The deadly eastward spread

Violent extremism in Pakistan, particularly in the NWFP, has in recent months acquired a dramatic ferocity. An unprecedented number of suicide bombings have taken place across Pakistan, the latest of course being the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December. Whereas the problem used to be seen as confined to Pakistan's tribal areas, this step-up of violence was utilised as a prominent justification for the 3 November declaration of emergency by General Pervez Musharraf. Indeed, the response by the Pakistan Army has been nearly as ferocious. During a single incident on 7 October in the NWFP's Bannu District, military gunships are reported to have killed several hundred civilians, mostly women and children. During the course of November, 728 people were reported killed – including 293 civilians and 94 security personnel – making the month the most deadly for all of Pakistan since 2001. More than half of these casualties took place in Swat District, in the northern reaches of the NWFP.

The increase in violence follows on the heels of a gradual recognition of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as having become the new operational base of both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Following the toppling of the Taliban government in 2001 in Afghanistan, the tribal areas provided a natural gateway to the fleeing Taliban militants, and guaranteed them a safe haven owing to the shared Pashtun ethnicity. The appalling socio-economic conditions in the area; the installation of an Islamist, Taliban-leaning government headed by the Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal in 2002; and a series of peace agreements between pro-Taliban militants and Islamabad (two between South Waziristan and Islamabad in April 2004 and February 2005, and another between North Waziristan and Islamabad in September 2006) – together these factors have facilitated the consolidation of the Taliban in the area. The NWFP has also progressively come under the grip of Islamic militancy of a domestic variety. This process has particularly gained momentum following the July 2007 standoff between the Pakistan Army and radical Islamists that ended in the storming of the Lal Masjid, killing its chief cleric Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi and several others. One of the more visible manifestations of this trend has been the intense fighting, in Swat since late October, between Pakistani security forces and pro-Taliban militants belonging to the militant outfit Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), led by the radical cleric Maulana Fazlullah.

The militancy in Swat has the primary objective of the enforcement of Sharia law, though there are conflicting reports regarding the true support of the local communities for Sharia law. While there appears to be little backing for Fazlullah's violent methods – such as the killing of suspected 'informers' or 'spies' of the Pakistani security forces – with little state infrastructure in the area, the culture of Sharia is already prevalent. The militancy itself seems to be targeted mainly against perceived Western practices, particularly the role of the judiciary for dispensation of justice. Sermons called by Fazlullah continue to draw large crowds, but since the escalation of the conflict in October a large element of fear has also set in.

In a late-November offensive in Swat, the Pakistan Army again unleashed a series of aerial attacks using helicopter gunships, followed by a ground operation. Islamabad deemed the operation successful in regaining control of the occupied territories, though the significance of the conflict – both for Pakistan and the larger Southasian region – remains high. There are two particular factors behind this. First, this violence represents the first all-out combat between pro-Taliban militants and government forces outside of Pakistan's tribal areas. Swat is one of 24 'settled' districts in the NWFP that is administered by the provincial government. While slow Taliban encroachment has been taking place in other settled districts, such as Tank, Bannu and Hangu, the Swat conflict is the first to acquire this level of intensity.

The second factor is what appears to be the growing influence of al-Qaeda in the province. While Maulana Fazlullah has openly described Osama bin Laden and Taliban head Mullah Omar as his "heroes", the impact of these groups on the area is further substantiated by the large-scale presence of foreign fighters in the Swat conflict. As such, despite the fact that the military has regained large parts of the Swat Valley, the last couple of months of conflict symbolise a pressing security concern for Islamabad. While some observers and analysts in India point to other failed extremist agitations in Swat, such as one that took place in 1994, they also acknowledge the growing magnitude of such agitations, of which Lal Masjid is regarded as a turning point.

Eastward spread
New Delhi's reaction to the militant upheaval in Pakistan has been one of anxiety and concern – not only over the spectre of rising militancy in the region, but also over its potential impact on the four-year old Indo-Pakistani peace process. Although the Indian government continues to repeat its public stance of non-interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs, it has simultaneously been closely monitoring the goings-on in the Pakistani tribal areas.

Starting in October, the violence in Swat has led to a large-scale re-deployment of Pakistani troops into the NWFP from the Kashmir frontier. While this has led to a palpable sense of relief within a section of the Indian security establishment, there is nonetheless a dawning realisation of the new security concerns that this represents for India. Holding that the militancy infrastructure in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir is still "very much intact", in mid-November Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor expressed concern about "a spurt in terrorist activities as a fallout of the ongoing turmoil in Pakistan … if there is a strong crackdown on jihadis in Pakistan, one of the options for them could be to head towards India." This worry has led to heightened vigilance being maintained across the Line of Control, with Indian troops having been put on high alert.

The growth of militancy in Swat, as well as further east in Shangla District, represents a distinct eastward spread of religious extremism within Pakistan. It was following the militants' pullout from a 'non-interference' peace agreement in July 2007, that intense fighting erupted in Pakistan's tribal areas. This violence has been particularly high in North Waziristan, but has also broken out in other areas of the FATA, including Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency and South Waziristan, as well as other settled districts. As in Swat, in each of these areas the militants, attempting to ensure the enforcement of Sharia law, are being met with stiff opposition from the Pakistani state.

