Silence and sacrifice

On a cold, windy day in December 2009, a school building in the isolated Malakand region of northwestern NWFP (today renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) was being guarded round-the-clock by soldiers. All civilians were kept at bay, with entry to what was now a high-security zone only possible with permission from the top military commanders, camping not far away. 'Dangerous kids', including 'suicide bombers', were said to be undergoing rehabilitation in the school building, following their capture during and after Operation Rah-e-Rast ('Right path'). That military action had been launched the previous May to take back control of the Swat Valley from a faction of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) led by Maulana Fazlullah, the 'Radio Mullah'.

Inside, the kids had been divided into two groups, separating the hardened elements from those whose return to normal life would likely come more quickly. The building housed teenagers from 13 to 18 years – all male, though girls have been used by the TTP and other organisations for suicide missions from time to time, including in the attack in Peshawar of 11 August. The indoctrination of these children was clearly evident in the rage in their eyes; for this reporter, it was nerve-wracking just to stand in front of them. The first 14-month 'deradicalisation' course was the first of its kind in Pakistan, and the course continues today, with new entrants.

Pakistan was caught unprepared when the suicide-bomber phenomenon suddenly began in earnest, in 2006. At that time, the security forces seemed not to know how to counter this newly adopted militant strategy. Indeed, even since that time, according to this writer's calculations, the success rate (measured by the number of attacks pre-empted or foiled by security forces) against suicide bombing has remained insignificant – just two percent; the bombers can strike almost anywhere at almost any time, as they have proven repeatedly in recent years. No reliable figures exist on the exact number of recruited potential suicide bombers, but security officials fear – and militant organisations claim – that the number is in the thousands.

An on-the-ground exploration of this phenomenon uncovers a world quite different from what is considered normal, with a painstaking process methodically brainwashing kids as young as 12. 'In the beginning, parents used to take pride in their children being used as suicide bombers against the American and NATO forces in Afghanistan,' a tribal journalist from Miranshah in North Waziristan said recently on condition of anonymity, underlining the deep-rooted anti-Americanism among the conservatives local communities. 'For missions into Afghanistan, tribal children [in Pakistan] were picked up for their language and resemblance of dress,' he added.

Pakistan's Taliban has never allowed the media access to the suicide-bomber trainings, although its members have allowed certain 'embedded' journalists to visit areas under their control for propaganda reason when civilians have been victim to US 'drone' strikes. However, interrogation of the very few captured suicide bombers has offered the security agencies some first-hand knowledge about secretive training manuals. 'In 2007 the first suicide bomber was arrested,' Shafqat Malik, a Peshawar-based explosives expert told this reporter. 'That was when we saw the suicide vest for the first time.'

Awaiting the tashkeel

From what has been pieced together, the process begins with the initial 'recruitment' – often taking the form of outright kidnapping – followed by a long procedure of indoctrination, typically carried out within the confines of certain madrassas. Fifteen-year-old Shakirullah, of Jandola in South Waziristan, can testify to how madrassa efforts made him into a bomber. After being arrested in 2008 in Khost province of Afghanistan, evidently before he could blow himself up near some US soldiers, the teenager was allowed to speak to the media in Kabul, at which point he implicated clerics at a madrassa in Jandola as being 'part of the network'. A security official in Peshawar subsequently explained that this referred to militants' tendencies to use madrassas both for indoctrination and logistics purposes (to survey the area, etc) while carrying out a suicide mission.

According to militant insiders, potential suicide bombers are separated from other foot-soldiers and treated well. 'It's a long and painstaking process to train a kid,' Taliban suicide-bombing mentor Qari Hussain, now dead, was quoted as saying to a journalist who visited him in 2007 in South Waziristan. 'We do not allow the fidayeen to mix with others, and even their living spaces are separate from others.' (Members of the Taliban are said to get angry at the term suicide bomber, insisting instead on the Arabic word fidayeen – those who sacrifice.) According to a training booklet recovered by Pakistani intelligence, once the training begins, the process of indoctrination will include extensive recitations from the Quran; listening to Taliban-composed songs (instrument-less, and hence not proscribed) glorifying jihad, the Taliban struggle and the importance of defeating the 'infidels'; and watching DVDs showing US, NATO and Pakistani forces purportedly unleashing 'injustices' against Muslims.

