Three Gorkhali Myths

Like so many other political, economic and cultural processes, the issue of Nepalis in foreign military and pars-military forces is often obscured by multi-layered veils. These veils not only cloud the perceptions of our men in foreign uniform, but also fog the personal and collective values of Nepalis generally. This leads to distorted interpretations of our past and present, and to wrong prescriptions for the future.

The Myth of "Isolationism"

One of the long-standing myths is summarised in the notion of "isolation". Politicians, political scientists, historians and journalists without exception have told us that prior to 1950, we were, as a people, isolated from other peoples. Correspondingly, that the Nepali state practiced isolationism vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The "modern period" of Nepali history is said to begin from the 1950-51 watershed, when there was a "democratic revolution" which, in turn, opened Nepal to the world.

This interpretation of history is patently false. Lying in the zone of transition between the Indic and Sinic civilisations, two of the greatest cultures of world history, Nepal could not have remained isolated in any period of history. Trade, culture, migration, political influence and domination constantly buffetted what is present-day Nepal. The scale and the rate of flow varied temporarily at brief periods, but it always resumed.

During the latter part of the Colonial Era, primarily though not exclusively because of the Gurkhas, Nepal moved into the centre stage of the global military theatre. Demographically, Nepal remained one of the most open (i.e., mobile) populations. Such large-scale mobility necessarily had its corollaries in the political, economic and cultural lives of the Gurkhas and their communities back home. Surely, Nepal's level of global interaction were limited within the spheres of the British Empire. But that was the hallmark of the colonial order. It was a carved-up and buffered world, and none but the colonial masters dared trespass geopolitical, economic and cultural divides.

Why, then, do we continue to propose the "isolationist" historiography which misrepresents the Gurkhas' and Nepal's — history? It is the urge of the modern period to portray the Rana period as one of unmitigated evil, one which kept Nepal "in darkness". It is also the need to extol the political-diplomatic sagacity of the regime to come, under King Mahendra and the Panchayat system in particular, which supposedly introduced Nepal to the world. There are also those among us who believe that the "post-1950 openness" was really due to Jawaharlal Nehru, generous enough to let Nepalis breathe fresh air in the community of nations. Most importantly, the historiographical misrepresentation owes much to the upper caste, upper class. Hindu, Kathmandu-based worldview which, swallowing the English notion of "military castes", regarded the travails of such castes as unfit to enter the history books of Nepal. A historiography which broke away from "pre-1950 isolationism" would, at the very least, place the institution of recruitment at the heart of Nepal's interface with the colonial era and legitimately recognise the Gurkhas' role in Nepal's history.

The Myth of Gurkhas and the 1947 Treaty

The occasional debates in Kathmandu on the issue of the Gurkhas centre around the Tripartite Agreement of 1947, which legalised the "partition" of the Gurkhas between Britain and India. As the argument goes, were it not for the treaty, there would be no Nepalis in foreign uniform. This assumption may hold true as far as recruitment into the British Army is concerned. (Even this is not certain, however, as indicated by the recruitment of Nepalis for the Brunei Guards and Singapore police, both carried out under the aegis of the British Government.)

As far as the recruitment into the Indian military is concerned, the assumption cannot hold true. This is simply because the political foundations of Nepali recruitment into the Indian military is laid by the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. While the 1947 treaty provides the legal basis for recruitment, it would be inoperative in the absence of the 1950 Treaty, which assumes an open border between Nepal and India and goes on to enunciate the "rules of reciprocity" in matters of residence, job entry, property ownership and soon. Such provisions, as long as they hold valid, would substantively nullify any attempt at breaking away from the 1947 treaty. The view that recruitment of Nepalis in the Indian security forces arises out of obligations to the 1947 agreement, thus, is another myth.

The Myth of Gurkhas, Ethnicity and Regionalism

That Gurkha recruitment has a decided ethnic and regional connection has been a subject of much discussion. What is less exhaustively discussed is the internal political implications of recruitment. This lack of debate and knowledge can largely be attributed to the myth that recruitment is, as far as internal Nepali politics is concerned, quite neutral.

The recent national election results, however, indicate that recruitment may not., after all, be politically neutral, It appears that one of the many causes underlying the east-west electoral divide may have been related to recruitment. As is well known, West Nepal has 'historically been the heartland of recruitment. Can one, then, surmise that the decided electoral dominance of the Nepali Congress Party (which is widely perceived to favour continuation of recruitment and which is also regarded as favouring a closer-than-friendly relation with the Indian state) may partially be linked to the institution of recruitment?

To the extent that such a link has been operative, the question as to whose interests the certain Pratinidhi Sabha representatives would be serving during their tenure would have to remain open. Would they be defending the recruiters? The recruits? Or the larger interests of the Nepali State?

Mishra teaches sociology at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu.