Afghanistan: Too much, too little

Do the Afghan national security forces have the necessary capacity to take over security operations from the international military forces stationed in Afghanistan? It depends on who is asking. In late November, the NATO summit in Lisbon signed off on a 'timetable' for handing over responsibility to Afghan forces in a process expected to begin in the spring of 2011 and be completed by 2014; US troops are expected to start their 'drawdown' in July 2011. While the beginning of the withdrawal does not imply an exodus of the troops, it will see the beginning of gradual reduction – and, more significantly, decreasing participation of the troops in forward operations.

Ahead of and following the Lisbon summit, a broad section of the donor community was at pains to draw attention to security 'gains', linking success to the high 'attrition rate' (ie, the killing of) militants, a narrative designed to show that conditions are being created for the transfer of security responsibility. Missing from this narrative is the high attrition rate within the pro-government civilian and military ranks, too, as the insurgents step up their operations, moving deeper into Afghan villages. Frequent briefings claim the success of large-scale operations, especially in southern Afghanistan, as well as the larger role of Afghan forces who are sometimes credited with taking the 'lead' in some security operations.

The audience for this storyline is not quite clear. Are the spin doctors trying to convince the Afghan population? Their own domestic audiences – or themselves? What is quite clear is who is not buying into the hard sell: a substantive section of the internationals with boots on the ground in Afghanistan, who have relied on international private security firms for their security, and who have been in an uproar since President Hamid Karzai ordered a ban on these companies. President Karzai argued that the presence of the private security firms was undermining the growth of the Afghan forces and challenging their authority, and asked that the international community instead use the Afghan police and army for their security.

While diplomatic missions and international military forces have apparently been exempted from the ban, private aid contractors have threatened to pull out or downsize, insisting that the Afghan forces are unreliable. They have also warned that development would come to a halt throughout the country as a result. What appears to have escaped notice of the NATO member states, insisting that the capacity of the Afghan security forces is now robust enough to take over security duties in some parts of the country, is that their own private development contractors vociferously deny this capability.

Not only have the troop contributing countries not challenged these claims of the private security contractors, but the US has worked hard to meet its contractors' needs through behind-the-scenes diplomacy. The irony is emphasised by the commander of international troops, US General David Petraeus, who has played a key role in trying to work out a compromise on the ban. In Lisbon, it was Gen Petraeus who provided the detailed narrative of the security situation in Afghanistan, spelling out where the Afghan forces can take over responsibility. Apparently, the Afghan security establishment does not have the capacity to spell out its own state of preparedness.

Indeed, demilitarize

Alongside the build-up to the 'transition' is the parallel track on 'reconciliation'. A glut of recent stories in the Western media has made insinuations of a concrete engagement between the Afghan government and insurgent leaders. None of these have involved the grandiose High Peace Council (HPC), set up at the end of September with 70 members. While the HPC has been credited with wide-ranging powers, none of these have been spelled out in detail. This suggests that it will remain a body of ambiguous powers and uncertain merit, giving an impression of wide-ranging consultation with Afghan society while real decisions are taken in closed councils. The HPC has already been criticised widely, given that its membership is dominated by former mujahideen leaders who fought the Soviets, militia commanders and those in the forefront of the fight against the Taliban – hardly the neutral interlocutors who could help negotiations move forward.

The episodic contact with the insurgency does not suggest that even the starting principle of reconciliation has been accepted by the top leadership of the Taliban. On the occasion of Eid-ul-Adha, a statement issued in the name of the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar, spoke of 'misleading rumours of peace talks', adding that claims about 'negotiation, flexibility in the stance of the Islamic Emirate, are mere baseless propaganda'. The message underscored the Taliban's own reconciliation programme for 'those who have left the ranks of the enemy' and who would be offered 'special incentives and acclamations'.

The implacability of the stance of the Taliban, and its threat to kill those reaching out to the government, suggest that there is currently no real ground for a negotiations process to get underway. Further, with President Barack Obama's recent electoral setback, it is likely that the Republicans will play a more dominant role in shaping the US's policy on Afghanistan, and they have made it clear they are opposed to a troop withdrawal. Before President Obama could even take stock of the altered circumstances, President Karzai recently began to call for a reduction of international troops and their military operations.

Such a call for a reduction in the military presence that impacts on the lives of ordinary Afghans would be welcome if it was rooted in a larger political vision for the country. The humanitarian community, for example, had responded to the proposed ban on private security companies by pointing out that it was not using any such security. Not only do the non-profit NGOs and humanitarians not use private security firms, but they also refuse armed protection of any kind as a matter of principle, generally relying on the community they work with to protect them. Their work might actually benefit from any de-militarisation.

However, President Karzai's pronouncements do not suggest that there is any long-term planning for the interests of the country. Simultaneous with his demilitarisation call, the president even found occasion to make claims as to the rigging of the 2009 presidential elections by the US, though there is well-substantiated evidence to show that the bulk of rigging was done by his own henchmen. Such sporadic pot-shots at the international community suggest that Karzai is playing to the national gallery, using populist rhetoric to distract from the very real shortcomings in his own backyard.