Academics to Obama: Forget the militaries! Demilitarisation, development and sustainable peace
Reframing a regional approach to South Asia for the new administration of Barack Obama. A report prepared by the New York University Institute of Public Knowledge Working Group on South Asia, including Amrita Basu, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Nyla Ali Khan, David Ludden, Zia Mian, Senzil Nawid, Sahar Shafaqat, Kamala Visweswaran and Chitralekha Zutshi.
At no time has South Asia figured more prominently in US foreign policy. Today, the new administration of Barack Obama has an unprecedented opportunity to transform US foreign policy in the region, and therefore to transform the region itself. President Obama is already executing a renewed US commitment to multilateralism. After his 6 April proclamation in Turkey that the 'US is not at war with Islam', many are newly optimistic about the administration's aim of reversing the deleterious effects of the last eight years, by building relationships with the Muslim world based on mutual respect and seeking common ground. This reorientation toward dialogue and diplomatic engagement will be of particular value in South Asia, where the majority of the world's Muslims reside and where half of the region's eight countries have Muslim majorities. Yet despite the administration's recent jettisoning of the language of the 'war on terror', there is growing concern that its underlying framework remains unchanged, and will generate another decade of failed policy in the region.
With the view that the central stated goal of US policy – 'disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan' – is too narrowly drawn and counter-productive, nine scholars on South Asia recently got together to attempt to reframe the discourse, on the belief that interdisciplinary academic expertise has an important role to play in this discussion. (This report is the result of those discussions.) With the broad, long-term objective of US foreign policy of facilitating the development of a sustainable peace, the short-term goals to achieve that objective should be step-by-step demilitarisation of the region. A transitional process of this type requires careful thought and planning, and will be difficult. But the reverse scenario – increasing military aid and troop build-up in the region – is as precarious, with multiple known negative consequences for the region. While there may be short-term negative consequences from demilitarisation, the overall benefit from a 'human security' perspective will be both immediate and long-term. It thus makes ethical, political and economic sense to undertake strategies of demilitarisation to stabilise the region.
Increasing numbers of Pakistani and Afghan civilian deaths have fuelled anti-American sentiment against what is now popularly understood in South Asia as an American occupation of Afghanistan, and an American war against Pakistanis. In such a situation, the US can best demonstrate its commitment to peace in the region by announcing a plan for the phased withdrawal of US and NATO troops and replacement with UN peacekeeping forces. This will sound counter-intuitive to some; but by removing a major source of recruitment to neo-Taliban and jihadi groups – American authorised bombing of civilians, and the increasing presence and visibility of US troops – popular support for these groups will inevitably erode. When this happens, the Taliban and other groups will use force to extract people's compliance (a process already taking place), and it will be the role of UN peacekeeping forces to help protect the Afghan and Pakistani people from extremist violence.
It will take time to build UN support for such a mission, and as such the US will need to persuade both the UN and the international community as to the positive and primary role it can play in demilitarising the region. The US will also need to transfer the billions it spends on military aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan to the UN, so that the latter, in consultation with national governments in South Asia, can hire peacekeepers from other countries to serve in the region. If the UN Security Council authorises peacekeeping forces, care will have to be taken to ensure that these forces are not seen to be implementing US directives or hidden agendas, but rather working from international commitment and concern. Peacekeeping forces should therefore be selected in consultation with the civilian government and non-governmental organisations within Pakistan and Afghanistan to build a popular mandate.
Most importantly, as President Obama has already indicated, the US will have to demonstrate that it is willing to abide by international law, and be a more humble and cooperative member of the international community. 'American exceptionalism' has resulted in uniquely American quagmires, and it cannot expect the international community to respond to a US appeal for UN peacekeeping forces without a major restatement and reorientation of American goals and identity. Such a restatement of American identity must recognise that the interests of the American people are inseparable from the interests of South Asian (and other) peoples: if peoples elsewhere are injured by the effects of US foreign policy, then the American people are also more vulnerable to attack and injury.
Wicked problems
The idea of 'wicked problems' was first concretely articulated in 1973 by scholars Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber. Since then, the concept has been widely used in planning and design, with recent applications in the field of public policy. Wicked problems are characterised by social complexity, a large number and diversity of players, a high degree of fragmentation, and contested and multiple forms of causality. Different stakeholders in a conflict beset by wicked problems fail to arrive at a common definition of the problem at hand, often because they disagree on the cause of the problem.
