, has become entirely dominated by the smaller coalitions, each focused only on the large numbers they can mobilise from rural India.

This is the biggest threat to a resolution of the Kashmir issue or relations with Pakistan, or any of the border issues facing India. Because of this situation, terrorism is the only aspect in the Kashmir issue or India-Pakistan relations that interests the chieftains of all these regional political units. Any of these issues can have a violent flare-up – like bomb explosions or violent threats, which begin to impinge upon the superficial peace of urban India – and that is when everybody wakes up to these issues, and then the immediate outcry is to put a stop to it. As such, there is a tendency to see these issues as a law-and-order problem only. Questions such as, Why is the intelligence not working? and Why are the internal policing mechanisms not effective? and Why are the borders not being effectively patrolled? – these are asked in the aftermath of terrorist outbursts. This attitude reflects a rather distorted and short-sighted, linear policing agenda, rather than a fundamental resolution of these issues. This is very significant, since I don't see this trend in Indian politics being reversed easily.

There is a grand confederation of the poor, so to speak, that is being built by the regional political forces. There is only a very ad-hoc joining of hands among all of them, when it comes to sharing power at the Centre. These people are positively disinclined to meddle with any of the so-called national or international issues, and most of them don't even have a view on these issues. Moreover, the regional press is not seized by these issues in the same way that regional politicians are not seized by these issues, and the two are interlinked. The regional press and politicians behave in the manner they do because their constituents are not focused on these issues.

I suspect that the current mutation of the Indian political DNA is pushing it more and more in this direction. When you have people who are likely to become the decisive players in the politics of New Delhi, but are able to do so only on the strength in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh or Maharashtra, you are unlikely to have a vision that is fresh or focused on resolving these longstanding national issues. This poses the most serious challenge to building-up a process that is sustainable and positively geared towards resolving these problems. Any analysis we undertake of the current challenges needs to keep this perspective in mind. Otherwise, you will always run into the political establishment of the day.

Siddiqui: If you look at what has really happened with these coalitions emerging in the last 15-20 years – from the time Narasimha Rao was India's prime minister, with a minority party government – till now, and if you look at the economic growth that has taken place since then, it is phenomenal. It was believed by urban middle-class Indians that, due to so many coalition parties, India would not grow; these were seen as an impediment to India's growth. But this has not happened. Whether it is the Akali Dal or the DMK or Anna DMK or some of these parties that were talking of secession or separation or their own language, etc – today, they are part of the Indian federation, because they have a share in the power and they have a stake in the Centre. This is leading to a more stable society, more stable polity and a more stable economy.

And as far as India's foreign policy is concerned, let me tell you that parties like the Samajwadi Party are extremely interested and so are Laloo Prasad and his constituents, in what is happening in Kashmir or in India-Pakistan relations. When we make our speeches in the villages, there is talk at the grassroots level regarding these issues, but there the concerns are different and more immediate. Concerns are real human concerns, such as how Indians can travel to Pakistan, etc. That is why Atal Behari Vajpayee was very conscious of this fact, and was concerned about opening the borders and allowing people to travel from one country to another. These are the issues that affect the common man. These may not be the issues that concern the urban middle class, but these are definitely the issues that concern the lower sections of the society.

Ketkar: The point here is that the processes of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation, which began in 1991, were more or less impersonal, in the sense that no political party had an agenda prior to 1991 on any of these processes. The Congress campaign in 1991 did not mention whether it would liberalise the economy or privatise industries. The beneficiary between 1991 and 2008 of this entirely new process of liberalisation has been the Indian middle class. But, let us not define middle class only in the context of the urban middle class, because there has been a growing rural or 'rurban' middle class, which is also the beneficiary of this economic liberalisation. However, there is a complete separation between the beneficiaries of these processes and those who are not beneficiaries. As a result, three new bourgeois groups can be said to have emerged out of these processes. One is the corporate bourgeois or the corporate global bourgeois; second is the regional bourgeois, who felt neglected in the process of overall development; and third is the regional bourgeois, who started forming political parties. Therefore, the regional parties emerged to protect 'rurban' interests, including the agricultural as well as the neo-industrial, neo-rich, middle-class interests since 1991. This is why we have seen regional parties emerge, particularly after 1989 and 1991.

The so-called 'backward' castes or the economically oppressed also felt the need to join this bandwagon. As a result, they started forming their own political parties, to eventually join the mainstream parties. This is why we have these three sectors of economic bourgeois emerging – the rising caste bourgeois, the rising regional bourgeois, and the rising corporate bourgeois. The conflict at present is among these three. Since the economic aspirations of these three sections do not correlate with each other, the polity is getting fragmented, including the caste polity. During the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, we will see this multi-fragmentation of politics: on the one hand, there is the process of globalisation, on the other hand, there is the process of fragmentation. Therefore, the chances are that this Lok Sabha will not be there for us in the next five years, and will be forced to dissolve. Another election will need to take place, until the whole process of social mobilisation gets streamlined, where the poor and the middle class somehow acquire an actual stake in running the economy and the polity. At present, this is not happening.