Such activities 'are aimed at injecting anger into the teenager against the Americans and Pakistani soldiers,' a psychiatrist at an army-run rehabilitation centre in the Swat Valley said, again on condition of anonymity. According to some eyewitnesses, the process can be extremely effective. Noor Muhammad, a 15-year-old from Kabal in Swat district, says that it took him no time to swear allegiance to the Taliban after he heard the songs. 'These songs electrify you, have a deep impact on you,' Noor said after graduation from the rehabilitation centre last year. 'They make you believe as though you have no duty other than jihad – and that the Taliban are the saviours.'

The training can stretch from months to years, and it is longer if one is aiming at a high-value or difficult target, for which extensive mental and physical preparedness is required. According to Qari Hussain, the Taliban trainer, the 18-year-old man who carried out the March 2010 attack on the Federal Investigation Agency office in Lahore, which killed 11 people and wounded 37, was trained for four years. Former chief of security for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Mehmood Shah, explained how the bomber is treated before being sent on mission. 'The militants provide the suicide bomber with new dress, and take him to the bazaar to buy anything he wants,' Shah says. 'But he is not allowed to mix with anyone.'

TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud claims that bombers openly weep when they are not picked for strikes during the tashkeel, a meeting during which bombers are selected for designated attacks. 'You would not believe the pain the bombers feel when they are not picked up for suicide missions,' he told this reporter in May 2008. Hakimullah succeeded his predecessor, Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in August 2009 in US drone strike in South Waziristan.

Sweating beneath chadar

According to prevailing wisdom, particularly among counterterrorism experts, it is mainly religious motivation that drives an individual to 'achieve' the target. This is clearly only part of the story, however. In fact, research by Shafqat Malik, a police official in Peshawar, suggests otherwise. 'Emotional instability' at an early age is the primary factor behind a teenage suicide bomber's motivation, he says. 'Poverty and revenge, coupled with helplessness, helps to indoctrinate the kids,' he has written. 'Religious feeling is a bonus, [working] as catalyst, but it is not the only factor.'

The suicide-bombing-prone militants – as well as their trainers – seem to draw no distinction between the battleground and, say, place of worship. 'Wherever you find the target, it should be taken out,' Hakimullah Mehsud conceded a group of journalists in May 2008 in South Waziristan. In recent years, mosques have not been spared when targeting those seen as hostile to the militancy. One would-be suicide bomber told a television interviewer that he would carry out his assigned attack even if his family members were present at the designated site. 'No one is innocent in Pakistan,' he said. 'The innocent are those who are waging jihad in Waziristan.'

The bomber's ideological training, of course, come along with lessons in making the explosive vest that the attacker will, eventually, wrap around himself. The 'TTP bomber', according to Malik, normally will carry eight kilograms of explosives while on his mission. However, Malik says, when going into a high-security zone in order to reach a high-value target, a bomber will typically carry a far smaller volume of explosives, to avoid detection. The explosives are worn next to a pallet sheet glued with hundreds of ball bearings, allowing the bomber to inflict maximum damage even as he gives up his own life. In order to further increase casualties, a low-intensity bomb is sometimes set off at first, in order to attract more people to the blast site; as the crowd grows, the suicide bomber will strike.

According to Malik, the attacker cannot walk far, given the weight of his explosives, and so most are dropped off by car close to the target. Nevertheless, the physical condition deteriorates considerably as the bomber nears the target. 'Wearing the chadar to avoid explosives-laden vests from being spotted, his lips get dried up, and he simultaneously starts to shiver and sweat,' Malik says. Throughout Pakistan, the security forces have erected notice boards to warn pedestrians to remove their chadar veils before approaching a security checkpost.

Through mid-July, this year has seen 22 suicide bombings in Pakistan, indicating a somewhat lower rate compared to last year's total of 55. On the other hand, in some of these attacks, casualties are counted in the scores. And, says Malik, 'They are not running short of bombers.' At the same time, there have been some successes for the security forces. Most observers agree that one major achievement has been in breaking up the connections between the militants and their local collaborators. 'Denying logistics and local sources may have crippled these organisations' abilities to carry out suicide bombing at will,' Malik suggests.

The suicide mission remains extremely potent as a strategy of extremism. 'A 500-pound bomb will not affect you as much as a single suicide attack,' a young commissioned army officer told this reporter. 'The Pakistani nation will stand up against any foreign aggression, but it has not stood up resolutely against the suicide bombing – and fighting these elements can only be more difficult when the nation stands divided.'

~ Iqbal Khattak is a contributing editor for Himal Southasian.

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