Ongoing forms of conflict in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan are characterised by decades of failed US policy, and are classic examples of wicked problems. Consider the assumption that fixing the security situation in South Asia is foundational for the region to address its other pressing problems. Here we might question the claim that extremist violence, rather than poverty and economic underdevelopment, is the primary form of violence and deprivation faced by the people of the region. Each dollar spent on military aid is a dollar not spent on economic development. And spending money on both armaments and economic aid tends to cancel out the effectiveness of the latter, since a highly militarised environment means that development projects and normal forms of employment cannot take place (as is the case in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir). Ongoing militarisation directly and negatively impacts the welfare of women and children, polarises and brutalises society, and perpetuates an ongoing cycle of economic underdevelopment that ultimately feeds recruitment into militant groups.
Meanwhile, in the 'fix the security situation' view, it is 'terrorism' that is the motor driving US foreign policy. But suppose extremism is not only a cause, but also an effect of US policy in the region. Such an understanding would lead us to conclude that if past policy has actually produced or escalated extremist activity, a continuation of this policy, even in the guise of an 'integrated counterinsurgency policy', would only lead to more extremism and deepened conflict.
Wicked problems require holistic analyses that consider the possible effects of changes to other elements in the system, rather than strictly linear forms of problem-solving. The present-focused orientation of US foreign policy leads to a linear and narrow set of objectives that attempt to address a wicked problem as if it were more of a tame problem. For example, the administration's declared objective of sending more troops to Afghanistan to eliminate or destabilise al-Qaeda is too narrowly defined, and fails to take into account that increased US military presence in the region will only escalate and prolong the conflict. In this case, the narrowness of the goal itself stems in part from a misreading of the causes of the conflict, with the result that the policy is doomed to failure. The more Pakistanis and Afghans die from US drone and larger-scale targeted bombings, the more agricultural land and other resources are damaged, the more anti-Americanism will grow, and the more likely it is that al-Qaeda and the Taliban will recruit larger numbers of Afghans and Pakistanis to fight a war against the US. The cycle will only repeat and create more blowback which will again put American citizens at risk.
Wicked problems require that all possible stakeholders in an issue be included in solving the problem. One of the major difficulties of attempting to find solutions to conflicts in South Asia is the failure to identify the peoples of South Asia as major stakeholders in the processes of resolving conflict. The goal of US foreign policy should be to facilitate peace in the region; but this is a complex, wicked problem that cannot be solved primarily, or even partly, through military intervention. Continued militarisation of the region has only created more violence and instability, with devastating consequences for the peoples of South Asia. A US foreign policy in South Asia that fails to build an analysis of blowback into its calculation is unsound foreign policy. While clearly not all of the violence in the region can be linked to the history of US intervention, American foreign policy in South Asia has continued to make the tragic mistake of assuming it understands the problems of the region. All the while, however, it has actively failed to acknowledge its role in creating problems of the region – another classic symptom of a wicked problem.
An alternate regional approach
At its inception, US 'area studies' were a product of the Cold War system, the result of a narrow definition of American interest. However, the continued emergence of such academic focuses over the past three decades points to their heightened value in informing policy considerations. Consider, for example, the redefinition of American interest from anti-communism to anti-terrorism, as reflected in the administrative organisation of regions such that the Near East and South Asia (NESA) division within the National Security Council includes Pakistan and Afghanistan; while India (and China) fall under the Asia division. The rationale for this lies doubly in a form of 'Indian exceptionalism' (as discussed below), which sees India and China primarily as markets to be courted, and South and West Asia as an arc of 'Islamist terrorism' to be combated.
This 'courtship vs combat' framework results in several problems. First, the increasing threat of Hindu nationalism and extremism in India can neither be conceptualised nor addressed. Second, it fails to see that it is decades of failed US policy in South and West Asia that have also sustained and produced these new alignments between groups in these regions. Third, under this framework, the view of these new alignments leads to a conflation of entire groups of Muslims as 'terrorists', where the attempt to distinguish 'good' from 'bad' Muslims through counterinsurgency operations further divides and debilitates Kashmiri, Pakistani, and Afghan societies. And fourth, this framework ignores the fact that the majority of the world's Muslims live in South Asia, and that US foreign policy in the region has been a central (if not the only) factor in their radicalisation.