Flare-up in Kashmir

Khursheed Wani: In the last month, tens of thousands of people have come out onto the streets to protest against the Indian government, and to call for azadi. In 1992-1993, the Islamic groups in Kashmir imposed a ban on the Amarnath Yatra, which created a perception in India that the militants were against Hindus. Then Indian agencies also started thinking along these lines. The Amarnath issue became very sensitive, particularly after General Sinha took over as governor of J & K. What governor Sinha did was to start taking undue interest in the work of the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board; and in 2004, he decided that the Amarnath yatra should be held for two months. J & K is a sensitive state, and so when there are hundred of thousands of yatris coming and going, security was compromised. When the Mufti wanted to restrict the yatra to its original one-month period, Sinha tried to suggest that the Mufti was against Hinduism. The government of India, through Governor Sinha, was trying to get Hindus from outside India to settle in Kashmir, to change the demography of the Valley, which has been predominantly Muslim. For the first time in the history of J & K, the conflict was not taking place on a regional basis, but had taken on a communal slant.

At this point, the Indian government is unable to understand how to stop the agitations in Kashmir. What is the difference between 1990 and 2008? In 1990, people came in their tens of thousands onto the streets, demanding independence and all that. At that time, the gun was introduced to Kashmiris, and for the first time it was in the minds of the people that they can now take on the army, the Indian authority. But 19 years down the line, the gun is still there. Everybody has now realised that the introduction of weapons also brought misery and suffering to the people of J & K. Earlier, it was those who were 35-to-50 years old that were out on the streets, and now it is also the generation of 15-to 25-year-olds. So, one can say that it is completely a people's movement now in Kashmir, and it is high time that India and Pakistan looked at the ground reality. Unfortunately, every time there is talk about Kashmir, the ground situation is never addressed. India and Pakistan should start negotiating, start talking about Kashmir seriously, and they should settle this issue once and for all by involving the Kashmiri leadership.

Haidar: I might have doubts about collusion between the Centre and the J & K authorities. I am more persuaded by the vision of a breakdown of competence and a lack of understanding. I think the governor of J & K historically has had much more executive authority than a normal governor. Regarding the communal divide, I think that this is a dismaying new feature of J & K politics. We have not seen it before, and it is worth noting that the communal parties in Jammu have been closely associated with the agitation there. Though this is not the first time that the Hindu communalist parties have tried to exaggerate the communal issue in Jammu, I think the idea this time is to project it more widely across the nation in the context of the upcoming elections. The final point is that there has been no reference to Pakistani fomentation of the trouble, and this is something worth noting. In terms of the India-Pakistan relationship, this agitation, while a complicated matter, may not introduce insuperable new elements into these complicated matters.
 
Siddiqui: I want to know about the Kashmiri leadership: How has the leadership's perception changed on the issues? You said when Mirwaiz Omar Farooq went to Pakistan in January 2007; there was a strike by Syed Ali Gilani. Recently, Omar Abdullah and Tariq Amir went to Pakistan for a conference, and when I spoke to Gilani and Mirwaiz they said, "We refuse to sit with these people at the same table to talk to them."

Wani: Gilani has always been a hardliner, and an advocate of the right of self-determination. It is interesting how the leaders in Kashmir follow the people, but the people don't follow the leaders. So whatever the ground situation is, the leaders change accordingly. I think people were more favourable to a dialogue last year than this year. People are favourable to a dialogue, but there is a sense of suspicion that Mirwaiz Omar Farooq is not talking about independence, while Gilani is. This suspicion has always been there. It is the ground reality in Kashmir that decides how the leaders should express their stances. Why are Gilani and Mirwaiz together? They were bitter enemies a year earlier, and are now together only because the people want them to be together.

Hussain: Two quick queries. One, every uprising has a slogan. Is there a slogan that you see being raised in this uprising? Two, I am struck by the absence of guns. We thought that the militants were all around, and if there is an uprising on the streets and the people are coming out in their thousands, one would expect the militants to either champion that cause or, at least, to show their presence. What is the role of the militants, then?

Wani: Initially, there were many slogans, but this time, when there was a huge public gathering in Srinagar, the leaders decided that the slogan would be, "We want self-determination." But though the people are united, the leaders are singing different songs. Yassin Malik's slogan was Us paar bhi lenge Azadi, Is paar bhi lenge Azadi [We will gain independence on that side, we will gain independence on this side]. And Gilani said, Pakistan se rishta kya, Hum Pakistani hein, Pakistan hamara hei [We are Pakistani and Pakistan is ours]. About the gun, I can tell you that the people are not supporting the gun as such – though there is sympathy for the militants, and it is due to this sympathy that the militants are surviving.

