Those who know must sneak a glance at it anytime they drive down Khyber Road, connecting the old city of Peshawar with the town's posh cantonment areas. From the outside, it looks no different from other brick buildings. Inside, however, it houses the northwestern command of the Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Yet this building, for decades an icon of the ISI's power, today is no longer standing, after a series of massive, vehicle-borne explosives were detonated at 6:45 on the morning of 13 November, killing 14 officials and guards along with three civilians. The blast was heard some 25 kilometres away.
The attack took place the day that US National Security Adviser James Jones arrived in Islamabad bearing what was described as "a letter from President Barack Obama". Addressed to Pakistan's political and military leadership, the communication included a demand to "do more" to counter al-Qaeda in the tribal belt along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. There was also a timeframe included for this action: prior to the critical midterm elections in the US, in November 2010. Indeed, Washington clearly still needs the help of the ISI, despite having "deep suspicion" about the agency's alleged links with groups such as the Taliban.
The 13 November attack came almost a month after the Pakistan Army launched Operation Rah-e-Nijat ('Path to Salvation'), on 17 October, the military's latest offensive against the ongoing militancy. This action was an attempt to regain control of strongholds and training grounds for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in areas occupied by the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan. Contrary to initial predictions of a long, bloody fight, the military met with a number of swift successes, surprising many by taking control of some 90 percent of former militant-held areas. Losing South Waziristan as a stronghold has undoubtedly been extremely costly for the TTP, particularly following on the military's success in pushing out Taliban militants from the Swat Valley during the previous army undertaking, Operation Rah-e-Rast, in May.
Sources close to the TTP claim that the militants' retreat was less a hasty withdrawal than a tactical ploy. "We have made a strategic decision to let the military come deep inside the Mehsud territory, and then launch four-pronged attacks," said Qari Hussain Mehsud, senior TTP leader and its suicide-bombing mentor, told local media in mid-November. Yet with the military moving in as far as Makeen, seen as the TTP's headquarters, as Himal went to press the militants' promised coordinated attacks had yet to start. "The TTP has lost ground," says analyst Dilawar Wazir, based in Peshawar. "It simply cannot fight the military without territory under its control."