Always a Bridesmaid, Often a Bride

As squabbling politicians paralyse the country, will popular demand bring the army out of the barracks?

For a company that once ousted both the party presently in power as well as the main opposition,   the Bangladesh armed forces in 1996 appear decidedly reluctant to do an encore. As the long-standing political crisis escalated into a national election entirely boycotted by the Opposition, some wondered whether a stretch of army rule might not be such a bad idea after all.

Mujib

The links between the armed forces and mainstream politics began to be forged in 1971, when, at huge risk, Bengali soldiers crossed over to the nationalist army. However, in newborn Bangladeash the military found it had no role to play other than when called occasionally to impound illegal weapons and ration cards. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the country´s founding father, imposed one-party rule, national emergency and even raised the Rakkhi Bahini, a personal para-military guard. Taking advantage of the considerable socio-economic chaos, a section of the army assassinated Sheikh Mujib, killed most of his family members, and sent his party, the Awami League, packing into exile from power, which has now lasted 20 years.

Zia

 The August 1975 coup was not merely a reflection of public unhappiness expressed through military hands, but a sign of internal military discord as well. It unleashed more coups by contending factions. On 3 November 1975, a group led by war hero and the army´s number two, Gen Khaled Mosharraf, took over. Four days later, the charismatic veteran Col (retd) Taher, supported by a leftist civil-military combine, dislodged them. But before the night was over, the soldiers had opted for Gen Ziaur Rahman, the army chief jailed by Khaled for refusing to go along with his plan. Gen Zia, the most popular figure of the liberation war, emerged as a hero on 7 November 1975. He put the radicals behind bars and did away with a large number of them. In the following years, while civilian politicians fought their petty battles and party- hopped, factions in the military periodically tried to take over. Between 1975 and 1980, Zia put down over 20 coups, before he was himself gunned down by fellow liberation war veterans in May 1981. Zia had by then become President, having founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Zia´s widow, Khaleda Zia, today leads this party.

Ershad

Although Gen H.M. Ershad, the then army chief, did not take over as expected when Zia was assassinated, he did so a year later, in March .1982. He declared a "war against corruption" and promised to return to the barracks within two years. But, by the end of those two years, he had gained a reputation as a serious "crony capitalist". Ershad was also the moving force behind the formation in 1986 of another military-backed political party, the Jatiyo Party.

Ershad was also the first takeover supremo without a liberation war background. He felt that much of the discord within the army was due to friction between those who had taken part in the liberation war and those who had not. He systematically eased off most of the senior officers who had fought in 1971, which did reduce internal tension. The officers who remained were younger, and said to have strong links to civilian society. Meanwhile, the retired and released officers did well in business and politics.

However, opposition to Ershad mounted, due to the aura of corruption around his Jatiyo Party, plus general resentment over the open and covert military control of the civilian administration. Both Mujib´s daughter, Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League, and Khaleda Zia, (the assassinated General´s spouse), of the BNP proved to be determined opponents.

The opposition understood—what Ershad apparently  did  not—that in Bangladesh it is the urban populations that had a decisive say in political matters. Thus, while Ershad basked in rural support, the asphalt of Dhaka and other cities ignited in revolt. There was a feeling that the general had damaged the army´s image, and so when it came to the crunch the officers refused to bail him out. They felt more threatened by his unpopularity than by the civilians demonstrating against martial law.

The army, especially the mid-level and junior officers, approved of Ershad´s departure, and the public agitation carried the day. Ershad is now in jail under various charges, including a 14-year-old one of having plotted the murder of Gen Manzur, who had himself been accused of killing Gen Zia.

The Will To Intervene

 The BNP´s unexpected win in the 1990 elections, held under a neutral caretaker government, did not help its relationship with Awami League, which had been sour at the best of times. Since then, it has gone from bad to worse, leading the whole country into chaos. Over the last two years, the deadlock between the two parties has successfully resisted mediation, local, national and international.

Meanwhile, the Election Commission asked the army in January 1996 to help the police in collecting unauthorised arms to ensure a peaceful atmosphere for the polls. This caused considerable embarrassment to the armed forces, as it was going to be their first public engagement after the departure of Gen Ershad. The well-nurtured image of a non-controversial army was bound to be tarnished.

The national political standoff is not expected to be resolved after the elections. As chaos and violence escalate, will the army be forced to step in? Maybe, but there are restraining factors.

"The military finds no reason to intervene because the soldiers are earning good wages as UN peacekeepers, and martial law imposition may threaten that," says Imtiaz Hussain of Dhaka University, a military watcher. He adds: "The donor governments have also stated that they would disapprove of a military takeover, so why should they be rash? After all, their status is not threatened."

But, if the situation worsens and the military has to play a more active "peace keeping" role at home, the neutral image gained in the last few years may also come under attack. Gen Abu Saleh Md. Nasim, the present army chief, is not known to be keen towards any party and is said not to favour martial law rule. "You see, the military does not need to take over the country to protect its interests," explains Amir Khasru, a journalist. "It is practically guaranteed by the administration. A takeover will only put all that into risk."

With access to dollar incomes in UN duties, guaranteed benefits during and after service, and de facto acceptance of their privileged position in the state hierarchy, the incentive to intervene will certainly have to be compelling. Mr Hussain believes that, while the army is elitist in character, it has changed in complexion over the years and many officers will be reluctant to oust a civilian government, something their predecessors might have done without compunction.

Most analysts believe that the military will take over only if requested by the Government, the Opposition and (most importantly) "the donors". Says Mr Khasru, "It is also a question of image management. They would like to be seen as fulfilling an onerous responsibility rather than looking after themselves."

In a recent survey by a Dhaka think tank, 49 percent of the people polled opposed martial law. Yet, few approved of the civilian politicians. Should the situation deteriorate, and the political crisis deepen, the military may become the only option, whether anyone wants it or not. And that could include the military itself.