In opposition to NESA policy debates, it is important to locate Afghanistan in the context of South Asia. This is not only because it is the most recent member of SAARC, but because understanding Afghanistan apart from Central and West Asian studies allows us to see continuities of histories, cultures and religious experience that are resources for peace-building in the South Asian region. Modern South Asia is marked by extensive linguistic, religious and cultural diversity. While the emergence of nationalist movements tends to lead to a reification of bounded identities, social and religious practices throughout contemporary South Asia also defy narrow community, regional or political identities.
Finally, it is important to recognise that there are strong, secular political traditions in South Asia that are linked to socialist, democratic movements. This is not to deny that some communist groups in the region resort to violence. Rather, it is to emphasise that, in the name of the fight against communism, the historical alignment of US foreign policy with religious extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and with military dictatorships in Pakistan and Bangladesh has, over time, led to a weakening of the secular fabric in those countries. Even today, amidst the demise of state socialism, movements for secularism, minority rights and nuclear disarmament are anchored in socialist, democratic and secular frameworks, which provide powerful counterweights to authoritarian and extremist religious tendencies in the region.
Social movements and civil society
As Amartya Sen reminds us, social movements for justice are good for democracy. People's movements for water-resource planning and development communicate between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Feminist movements share information and develop shared political and legal strategies for advancing women's rights in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Gay-rights activists have made recent strides in Nepal and India that are being discussed in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Micro-credit models developed in Bangladesh or Sri Lanka are debated in India, Pakistan and Nepal. Peasant movements from Okara in Pakistan to the Tarai region of India and Nepal seek land rights for those who till it. Right to Information movements have emerged in India and other parts of South Asia to hold local, state and national governments accountable for policy implementation and expenditures. In short, the US needs to develop a regional foreign policy that is attentive to the heritages, languages, cultures and social movements that bring the peoples of South Asia together.
If the US wants to support democracy in South Asia, it should recognise and respect the democratic aspirations of its peoples, and their capacity to effect meaningful change and reform without US military intervention. The lawyers' movement in Pakistan is an example of a mass-based movement that successfully sought to restore the rule of law, and to challenge a deeply undemocratic military government. There is much talk today of Afghanistan and Pakistan being 'failed states'. From a statist or 'security studies' standpoint, these states 'fail' with regard to being unable to contain 'terrorism'. From a people's or 'human security' standpoint, however, they fail because they are unable to provide for the basic needs of their citizens.
In Afghanistan, while there are a number of important sectors for continued institution-building with US support, many express concern about existing areas and forms of institutional expansion in the country. In Pakistan, however, it seems clear that US support for the country's military has historically impeded the growth of democracy. The continued and exclusivist focus on getting the Pakistani government and military to concentrate on counterinsurgency activities buttresses the power of the latter at a time when large sections of Pakistani society are mobilising to re-establish civilian rule of law, after decades of military rule. The lawyers' movement is only the latest instance of a broad-based social movement in Pakistan seeking to constrain the military and to make the government responsive to the needs of all its citizens, including women, workers, and ethnic and religious minorities. The reinstatement of the judiciary in Pakistan was the result of a historic, non-partisan social movement that successfully pressed its demands in a peaceful manner. This form of grassroots democratisation should be acknowledged and supported by cutting US aid to the Pakistani military. The Pakistani military is an unreliable partner to engage in the process of establishing long-term peace in the region, due to its own interests in maintaining ongoing conflict with Afghanistan and India as well as unrest within Pakistan.
South Asian states are often unable to democratically represent their peoples. In such situations, US foreign policy must recognise that, since sovereignty is always vested in the peoples of any country, those peoples have the right to have a say in the decisions that affect them. If the objective of US foreign policy in South Asia is demilitarisation with an eye to bringing peace to the region, then the peoples of Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan also have the right to participate in crafting a sustainable peace process that will best meet their needs over the long run. In Kashmir, for example, the Kashmiri people have never been made partners in a peace process, despite 60-odd years of war, conflict and on-again-off again negotiations between India and Pakistan.
There is an active grassroots India-Pakistan peace movement that deserves recognition and support. Over the past few years, the Indo-Pakistani peace movement has been undertaking limited cultural exchange (hampered by government reluctance), although travel between families split by the border has been facilitated in recent years. Such activities, if stepped up by both governments, will both obviate the need for and defuse the military build-up on the India-Pakistan border. Such cultural and family exchanges across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border need not be seen primarily as transgressive and thereby as threatening and dangerous. Rather, they need to be seen as normal forms of social intercourse and exchange between groups that are split by an arbitrary nation-state boundary. As with the bus routes in Punjab and Kashmir between India and Pakistan, a key element in solving the Kashmir and Afghanistan conflicts may be to work toward decriminalising and normalising border crossings, rather than militarising and hardening the borders.
