For generations, the basic political geography of Ladakh – a vast, cold desert in the far north of India, suspended between the Himalaya and the Karakoram – was relatively simple. It revolved around two centres of gravity: to the east lay Leh, where Tibetan Buddhism influenced culture as well as politics, and to the west stood Kargil, a predominantly Shia Muslim district whose history, culture and anxieties often diverged from those of its neighbour.
But on 27 April – three days before India’s home minister, Amit Shah, was due to visit the region – that political geography was drastically changed. The administration of Ladakh, directly appointed by the ruling Hindu Right government in New Delhi under Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), announced the creation of five new districts. This amounted to the most consequential reorganisation of the territory’s internal boundaries in its history. It followed New Delhi’s abrogation of Article 370 and Article 35A of the Indian constitution in 2019, which dissolved the former state of Jammu and Kashmir and made Ladakh a separate Union Territory. As a result, Ladakh’s administration fell under a New Delhi-appointed lieutenant governor, with the locally elected hill councils left out of decision-making.
The Modi government described the creation of new districts as an act of “administrative decentralisation” for a region spread across nearly 59,000 square kilometres of some of the world’s most inhospitable terrain. Ladakh’s governor said that the move, “apart from bringing governance closer to citizens, will create new avenues for growth, employment and entrepreneurship.” But in Ladakh, boundaries have rarely been mere administrative lines. Questions of territory here are inseparable from questions of identity, representation and power. And the complications are compounded by Ladakh’s singular place in India’s strategic imagination, given that it is wedged between Pakistan and China and sits astride some of the most militarised frontiers on earth.