Ram: The United Jihad Council has asked the militants to put an end to their activities in Kashmir Valley, in the wake of a heightened demand for independence. So, the 13-member group has asked separatist politicians to pass a resolution for freedom, and to limit their struggle to achieving their goal of the right to self-determination. So they have asked militants to cease militant activities, as well as to not display weapons in public during the rallies, because this gives the security forces an excuse to open fire on unarmed protestors. But they would continue to strike at troopers and border areas, where there was no civilian population.

I think the Indian authorities have made an unholy mess in Kashmir, and I think there was considerable collusion by the Centre. Our report from Luv Puri in Jammu says that they are close to an agreement because there is going to be 'diversion' of the land during the yatra season. This springs from a judgment by the J & K high court, in 2005 I think, where they suggested a temporary diversion. Ownership of the land will not be transferred, but it will be given to them just for the season, where they can put up these pre-fabricated structures. So the Samiti leaders are quoted as welcoming this, saying that they are satisfied with that, after which, the shrine board will be reconstituted. So I think the Centre is caving in because elections are coming. On the whole, the Indian state will try to ride it out and contain the situation with strong security and repressive measures. There will be a lot of divisions on this, including from allies of the Congress. I think this will be a highly divisive issue in Indian politics.

Shankar: It is almost a routine in India that when the government at the Centre changes, there is a mass reshuffling of the governors at the state level. Governor Sinha should have been the prime target to go for a reshuffling when Manmohan Singh came to power, but he survived. He was a marginalised element even within the BJP, and was made the governor of Kashmir only towards the end of the BJP government's time in New Delhi. So, for someone like him to survive clearly shows the reluctance of the Manmohan Singh government to take a tough stance on something as critical as this. In addition, the fact that General Sinha made trouble towards the end of his tenure comes as a huge surprise.

The second thing is, let us not forget the role of Ghulam Nabi Azad, who was the chief minister. He was easily in a position to take precautionary measures, to make sure that the situation did not get out of hand. But he comes from Jammu, and these are election times and he is desperately looking for a constituency. Third, I am pessimistic about the ability of the Indian government to take a clear position. I do think that the new governor, N N Vohra, is an intelligent man; his heart is in the right place. But at the end of the day, he can do barely anything more than make a recommendation. As for the left parties, I am pretty cynical. For almost four and a half years, the left was in a very influential position within this government. The left does not have a single thing to say for itself that it can claim as a sensible proposal for resolution on the Kashmir issue.

Shami: What is the future of the insurgency in Kashmir? Have the mujahideen stopped forever, or will they wait for a certain period? In Pakistan, some people think that there is a good chance of building a nexus with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and with other militant groups of Kashmir and insurgency. Do you see any possibility of that?

Wani: At the moment, in Kashmir Valley, since the militants started in a different context and also because the people are by and large fed up with violence, the role of militants is not there. This time the protests have been quite peaceful; but if these 15-to-25-year-olds on the streets are subjugated for one, two or three years, then they may look for violent avenues. At this point in time, the demonstrators have come out on the streets with one clear idea: that India and Pakistan should come closer and settle the issue of Kashmir according to the aspirations of the Kashmiris. But if a resolution is again delayed, there is a fair chance that militancy will again erupt.

Ahmad: Recognition by both Pakistan and India of peace between them is a strategic imperative. They must renounce the use of force for settlement of their disputes. And I'll go even to the extent that they should at some stage enter into a no-war pact, with an inherent mechanism for conflict resolution and conflict management. Steady improvement of relations between the two countries requires further changes in the ways in which they deal with each other. India, as the largest country in Southasia, must lead the way by discarding the old behaviours in the region. For India and Pakistan, the national priority must be sustainable socio-economic development. This requires a stable and peaceful neighbourhood. That brings in the SAARC framework.

Build trust and confidence. Establish a strategic restraint regime. Develop mutually beneficial cooperation and visible progress towards resolution of disputes. Kashmir remains the overarching factor that casts a shadow on the prospects of peace, so we have to mange this in close consultation with the Kashmiri people. Strengthen mutual cooperation in counterterrorism. A joint anti-terrorism mechanism is already there, but it is insufficient. I think we need to work out more effective mechanisms, so that we can deal with this menace as a common threat.

A S Panneerselvan is the director of Panos South Asia.  

PREVIOUS PANOS-HIMAL ROUNDTABLES

6th Panos-Himal Roundtable
Looking back at the peace process: Turbulences and implications
Siem Reap, Cambodia  (October 2007)

5th Panos-Himal Roundtable
Are India and Pakistan really in control of the situation?
Cairo, Egypt (November 2006)

4th Panos-Himal Roundtable
The question of Kashmir
Istanbul, Turkey (December 2005)

2nd Panos-Himal Roundtable
The nuclear weaponisation of Southasia
Bellagio, Italy (July 2003)

1st Panos-Himal Roundtable
Conflict and the India-Pakistan Media
Nagarkot, Nepal (May 2002)