Beyond Indian exceptionalism
India has made great strides in development in recent years, and has the largest population, the largest economy, and the largest standing army in South Asia. For all these reasons, India feels that it should be seen as distinct from other countries in its neighbourhood. Yet despite its recent economic growth, India still shares much in common with its neighbours with regard to poverty. Indeed, on some poverty indicators, India does worse than other countries in the region.
In terms of rural poverty and the struggle for land rights, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal share much in common. In the latter two countries Maoist insurgencies have grown stronger, resulting in Nepal's recent election of a Maoist government. Large parts of India, in Kashmir and the Northeast, are under military occupation, suggesting structural similarities between Bangladesh's military occupation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and Sri Lanka's longstanding military occupation of Jaffna. The creation of large, externally and internally displaced, traumatised, resource-deprived and thus volatile refugee communities in these areas also creates fertile ground for militant resistance, as it did in Afghanistan. For all these reasons – social, economic and political – the development of a coherent and sustainable US foreign policy in South Asia must locate India as part of a region whose development needs predominate.
US foreign policy, however, continues to exercise a form of Indian exceptionalism, which sees India primarily as a market. This is not to call for any reduction in trade or other forms of economic exchange between the two countries, but the recent US-India nuclear deal and the latest high-profile sale of military equipment to India inevitably contributes to tension on the Indo-Pakistani border and instability in the region. Such deals do not contribute to economic and social development, but occur at the expense of it. Defence spending in India is more than three times as high as the combined expenditure of its central and state governments on health.
Although the new US administration has wisely jettisoned the language of the 'war on terror', much work remains to be done to overcome its legacies. As noted in the last section, the current conceptual framework underlying US foreign policy in South Asia defines US allies according to their focus on 'anti-terrorist' or 'counterinsurgency' activities. In the South Asian context, this means that Hindu nationalists in India are often well-positioned to seize power, riding crests of opportunistic 'anti-terror' populism. It is important to realise that it is ineffective to ask Pakistan to bear down upon extremist organisations in Kashmir without also asking India to prosecute Hindu nationalist organisations as well. Any regional focus on extremism cannot single out Islamist activities as the single cause of terrorist violence in South Asia. In fact, by not aggressively prosecuting Hindu extremists, India has compromised its own judiciary and investigatory apparatus – indeed, its very 'rule of law'.
Ultimately, the primary and intensive focus on 'terrorism' and 'counterinsurgency' is itself a limited and ineffectual strategy. By starting from the ground up and looking at the variety of religious forms of organisation in a historical context, South Asia scholars can learn the dangers of assuming too easily a conflation of 'religious extremism' with political 'terrorism.' The fact that these two things are so readily aggregated in the case of 'Islamist terrorism' and so easily disaggregated in the case of 'Hindu nationalism' begs further analysis.
Undoubtedly, a great deal of planning and strategic analysis is necessary to recalibrate short-term and long-term foreign policy goals for South Asia. Scholars can play a valuable part in this conversation, if the administration were to broaden the mechanisms through which it might consult with them. It is precisely the 'outsider' quality of academia that allows scholars to review the same facts as policymakers, but to provide different questions and points of analysis by which to aid in the generation of new policy frameworks. To this end, Barack Obama's administration might consider setting up focus groups of academics and policymakers to explore new problem-solving and peace-building methods. It could also consider initiating multilateral commissions of scholars assigned to collaboratively study and evaluate longstanding issues or newly emerging problems with joint recommendations for the governments of South Asia and the US.
Future working groups must focus on issues of conflict and development that traverse the region and also affect India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. South Asia is increasingly not delimited by the geographic boundaries that define the eight SAARC member countries, and so requires knowledge of its diaspora populations. This is especially true when we consider 'trans-nationalist' Hindu and transnational Islamic movements with diaspora communities in the US that pose new challenges for social scientists and policymakers. It is unwise to think that politics in India or elsewhere in South Asia can be cordoned off from political processes in the US, or that these politics will not be affected by its diaspora communities.
By New York University Institute of Public Knowledge Working Group