With the northern part of Swat bordering on Azad Kashmir, New Delhi is increasingly worried about the possibility of a spread of militancy into Gilgit. This, in turn, would appear to pose a substantial threat regarding a subsequent rise of militancy in Kashmir. Some point to recent statistics to suggest that this is already taking place. Despite dramatically lower levels of violence recorded in Jammu & Kashmir throughout the course of 2007 – down by 50 percent over 2006 – during November and December the Indian Army reported stepped-up infiltration attempts across the Line of Control, particular in the Machil sector of Kupwara District, as well as attacks by 'foreign' militants.

Intelligence agencies in J & K have likewise alleged a rise in the presence of militant 'sleeper cells' and foreign mercenaries in northern Kashmir, particularly in the Pir Panjal mountain region. Notably, during a raid on 15 November, the Indian Army claims to have recovered a tank destroyer, with a range of 1200 metres, in the dense Hafruda forest in Handwara-Kupwara. This is said to have been the first 'war weapon' found in J & K during the course of 18 years of insurgency. While some have warned against blowing this lone discovery out of context, it does seem to indicate an increased level of planning on the part of militants in the area. And, with the rising extremism in the NWFP, such a development could indeed be more than mere coincidence.

Emerging configuration
Aside from security apprehensions, the political implications of the growing militancy in Pakistan stand to complicate policymaking for New Delhi. Amidst the step-up in violence in the NWFP, the Indian political establishment has recognised former General Musharraf as a legitimate civilian president, and has expressed confidence in his commitment to the peace process. New Delhi has also voiced its assurance in the new chief of the Pakistan Army, Ashfaq Kayani, who is now leading military operations in Swat. India's National Security Advisor, M K Narayanan, recently referred to Kayani as a "professional soldier", who he believed would "not indulge in an adventurous action against India".

Implicit in such support, of course, is recognition of the fact that the single most important entity in Pakistan remains the army, though this could increasingly be tested by the new 'civilian' administration. For this reason, New Delhi was careful to avoid condemning the Pakistan Army's Lal Masjid operation. Likewise, Indian officials refrained from overtly demanding the restoration of democracy following the imposition of the state of emergency in Pakistan in November.

These are clearly significant boosts from New Delhi for both President Musharraf and the Pakistan Army. The motivation for so doing can be at least partially explained by a turnaround in fortune for the Pakistani military. Long accused of fostering militant operations in Kashmir, and of having close ties with the Taliban, the army is increasingly being targeted by pro-Taliban militants in Pakistan. This follows a dramatic rise in anti-Musharraf sentiment within Pakistan in recent months, emanating from various ranks of society but importantly including the most conservative elements.

Since the Lal Masjid operation, anti-Musharraf sentiments have become a crucial element of the jihad being waged in several areas of the NWFP. Accusing President Musharraf's administration of being un-Islamic, pro-Taliban militants and radical clerics across Pakistan have decreed that all Muslims must begin to wage jihad against Islamabad. All of this lends credence to the opinion within a section of the Indian security establishment that the current phase of Islamic militancy in Pakistan is no longer being guided by the Pakistan Army, as many have maintained was the case in the past.

The rise of resentment against the Pakistan Army, coupled with the continuing centrality of the army within the Pakistani state, together pose a serious dilemma for New Delhi. While South Block, in order to advance the peace process, will be required to continue to engage with President Musharraf as the nominally elected leader of the country, this is likely to amplify the potential threat being faced by India from cross-border Islamist militants. With anti-Musharraf sentiment becoming entrenched in the jihad being waged within Pakistan, an incongruous situation could well emerge where New Delhi's association with the president could evoke a militant reaction within India. This is similar to the threat perception within India from Islamist militants as a reaction to growing ties with the US in general, and with George W Bush in particular.

Ultimately, an assessment of the impact of rising militancy within Pakistan largely depends on Islamabad's counter-militancy policy. This, in turn, depends on the kind of power equations within Pakistan that are likely to emerge if elections throw up a prime minister with authority of the ballot; following which, much will depend on how the president and prime minister coordinate their roles. Between the three new centres of power in Pakistan – a nominally civilian president, the army chief and the prime minister – the shaping of the country's security policy, including its fight against militancy, will inevitably depend on a power configuration that has yet to emerge. Given the discontent in Pakistan against the military regime, will the civilian administration that comes to power gain a greater role in shaping Pakistan's security policy? While the answer to this question remains unclear, it is certain that India will have to chart out its engagement with Pakistan very carefully, particularly on the issue of counter-militancy.

There exists a possibility that the evolving – currently nominal – civilian administration could gain a greater role in shaping security policy. While the army remains, and is likely to remain, the main power centre, the future powers of the civilian administration are largely up in the air, particularly because it is not yet clear how 'civilian' a president Musharraf will be. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the subsequent unrest have only contributed to the flux. One way or another, the eventuality of a more powerful civilian administration is likely to impact the Indo-Pakistani peace process, and particularly the two countries' fight against militancy. As such, while New Delhi has stressed that it will continue with the current bilateral peace process regardless of who comes to power in Islamabad, the reality is that Indian officials can do little more than wait and watch, until Pakistan emerges from this period of uncertainty. 

— Devyani Srivastava is a researcher with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, in Delhi.
 
 

 

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